Indonesia's politics enters new ball game<\/p>\n
By Gerry van Klinken<\/p>\n
SYDNEY (JP): It still is not clear what kind of government
\nwill emerge from the elections whose results were declared last
\nweek. Some powerful Jakarta elites, unhappy with the people's
\nchoice, may manage to form a government that ignores the
\nelections. Even so, the results give a rare snapshot of the
\npolitical map at the grassroots. In particular, the regional
\ndistribution of seats won by various parties helps answer the
\nquestion many asked beforehand: \"Will these elections heal
\nIndonesia's weakened politics body?\"<\/p>\n
The first impression is encouraging for all those who had
\nhoped for a simple result to reflect the national mind. Defying
\npessimists, who said 48 parties would only produce chaos, the
\nresults are almost as simple as a New Order election, but with a
\nhuge swing away from Golkar toward Megawati Sukarnoputri's
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). The
\nthree New Order parties -- Golkar, United Development Party (PPP)
\nand PDI Perjuangan -- wrapped up among them 72 percent of the
\nseats. They each won seats in practically every province. The big
\nfive -- the New Order three plus Abdurrahman Wahid's National
\nAwakening Party (PKB) and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party
\n(PAN) -- won over 90 percent of all seats. Just eight parties won
\nover 96 percent of them.<\/p>\n
The swing against Golkar of 50 percent compared with the 1997
\nelections was strong right across the nation. Golkar achieved its
\nhighest result in South Sulawesi, but even there it suffered a
\nswing of 25 percent. PDI Perjuangan at 33 percent of the vote won
\nhalf as many votes again as its nearest rival Golkar, though less
\nthan a third as many seats because of the heavier weighting for
\nvotes outside Java. PDI Perjuangan, we must conclude, was the
\npeople's choice. This result does not suggest Indonesia is
\nincapable of achieving a national mind under conditions of
\nfreedom.<\/p>\n
However, there is a regional pattern to the distribution of
\nseats. While Golkar took a pummeling nationwide, the areas where
\nGolkar obtained more than the national average of 26 percent of
\nthe seats were all outside the Java heartland. In Java-Bali,
\nGolkar obtained 17 percent of the seats in each province, whereas
\nin the outer islands it was 36 percent. In as much as it was
\nsaved at all, Golkar's bacon was saved in the outer islands.
\nMoreover, Golkar's votes were strongest in rural areas. Town
\nvoters, also outside Java, often protested by choosing other
\nparties.<\/p>\n
In the past, Golkar relied on two things to win elections:
\nmilitary force and spreading the largess among local elites. This
\nwas the first time when both were in short supply. The military
\nmostly stood back and let this election run its course. And the
\neconomic crisis left Golkar short of the necessary generosity.
\nThe huge swing against Golkar indicates it never really won the
\npeople's heart.<\/p>\n
The swing to PDI Perjuangan, with little money to throw
\naround, suggested a rediscovered force in Indonesian electoral
\npolitics -- the force of charisma. But the swing was greatest in
\nJava, while a strong Golkar vote persisted in outer island rural
\nareas. This is an interesting pattern, one with a long history.<\/p>\n
Golkar's approach to politics was reminiscent of the colonial
\nDutch: paternalistic, nonparticipatory and development-oriented.
\nIt worked for both Golkar and the Dutch in the outer islands, a
\nthinly populated frontier region of plantations and mines. Both
\nfelt nervous about the potentially explosive populism of Java.
\nThe Dutch only once came close to panicking -- that was when the
\ncommunist party, PKI, launched an uprising on Java and
\nWest Sumatra in 1926\/1927. Golkar always won below average votes
\non Java.<\/p>\n
During their brief occupation of the archipelago, only the
\nJapanese 16th Army on Java felt compelled to swing with Java's
\npopulism by coopting Sukarno. Elsewhere, the Japanese ran an
\nentirely nonparticipatory regime. The revolutionary republic of
\nthe late 1940s was largely confined to Java.<\/p>\n
The perennially strong Golkar vote in the outer islands
\nreflects that region's frontier \"colonial\" character. In its
\npoorer parts, much of the urban elite is dependent on employment
\nin the civil service. In the resource-rich western part of the
\narchipelago, other elites benefit from export industries such as
\ncash crops, mining and forestry. These industries were not badly
\naffected by the economic crisis that brought so much misery
\nto the cities of Java and that brought down Soeharto. Such local
\nelites in turn played their part in ensuring a Golkar victory
\nthere.<\/p>\n
But these areas are also wracked with \"colonial\" violence.
\nAceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya are outer island regions where
\nruling elites have lost touch with the aspirations of the people.
\nIf the New Order appears to linger in the outer islands, the
\nheartland experienced a renewal in this election. A friend in
\nBali's Ubud described to me a \"golden, crystalline feeling\" on
\nthe day. People lined up quietly for hours waiting to cast their
\nvote. They were determined to set right the wrongs they felt were
\ncommitted under Golkar. Afterwards, they felt proud of what they
\ndid in that booth. The PDI Perjuangan protest vote in Bali was
\nstrong in rural as well as urban areas. Clearly, democracy should
\nconsist of more than a huge protest vote, but it was an inspiring
\nstart. Most of Java, where half the country's population lives,
\nwas the same, as were parts of Sumatra.<\/p>\n
However, the pattern of \"renewal in Java-Bali\" versus
\n\"conservatism in the outer islands\" cannot be the last word on
\nthis election result. The reason is simple. Golkar can no longer
\nbe a party of hegemony in the periphery if it has lost control of
\nthe center. This is the end of an era. Golkar might well become
\nlike Australia's National Party, a struggling rural party
\nlooking for coalition partners. However impressed local elites in
\nthe outer islands may have been by the long experience of
\nGolkar's hegemonic powers, that is today just a memory.<\/p>\n
We now need to think of Indonesia as a multiparty patchwork.
\nPDI Perjuangan dominance extends far beyond Java into parts of
\nSumatra, Kalimantan and Maluku. We see the PPP emerging as a
\ncredible party in Aceh. PAN, a completely new party, is a
\ncreative and credible force in the towns of western Sumatra, as
\nwell as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. The PKB, another new party,
\ndominates East Java.<\/p>\n
Golkar can't run Indonesia from a base in Sulawesi and a
\ncontested foothold elsewhere in the eastern archipelago. Not even
\nPDI Perjuangan has hegemony. Politics has entered a new ball
\ngame, a shake up at least, one that moves from city to country,
\nand which might bring back a salutary interest in what goes on on
\nthe ground. That's always provided Jakarta doesn't ignore the
\nwhole thing.<\/p>\n
Gerry van Klinken Ph D. (editor@insideindonesia.org) edits
\nInside Indonesia magazine.<\/p>",
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