Iran's revolution, 20 years after<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on the Iranian revolution by
\nSidhesh Kaul, a commentator on regional economic and political
\nissues based in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Feb. 11, 1979 was the day when the Iranian
\narmy's Supreme Council, after two days of bloody clashes between
\ngovernment troops and pro-Khomeini demonstrators, declared
\nneutrality in the crisis and ordered the troops back to the
\nbarracks.<\/p>\n
The Bakhtiar government fell and the revolution led by the
\nfrail, 76-year-old cleric from Qom, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
\nemerged triumphant.<\/p>\n
From 1956 to 1961 continuous discontent and sporadic strikes
\nled to the \"White Revolution\", a series of economic and social
\nreforms.<\/p>\n
The \"White Revolution\" had a hidden agenda as well -- it was
\npartly designed to reduce Islamic influence in society -- a fact
\ndeeply resented by the Ayatollah and the deeply religious
\nIranians at large.<\/p>\n
The \"White Revolution\" also had land reform on the agenda,
\ncarried out in three stages until 1971, though these strengthened
\nthe landowners as an important pillar of the regime.<\/p>\n
Yet economic growth and income disparity remained skewed.
\nHence, despite promises of fundamental reforms, the first large
\nscale protests erupted in 1963 against the Shah's government.<\/p>\n
The Shah reacted imperiously with increasingly brutal
\nmeasures. His reckless modernization campaign, focussed on the
\npurging of \"decadent Islamic traditions\" and his disdain for
\nreligious and cultural sensitivities, further alienated his
\nregime.<\/p>\n
Foreign policy also began to lean more towards the United
\nStates even whilst undercutting the Friendship Treaty with the
\nerstwhile Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
By the mid-1970s, over 50,000 tortured and maltreated
\nopponents of the regime languished in state prisons. The fettered
\nresentment reached volcanic proportions by the mid 1970s. Popular
\nprotests and strikes reached such heights in early 1979 that the
\nShah was forced into exile, leaving the country in the hands of a
\ncaretaker government led by the Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar.<\/p>\n
The Ayatollah, in exile since 1963 when he denounced the Shah in
\na scathing speech at Qom as the \"miserable wretch who violated
\nhis oath to defend Islam\", then seized the opportunity to return
\ntriumphantly to Iran.<\/p>\n
The theologists from Qom had won. They had won legitimacy to
\nestablish an Islamic theocracy in response to the Shah's alien
\nwestern-style regime.<\/p>\n
Iran now remains the world's only modern theocracy and the
\nrevolution continues in more ways than one. It is a bundle of
\ncontradictions as it experiments with greater freedoms, on
\npopular impetus, within a theocratic framework.<\/p>\n
Iran's revolution and its aftermath is a stark reminder for
\nthose who chose to ignore the importance of cultural factors as a
\nparameter of national stability, as well as a warning to those
\nwho hold the view that revolution is the only way to reform.<\/p>\n
Almost two decades have passed since the Iranian Revolution
\nand it is time to take stock.<\/p>\n
Some scholars argue that it would not be entirely correct to
\nanalyse the revolution in a purely religious framework or to
\nlabel it as merely an \"Islamic Revolution\", as they tend to
\nobscure other important reasons behind the movement.<\/p>\n
The underlying socio-economic factors, the Shah's skewed
\npolicies and his almost blind obsession with programs oriented
\ntowards western-style growth models at the expense of socio-
\ncultural sensitivities, contributed heavily to the revolution's
\nmomentum.<\/p>\n
The ayatollahs and mullahs, who the Shah often referred to as
\n\"religious fanatics\", merely served to funnel the popular
\nupsurge. But to undervalue the role that Islam played in the
\nrevolution is to oversimplify the analysis.<\/p>\n
Iran's population is predominantly Shiite and Iranians are
\nsometimes referred to as the \"Twelvers\" because they venerate the
\n12 descendants of the Prophet Muhammad as the rightful spiritual
\nheirs or \"imams\".<\/p>\n
The first Imam was Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet
\nMuhammad. His claim to the caliphate of the Arab empire was
\nusurped when he was assassinated by Uthman, a Sunni Muslim, of
\nthe Umayyad clan in the mid-seventh century, thus laying the
\nfoundations of the continuing deep schism between Sunni and
\nShiite Islam.<\/p>\n
Ali's death is mourned by Shiites the world over as an
\nappalling catastrophe, but even more significant is the killing
\nof the Third Imam Hussein by the Umayyads.<\/p>\n
Some scholars see Hussein's death as a redeeming sacrifice
\nsimilar to Christ's crucifixion. Ashura, the day Hussein achieved
\nmartyrdom, is an important day for Shiites and the devout
\npassionately mourn his death.<\/p>\n
But the dramatization of the Hussein story has a more explicit
\npolitical resonance than the Christian Easter. Imam Hussein's
\nmartyrdom symbolizes the wickedness of corrupt governments and
\nthe flourishing of evil since the golden age of the prophet. This
\nbelief is deeply embedded in the collective psyche of
\npredominantly Shiite Iran.<\/p>\n
The 12th Imam was Muhammad al Muntazar who is believed not to
\nhave died but to have disappeared. He has thus earned the title
\nof the \"Hidden Imam\" who, belief has it, would return as the
\nMahdi (Messiah) to rid earth of oppression and tyranny and fill
\nit with equity and justice.<\/p>\n
It is then not difficult to believe that rising up against
\ntyranny and oppression was an essential characteristic of the
\nguts and sinews of Iran, and the gatherings at Ashura were the
\nstarting points for the revolution.<\/p>\n
Iranian national consciousness is deeply wedded to Shiite
\nIslam and when the masses perceived a threat to the nation's
\nintegrity symbolized by the Shah's injustice and oppression,
\npolitical protest in religious terms was imminent.<\/p>\n
Ayatollah Khomeini was able to harness this energy and garner
\nsupport from all quarters of Iranian society.<\/p>\n
The Ayatollah was a shrewd politician -- he carefully avoided
\ndirect criticism of the Left to avoid alienating the vast
\nexploited working class, secular minded intellectuals and the
\npopular Marxist guerrillas or Fedayeen, and argued for the
\nrestoration of the 1906 constitution right up to the time he came
\nto power.<\/p>\n
He was the right man at the right time. He was always referred
\nto as \"Imam Khomeini\" and although it would have been blasphemous
\nto draw a connection with the \"Hidden Twelfth Imam\" or \"Mahdi\",
\nthe title certainly gave him additional legitimacy and authority
\namong the Shiite Iran.<\/p>\n
Khomeini played up to the messianic expectations of the
\nIranians to the hilt.<\/p>",
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