Integration, no; Major power rivalry, yes<\/p>\n
Eric Teo Chu Cheow, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) will be held in Kuala
\nLumpur on Dec. 14 under Malaysian Chairmanship, organized in
\nconcurrence with the ASEAN and \"ASEAN+3\" Summits. But its odds
\nare probably greater in geo-strategic and political than pure
\neconomic and trade terms.<\/p>\n
First, big Asian powers have their own agenda, with the latest
\nthinking in Beijing of perhaps \"downplaying\" it in favor of the
\nexisting \"ASEAN+3\" or \"10+3\".<\/p>\n
Second, and consequently, the \"numbers\" game has begun for the
\nEAS, between \"ASEAN+3+3\" and \"ASEAN+6\", as India battles
\ntenaciously for the second formula, with Japanese
\n\"acknowledgement\".<\/p>\n
More importantly, it could prove to be decisive for Japan and
\nChina in their future role and leadership in East Asia, just as
\nsmaller Asian nations fear of being caught between them in their
\nincreasing rivalry within the region.<\/p>\n
But where does its future of Asia (integrated or not) really
\nlie in geo-strategic, economic and psychological terms, with
\nWashington's shadow looming behind?<\/p>\n
Symbolically, Malaysia has been lobbying hard for the EAS as a
\nfruition of the idea of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
\nMohammed, who had mooted an East Asia Economic Caucus or Grouping
\n(EAEC\/EAEG) in the early 1990s to \"bring Asians together\". But
\nthe situations then and now widely differ.<\/p>\n
Some Chinese scholars have in fact recently mooted the idea of
\nthe EAS as a sort of an \"Asian coordinating group\" for APEC (just
\nas the existing \"ASEAN+3\" grew from the necessity for Asians to
\ncoordinate their positions in the face of the EU at ASEM); but it
\nhas one fundamental problem --- India is not a member of APEC and
\nwould need to join APEC for this logic to work! Understandably,
\nBeijing may be seeking to assuage American concerns of being left
\nout from the EAS (as expounded by a senior Chinese official
\nrecently), as well as to probably \"downplay\" this event, so as to
\nconsolidate its own influence within existing \"ASEAN+3\"
\nmechanisms. Big power politics may already be at play behind the
\nEAS before its effective launch!<\/p>\n
Two geo-political factors have already influenced the final
\nASEAN choice of participants to the EAS, which should stand at
\nsixteen when launched.<\/p>\n
First, the United States will be absent, unlike the recent
\nAPEC Summit in South Korea, and is taking a wait-and-see attitude
\non the EAS; hence there is a real \"need\" to cater for its \"non-
\nparticipation\" in this \"pure Asian grouping\", which is on the
\nminds of many Asians.<\/p>\n
Second, the rapid rise of India in the past few years has made
\nit necessary for ASEAN to bring India into the mainstream of
\nAsian regional integration, even as a counter-balance to China,
\nas some smaller Asian nations would bashfully admit.<\/p>\n
Bearing in mind these two trends, ASEAN Foreign Ministers in a
\nretreat in Cebu, Philippines in May, agreed on three criteria for
\nmembership to the EAS \"club\". Firstly, they must be dialogue
\npartners of ASEAN; secondly, they must have substantial economic
\nlinkages with the region, and lastly, they must sign the ASEAN
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), before being admitted to
\nthe EAS.<\/p>\n
China, Japan and South Korea automatically qualify; India
\nqualified too, when it signed the TAC. But it was only after
\ncareful consideration and negotiations that Australia and New
\nZealand agreed to sign the TAC (because of Canberra's special
\nmilitary alliance with the United States); the last two countries
\nwere probably included in the EAS as a \"strategic assurance\" to
\nWashington, viz to allay the latter's concerns that the EAS would
\nnot be in any way against American fundamental interests within
\nthe region, as was initially feared.<\/p>\n
But although the EAS' orientation appears to be logically
\ntilted towards economic cooperation (given the present
\ndifficulties of bridging serious and fundamental political
\ncontentions, especially between Beijing and Tokyo), some
\nobservers wonder if the EAS could perhaps \"mesh\" into APEC's
\nagenda, as informally put forward by some Chinese analysts; this
\nwould also have the added advantage of balancing Washington with
\nthe two Asian feuding giants, as well as India.<\/p>\n
Socio-economic issues should thus naturally form the crux of
\nthe EAS agenda (for geo-political reasons!), whether in symbiosis
\nwith APEC or not.<\/p>\n
Many observers had in fact thought that the EAS could envision
\na sort of pan-Asian Free Trade Area (FTA), a precursor of an
\nAsian Economic Community, whilst others have mooted the
\npossibility of building first an Asian Energy Community, along
\nthe lines of the European Coal and Steel Community (amongst its
\ninitial six members) in the 1950s.<\/p>\n
Energy cooperation would certainly be high on the agenda, as
\nAsian countries, ranging from China and Japan to Indonesia and
\nthe Philippines battle the current oil price hike and the ensuing
\ninflationary spiral that may slow down Asian economies. Still
\nothers had hoped for an Asian Financial Community, based on the
\nexisting Chiang Mai Initiative. But initial hopes and aspirations
\nof a nascent Asian Economic Community of sorts may now prove
\npremature in KL.<\/p>\n
More fundamentally, at stake is the future relationship
\nbetween \"ASEAN+3\" and the EAS, as the former already has
\nintensified cooperation and linkages in almost all fields, which
\nthe three new members could \"tag\" on to. But India would feel
\nmore comfortable with it was an \"ASEAN+6\" grouping, as it would
\nthen not be relegated to the \"third circle\" in KL.<\/p>\n
In fact, the future relationship between the EAS (either as a
\n\"ASEAN+3+3\" or \"ASEAN+6\") and the current \"ASEAN+3\" could
\nprobably become the thorniest issue in Kuala Lumpur; this
\n\"numbers game\" is clearly a manifestation of the deeper geo-
\npolitics that run beneath the EAS.<\/p>\n
But the ultimate bottleneck at the EAS would remain
\nundoubtedly the Sino-Japanese feud, which could turn out to be
\nthe unfortunate \"highlight\" of this Summit. Japanese PM Junichiro
\nKoizumi would be trying to meet bilaterally with Chinese Premier
\nWen Jiabao in Kuala Lumpur on the margins of the Summit, a
\nbilateral, which Chinese President Hu Jintao had clearly denied
\nKoizumi in Busan during APEC.<\/p>\n
Beijing has argued that the last Sino-Japanese bilateral in
\nJakarta during the April Bandung 50th anniversary commemoration
\nproved futile, as Koizumi still visited Yasukuni Shrine, though
\nbriefly, on Oct. 17. Moreover, it appears that there are enormous
\ndifficulties this year in organizing the \"traditional\" China-
\nJapan-ROK breakfast summit (as in the past five years) on the
\nmargins of the \"ASEAN+3\" Summit, given the serious unhappiness in
\nBeijing and Seoul over Koizumi.<\/p>\n
In reality, as long as Beijing-Tokyo relations do not
\neffectively mend, the EAS and its future organization would have
\nlittle hopes of taking off effectively and Asia would remain
\nunfortunately split (amidst growing Sino-Japanese rivalry) and
\n\"non-integrated\" (with neither a Chinese or Japanese or Indian
\nleadership, or even their co-leadership of Asia); after all,
\npolitics still prime over economics (to quote the words of the
\nformer Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-toung), and especially in Asia
\ntoday!<\/p>\n
The writer, a business consultant and strategist, is Council
\nMember of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs
\n(SIIA).<\/p>",
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