Is anybody really in charge in Aceh?<\/p>\n
Saiful Mahdi, Banda Aceh<\/p>\n
Preliminary survey results by Unifem (United Nations
\nDevelopment Fund for Women) involving around 6,500 Acehnese
\nwomen, survivors of the tsunami, indicated that almost 70 percent
\nof them make decisions on their own. Important decisions the
\nsurvivors make range from simple daily choices, to livelihood
\noptions, to whether they want to return to their original
\nvillages, relocate, or stay in temporary shelters.<\/p>\n
The remarkably high percentage has at least two
\ninterpretations. One might infer that Acehnese tsunami survivors,
\nespecially women, are very independent and self-resilient. They
\ndo not wait for the government to come along and tell them what
\nto do. They also do not make decisions based on input from NGOs
\nor UN agencies. Indeed, many who have been to Aceh's tsunami-
\naffected areas have witnessed a rise in people's independence and
\nresilience since the emergency period.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, one can critically ask: Why do the
\nsurvivors have to make most, if not all, decisions on their own?
\nWhere is the government? Where are the policymakers? Who is, and
\nwho should be, in charge of leading the rehabilitation and
\nreconstruction of Aceh? Is the Aceh Rehabilitation and
\nReconstruction Agency (BRR) in charge? Or is it the \"local
\ngovernment\"? And who exactly is the local government?<\/p>\n
It has been reported that many government offices did not
\nfunction normally in many areas in Aceh during the conflict
\nperiod, and also during the emergency period in the aftermath
\nof the Dec. 24, 2004 earthquake and tsunami.<\/p>\n
The problem with government in Aceh is not even a question of
\nsmall or big government. It is a more basic question of whether
\npeople can really feel the presence -- other than the military --
\nof the government, and how much it supports this devastated
\nsociety.<\/p>\n
When the earthquake and tsunami happened, Aceh was still under
\na state of civil emergency. Amidst the great need for clear
\ncoordination and leadership to cope with a challenging
\nhumanitarian situation, Aceh witnessed a vacuum of local
\nleadership on the one hand, and on the other, an ad-hoc,
\nsometimes mutually exclusive, emergency response from the
\nnational authorities, international agencies and NGOs.<\/p>\n
Based on the civil emergency status, it was the Aceh Police
\nchief who was the highest-ranking local government official in
\nAceh. Despite the governor being in jail for corruption, the
\nlocal civilian government, of which vice governor was the highest
\nranked official, was officially there too.<\/p>\n
The military commanders, who gave up their official power role
\nas martial law authorities in November 2005, are still very much
\nactive. Worst of all, there are the chronic overlapping
\nresponsibilities between the local government apparatus, the
\npolice and military, and central government instrumentalities,
\nincluding the Finance Ministry, Immigration Office, the State
\nSecretariat, Foreign Affairs Ministry, and even intelligence
\nagencies -- to name just a few.<\/p>\n
All are only concerned with protecting their bureaucratic
\nturf, and have almost no concept of working together in the
\ninterests of the people of Aceh much less the nation as a whole.
\nOnly with strong, credible leadership from within Aceh itself can
\nthere be any hope of whipping this bureaucratic malaise into
\nshape.<\/p>\n
One might argue that ACeh was confronted with an emergency
\nsituation that no-one had ever been exposed to. The leadership
\nfailure and vacuum in Aceh, however, can be traced back to the
\nconflict. Local leadership, be it formal or informal, was
\neffectively put into dormancy -- allegedly on purpose -- by the
\nwarring parties in Aceh. The politics of antagonism -- \"you are
\nwith us, or with the enemy\" -- has destroyed once-vibrant local
\nleadership.<\/p>\n
Weak leadership and unclear authority continue to slow down
\nthe rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Aceh.<\/p>\n
There was a glimpse of hope when the BRR was installed in Aceh
\nin March 2005. And Kuntoro Mangkubroto was right to ask for
\nministerial-level authority for his position as the director of
\nBRR. He was applauded for his quick and decisive moves to be on
\nthe survivors side of the rehabilitation and reconstruction
\nefforts. He let the people choose whether they wanted to return
\nto their villages or not. He fast-tracked approval of all the
\nprojects from national and international agencies.<\/p>\n
Kuntoro, however, was challenged in various ways by Jakarta's
\ntechnical ministries and legislatures. He reportedly had to go
\nback and forth in order to convince the House of Representatives
\n(DPR) to disburse the allocated tsunami budget accordingly.<\/p>\n
BRR did not receive any funds until June 2005, when the House
\napproved the disbursement, and some donor countries realized part
\nof their pledges following the positive results of the Helsinki
\ntalks.<\/p>\n
The peace deal between the Indonesian government and the Free
\nAceh Movement (GAM) signed on Aug. 15, 2005, in Helsinki has of
\ncourse brought optimism to the Acehnese. One of the points of
\nagreement was that GAM could place members to oversee the
\nrehabilitation and reconstruction process. And yet, somehow, this
\nseems to have slowed down Kuntoro and his team.<\/p>\n
Kuntoro was in a supposedly strong position as the director of
\nBRR; a ministerial-level position. However, he does not have
\nenough authority and machinery to direct all the rehabilitation
\nand reconstruction processes. It is said that the BRR is a
\ncoordinating agency, not an implementing actor.<\/p>\n
Another problem that needs immediate clarification is the
\nrelationship between BRR and the local government of Aceh,
\nespecially after the forthcoming direct elections.<\/p>\n
Clear and decisive government is critical after the Helsinki
\npeace accord. The presence of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
\nhas been significant in maintaining the peace in Aceh.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, an Aceh Governance Bill (UUPA) is being drafted.
\nThe bill, expected to be decreed by Jakarta in April 2006 at the
\nlatest, will spell out, among other things, direct elections for
\nthe governor, mayors and regents.<\/p>\n
Unless a popular leadership is elected directly and
\ndemocratically at the earliest possible time, Aceh will always
\nhave ambiguous leadership. UN agencies, national, private and
\ninternational institutions will then have to continue struggling
\nto find and choose their counterparts for better coordination in
\nthe reconstruction of Aceh.<\/p>\n
The writer is the coordinator of The Aceh Institute, and is a
\nPh.D student in planning at Cornell University in the U.S. He
\ncan be reached at saiful.mahdi@acehinstitute.org.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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