When a war ends, the world usually rushes to find a winner. But in\nthe US-Iran war that lasted from 28 February to 19 June 2026, there was\na hasty consensus: no one won, everyone lost. That statement sounds\nwise. It sounds neutral. And it is almost always wrong.<\/p>\n
War does not always produce equal destruction. There are parties that\nemerge from the battlefield in a stronger position than when they\nentered. In this war, that party is Iran. Not an Iran triumphant with\nmilitary parades in the streets of Tehran. Not an Iran burning enemy\nflags while cheering. But an Iran that, quietly and measurably, managed\nto hold onto everything that was meant to be taken from it, and then\nreturned to the negotiating table in a position even stronger than\nbefore the first shot was fired.<\/p>\n
Recall the original objectives of the US and Israeli military\noperation launched on 28 February 2026: destroy Iran\u2019s missile capacity,\ncripple its nuclear programme, and, most ambitiously, topple the Islamic\nRepublic regime. Trump even stated explicitly that only Iran\u2019s\nunconditional surrender would be acceptable. Three months later, not a\nsingle one of those three objectives had been achieved.<\/p>\n
Iran\u2019s nuclear programme? Under the Islamabad Memorandum of\nUnderstanding signed on 17 June 2026, Iran was merely asked to maintain\nthe status quo of its nuclear programme, not dismantle it, not\npermanently halt it. The nuclear issue was deferred to further\nnegotiations, with no guarantee of any outcome. Trump himself admitted\nthat in the Islamabad talks, almost all points were agreed upon, except\nthe nuclear issue, and Iran did not budge an inch on it. A country that\nwas initially ultimatumed to surrender unconditionally now sits at the\nnegotiating table with its nuclear cards still full in hand.<\/p>\n
Iran\u2019s missiles? They remain. Trump even surprisingly defended Iran\u2019s\nright to retain some of its ballistic missiles, citing the principle of\nequality among nations. This was a concession unimaginable at the start\nof the war, when the total destruction of Iran\u2019s arsenal served as the\nmoral justification for the most massive air strikes in the Middle East\nin a decade.<\/p>\n
The Iranian regime? It has hardened and sharpened. The death of\nKhamenei, which Washington had hoped would be the tipping point for the\ncollapse of power, instead triggered lightning-fast domestic\nconsolidation. Khamenei\u2019s son was appointed as his successor. An\nexternal enemy, as history repeatedly shows, became the most powerful\nand cheapest glue for nationalism. External attack did not erode the\nregime\u2019s legitimacy; it renewed its contract with the people. A regime\nbesieged from outside rarely collapses from within. History proves this\nover and over, from Cuba to North Korea.<\/p>\n
More decisive is who Iran faced. Not one country. Iran faced the\nUnited States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and\nKuwait, a coalition that militarily and economically far surpassed\nIran\u2019s capacity. For nearly four months, Iran did not just survive; it\nretaliated. US bases in the Gulf region were struck. The Strait of\nHormuz, the world\u2019s energy artery, was closed, shaking global markets.\nHezbollah, the Houthis, and the Axis of Resistance network moved with a\ncoordination that exceeded Western intelligence estimates. Iran fought\nin a manner suited to its capacity: asymmetric, dispersed, and\nexhausting a far larger opponent. In asymmetric warfare doctrine,\nsurvival is a form of victory, and Iran survived longer than anyone\nanticipated. Most importantly, it was not Iran that came first to\nrequest a ceasefire.<\/p>\n
Herein lies the uncomfortable paradox of victory. Wikipedia has\nalready recorded in its entry for this war: Result: Iranian victory\n(disputed). The word disputed is there not because the outcome on the\nground is unclear, but because some parties refuse to acknowledge it on\npaper. In international politics, recognition is a matter of narrative,\nnot fact. And Iran is clever enough not to need that recognition,\nbecause the substance is already in its hands.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia, this conclusion is not about sympathy or antipathy\ntowards Iran. It is about reading global shifts clearly. If a country\nwith an economy crippled by years of sanctions, losing its supreme\nleader in the middle of a war, and facing the world\u2019s strongest military\ncoalition, can still successfully preserve its nuclear programme, its\narsenal, and its regime, then something fundamental has changed in how\ngreat powers impose their will. Maximum pressure no longer guarantees\nmaximum compliance. Hegemony no longer works in the old way.<\/p>\n
For Indonesian diplomacy, which upholds the principle of being free\nand active, understanding this shift is not a choice. It is the starting\npoint for any foreign policy that wishes to remain relevant in a world\nthat is changing shape. The world after this war is not the same as the\nworld before it. In this war, there is no winner in a heroic and clean\nsense. But there is one party that emerged from the ruins with more than\nit brought in. And that party\u2019s name is Iran.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/iran-emerges-as-strategic-victor-in-us-iran-war-1782204810", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }