INTEL: Examining RI's intelligence services<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
INTEL: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service
\nKen Conboy, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2004
\n253 pp<\/p>\n
Any book offering a new perspective and information on its
\nsubject is always interesting, and even more so when it discusses
\nthe activities of an intelligence agency, usually closed to the
\ngeneral public.<\/p>\n
It inevitably draws people's attention, leaving them
\nanticipating the chance to learn a bit more about the cloak-and-
\ndagger activities of spies and secret agents.<\/p>\n
That is part of the attraction of this work by Ken Conboy, who
\npreviously authored a book on the Army's Special Forces
\n(Kopassus), and it does turn out to be an intriguing read.<\/p>\n
Written in a non-scholarly, layperson-friendly style, the book
\nreveals the wide range of activities of Indonesia's state
\nintelligence agency, under its changing names, from BPI to KIN,
\nBakin, LIN and BIN today, and the \"revolving door\" of its
\nofficials and leadership.<\/p>\n
Conboy provides a chronological detailing of the history and
\nmajor events in the intelligence service, from the establishment
\nof the agency, its development and covert activities, and the
\nmany reorganizations.<\/p>\n
There is more interesting information, including \"side\"
\nactivities not directly related to state espionage, such as the
\nrescue of a son of a pharmaceutical company tycoon and the
\ninvestigation into the currency counterfeiting activities in the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
The book also reveals the rivalry between the institution, at
\nthat time called Bakin, and the military's intelligence body,
\nBais, especially during the leadership of Leonardus Benjamin
\n\"Benny\" Moerdani in the Indonesian military.<\/p>\n
All of this makes for captivating reading, but the book fails
\nto identify the grand strategy of state intelligence, especially
\nduring the turbulent Soeharto presidency, and crucially lacks
\nfirst-hand accounts from the two prominent intelligence chiefs,
\nYoga Sugama and Leonardus Benjamin \"Benny\" Moerdani, from the
\n1980s.<\/p>\n
Conboy did secure information about the two figures'
\nleadership from books on them, media reports, through Bakin's
\ncase files and interviews with their subordinates; it's an
\nadmirable effort in itself but not quite the same as sitting down
\nfor one-on-one interviews.<\/p>\n
It would have been a tall order anyway: An intelligence
\nofficial to the core, Yoga has never swayed from a refusal to
\ndiscuss the agency's activities, while Benny is ailing (and would
\nbe unlikely to open up anyway).<\/p>\n
The book reveals the involvement of the state intelligence
\nagency in monitoring and bugging the North Vietnam Embassy and
\nthe information office of the communist National Liberation Front
\n(NLF) of South Vietnam in Jakarta in the early 1970s, securing
\ninformation which was of particular interest to Washington.<\/p>\n
Other controversial involvements were of Bakin's Special
\nOperation (Opsus) Unit's surveillance activities in Cambodia's
\ninternal political affairs, as well as on the embassies of the
\nNorth Korea, Cuba, China and the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
Similar activities were directed at embassies and
\nrepresentative offices of Arab countries, especially in the wake
\nof increasing international terrorism.<\/p>\n
Although the lack of transitions between the subjects is
\njarring, Conboy's work is an interesting read as it complements
\nthe limited information about BIN, especially regarding foreign
\nintelligence bodies and foreign agents. The author's previous
\nposition as deputy director at the Asian Studies Center, an
\ninfluential Washington-based think tank on South Asia and
\nSoutheast Asia, helps him fill the \"missing links\" of the local
\nintelligence agency's reports.<\/p>\n
The development of the state intelligence body has been
\ninextricably shaped by the involvement of the Central
\nIntelligence Agency (CIA), whose instructors declared Indonesia's
\nintelligence agents in 1980 as the most capable they had tutored
\nin the past half decade; Israel's Mossad; and Britain's MI6.<\/p>\n
The growth of the state intelligence body also could not be
\nseparated from the fight against communism during the Cold War
\nyears because, according to Western intelligence reports,
\nIndonesia was a \"fertile breeding ground\" for the ideology.<\/p>\n
In reading the passages about the 1950s and 1960s, it must be
\nremembered that there were two opposing Indonesian institutions
\n-- now defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the military
\n-- that won the praise of many political and military analysts
\nbecause of the strong discipline of their members and their
\norganizations' good management.<\/p>\n
Still, it's important for all readers to bear in mind that any
\ndivulged information -- reports, news, etc. -- is still part of
\nintelligence activities, and it's always difficult to tell what
\nis the truth from carefully constructed misinformation. Failure
\nto use a fair dose of skepticism in reading some of the accounts
\nmay end up with us accepting a grand ruse.<\/p>",
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