{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1337831,
        "msgid": "investment-in-indonesia-what-is-holding-back-recovery-1447893297",
        "date": "2003-02-22 00:00:00",
        "title": "Investment in Indonesia: What is holding back recovery?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Investment in Indonesia: What is holding back recovery? David Jay Green Country Director Asian Development Bank Jakarta dgreen@adb.org Indonesia is having tremendous difficulties convincing investors, either foreign or Indonesian, to commit their funds for the long-term. A host of problems, ranging from political uncertainty and insecurity to a still weak banking sector discourage people from building new plants and buying new equipment.",
        "content": "<p>Investment in Indonesia: What is holding back recovery?<\/p>\n<p>David Jay Green<br>\nCountry Director<br>\nAsian Development Bank<br>\nJakarta<br>\ndgreen@adb.org<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia is having tremendous difficulties convincing <br>\ninvestors, either foreign or Indonesian, to commit their funds <br>\nfor the long-term. A host of problems, ranging from political <br>\nuncertainty and insecurity to a still weak banking sector <br>\ndiscourage people from building new plants and buying new <br>\nequipment. Some change is occurring -- a messy process of reform <br>\nis producing some progress that, if sustained, could lure <br>\ninvestors back to this huge, sprawling country.<\/p>\n<p>Most adult Indonesians grew up in an economy very different <br>\nfrom the one they face today. Most importantly, they were <br>\naccustomed to an economy that grew substantially each year. There <br>\nwere difficult periods, but for decades average gross domestic <br>\nproduct and average income rose, and the incidence of poverty <br>\nfell. For most Indonesians, this world came to an end in 1997 <br>\nwith the East Asian Financial Crisis.<\/p>\n<p>True, the Indonesian economy is still growing about 3 percent-<br>\n4 percent each year and that is better than in many countries. <br>\nBut it isn't like the old days. Importantly, it won't rescue many <br>\nfamilies from poverty. At 3-4 percent growth, with the population <br>\ngrowing 1-2 percent each year, average incomes are rising only 1-<br>\n3 percent annually. This is better than nothing, but not always <br>\nnoticeable in a country where much of the population lives so <br>\nclose to the poverty line that illness or bad weather can push <br>\nthem under.<\/p>\n<p>One reason growth is sluggish is that investment is running <br>\nfar below levels in the mid-1990s. From 1988 to 1997 investment <br>\ngrew 168 percent, helping GDP nearly double. In 2002, while GDP <br>\nhad recovered to within 2 percent of its 1997 peak, real <br>\ninvestment was nearly one-third below the 1997 value. While one <br>\nshould not be overly nostalgic for the late 1990s -- growth then <br>\nhad many of the characteristics of an unsustainable speculative <br>\ninvestment bubble. However, current purchases of new business <br>\nequipment and the building of new plants by private or state-<br>\nowned firms are too small to generate income, jobs, or higher <br>\ngrowth.<\/p>\n<p>Why are investors so cautious? Three broad sets of problems <br>\nare hindering commitments by local and foreign investors: <br>\nConcerns over peace and security, weak banking and financial <br>\nsectors, and the cost of poor governance -- especially <br>\ncorruption.<\/p>\n<p>First, there are the headline grabbing problems of peace and <br>\nsecurity. The financial crisis in Indonesia was not just a period <br>\nof economic difficulties. The crisis was a trigger for wide-<br>\nranging political changes that moved to reverse decades of <br>\nauthoritarian rule. Understandably these changes are not smooth. <br>\nThe recent terrorist attacks in Bali have heightened the <br>\ninternational impression that personal security is an issue in <br>\nIndonesia and have surely discouraged foreign business interests <br>\nin the country. But security is not just an issue for foreigners. <br>\nLong-running conflicts in Aceh, the Moluccas, and other areas <br>\nhave kept Indonesians from making long-term investments in their <br>\nown country.<\/p>\n<p>The second set of problems rests in the weak banking and <br>\nfinancial sectors. The financial crisis was partly a failure of <br>\nthe banking system to operate on commercial principles. Before <br>\n1997, investment in Indonesia was typically financed by bank <br>\nloans -- often supplied by institutions that were little more <br>\nthan captives to larger industrial groups. The decision to loan <br>\nwas often made on the basis of non-economic considerations, <br>\nsometimes simply on the assumption that politically well-<br>\nconnected investors or contractors would not lose money.<\/p>\n<p>But now firms that blithely bought into projects touted for <br>\ntheir political connectivity are looking for robust returns and <br>\nexamining project-related risk. This new environment requires a <br>\nstrong financial system. But in Indonesia the banking system is <br>\nstill quite weak. Rescue efforts effectively nationalized the <br>\nmajor part of the banking sector. Fragile balance sheets continue <br>\nto discourage aggressive loan expansion.<\/p>\n<p>The third obstacle blocking investment is a new appreciation <br>\nof the costs of poor governance, especially corruption and <br>\nweaknesses in the legal and judicial system. International <br>\nsurveys rank Indonesia as facing one of the world's most severe <br>\ncorruption problems. Any reader of this newspaper has seen <br>\nstories of judicial shakedowns in Indonesia and anyone currently <br>\noperating in the country knows how difficult it is to avoid <br>\ncompromising oneself to get things done. Though often discussed <br>\npurely in moral terms, corruption in Indonesia is systemic, <br>\nreflecting problems with courts and the police and the need for <br>\ncivil service reform.<\/p>\n<p>Before the crisis it was common to excuse corruption and <br>\nassociated problems as a cost of business, one that bought the <br>\naccess to power and privilege that ensured success. But there has <br>\nbeen a reassessment. Across East Asia, especially in those <br>\neconomies hit by the crisis, investment has held up better where <br>\ncorruption is not seen as a massive problem. Corruption now <br>\nappears to be one of the more serious barriers to business <br>\noperations, particularly new businesses.<\/p>\n<p>All these problems require solutions. Restoring business <br>\nconfidence is likely to be a long-term process. But business <br>\nshould not disregard the real progress being made in Indonesia. <br>\nThe government has had signal success in bringing down inflation, <br>\nstabilizing the currency, meeting budget targets, and curbing the <br>\nimpact of the large public sector debt that is a legacy of the <br>\ncrisis. Without these efforts, the economy would still be in <br>\nrecession.<\/p>\n<p>Improving security, strengthening the financial system, <br>\ncleaning up the courts, revamping the police forces, and reducing <br>\nthe perception of corruption will take years. In each area <br>\nefforts are under way that can contribute to longer-term <br>\nprogress. There has been a recent peace accord in Aceh and banks <br>\nare being privatized. Anti-money laundering legislation was <br>\npassed. If these efforts can continue, if some dent can be made <br>\nin the perception that corruption is pervasive, then we will see <br>\npeople again willing to commit their funds to Indonesia's future.<\/p>\n<p>The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not <br>\nnecessarily represent those of the ADB.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/investment-in-indonesia-what-is-holding-back-recovery-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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