Indonesia's long-term objectives<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The country has been in a state of fervor since
\nthe onset of the financial crisis in July 1997. Rapid changes
\nhave occurred across the board and affected every segment of
\nsociety.<\/p>\n
Yet, change is taking place in a very disorderly way. It is
\nbecause the political system stalled during the last 20 years of
\nSoeharto's reign due to his constant refusal to accept any
\nchange, which he considered a threat to his retention of power.<\/p>\n
The pace of change is chaotic because political institutions
\nare weak. Under Soeharto, the political system became rigid so
\nthat when change becomes unavoidable, it takes place in a
\nvolatile and explosive way.<\/p>\n
Chaos and anarchy are detrimental to efforts to revive the
\neconomy. The transitional government under President B.J. Habibie
\n-- merely a continuation of the Soeharto regime without Soeharto
\n-- is unable to handle the situation. It is because it lacks the
\nlegitimacy and authority, as well as the political will, to
\nundertake the necessary reforms, except under pressure from the
\npublic, especially opposition forces and the students.<\/p>\n
Much more is needed to overcome the crisis than those
\nreactive, ad hoc and temporary measures. Above all, the
\nIndonesian leaders and public have to have a clear vision of what
\nthey want to achieve for the country's future so that they are
\nnot easily swayed and influenced by focusing only on short-term
\nneeds to resolve the crisis. And this will also help to overcome
\nthe pessimism and feelings of despair in facing the crisis. This
\nis important because it may take a decade before the nation can
\novercome its main challenges.<\/p>\n
Considering the demands of the people -- expressed during the
\nlast 20 months in reaction to the abuses and misdeeds of the
\nSoeharto regime -- three main objectives for the future are
\nimmediately obvious.<\/p>\n
The first is democracy. This does not simply mean a formal
\nparticipatory political system with a general election of
\nrepresentatives based on a multiparty system, but materially a
\nguarantee of political rights. These include freedom of speech
\nand organization; the rule of law and not of men; the right to
\nchange governments and, last but not least, an active civil
\nsociety to give meaning to democracy.<\/p>\n
The most immediate task now is to have fair elections on June
\n7. This is a prerequisite to the rebuilding of Indonesia, because
\nonly through a fair general election can the country have a new
\nlegitimate government. Only then will the government be able to
\nundertake the critical reforms in the political and economic
\nfields, which are in themselves very difficult and which need a
\nlot of sacrifices from everybody.<\/p>\n
One general election cannot solve all the problems in the
\npolitical, social and economic fields. Patience could only be
\nexpected from the general populace if it was asked for by a
\nsolid, legitimate government with majority support. A simple
\nmajority, with a vote of 50 percent plus, will not do the job.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the new government must be a broad-based government
\nwith at least two-thirds of the seats in the legislature. This
\nmeans that the three big parties -- Megawati Soekarnoputri's
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan),
\nAbdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB), and
\nAmien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN) -- have to cooperate and
\nform a viable coalition government.<\/p>\n
Ideally, this should be announced before the election. It will
\nfunction as a guarantee to the Indonesian people and the
\ninternational community that a solid government is possible after
\nthe elections. It should also help calm down the political
\natmosphere before the elections and during the campaign that
\notherwise could become uncontrollable.<\/p>\n
Of course, it is anybody's guess whether the three big parties
\ncould establish a strong coalition. They are potentially the big
\nwinners in the elections because their leaders have certain name
\nrecognition and they have an infrastructure based on well
\nestablished social or political organizations. PDI Perjuangan is
\nbased on the old Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), established
\nin 1927, and PKB is an outgrowth of the largest Muslim
\norganization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926. PAN relies on
\nthe support of the second largest Muslim organization,
\nMuhammadiyah, established in 1912.<\/p>\n
The three parties are already cooperating at the working level
\nin putting pressure on legislation for general elections and on
\npolitical parties, which helped produce decent political laws
\nthat are critical for a level playing field for the holding of
\ngeneral elections. The real problem concerns relations among the
\nleaders of the three parties but, in a survival situation, they
\nare bound to cooperate.<\/p>\n
Another problem in establishing a democracy is the role of the
\njudiciary in implementing the rule of law. This is an urgent
\nmatter because the Indonesian judiciary is archaic and corrupt.<\/p>\n
Political rights, especially freedom of speech, are of
\ncritical importance, and efforts to curb them by the government
\nshould be challenged. Granted, there is always the possibility of
\nirresponsibility by a member of the mass media, which should then
\nbe taken to court. But censorship in whatever form should be
\navoided because freedom of speech and opinion is a political
\nright that should always be guarded jealously by the people,
\nespecially civil society.<\/p>\n
The second objective is full autonomy of the regions. In fact,
\nthe idea of federalism is not a bad one for a country as big and
\ndiverse as Indonesia. Historically, it was an anathema to the
\nfreedom fighters of 1945 because it was proposed by the Dutch as
\na neocolonialist tactic. However, it does make sense to debate
\nthis thoroughly in the future. For now, full autonomy for the
\nprovinces is a political imperative; otherwise the center can no
\nlonger hold following the heavy-handedness during the past three
\ndecades.<\/p>\n
The newly approved law on decentralization and autonomy does
\ninclude full-fledged autonomy, where the central government only
\nhas defense, foreign affairs, the judiciary, monetary affairs and
\nsome fiscal policies under its control. The rest will be in the
\nhands of provinces. This is a good start, but its presence should
\nnot be an excuse to limit future developments.<\/p>\n
East Timor is, of course, a special case. The right of self-
\ndetermination after a few years of transition with full autonomy
\nis still an option for Indonesians and the East Timorese after
\nthe general election and with a new government in charge. It is
\nclear that both the offer of special status as a final solution
\nand independence in early 2000 is not a realistic or honorable
\nsolution.<\/p>\n
In the end, Indonesians still believe in the one Indonesian
\nstate and nation that is based on the strong sense of nationalism
\nthat emerged in 1908, something which cannot be discarded easily.
\nHowever, this sense of nationalism must be nurtured into a
\ndemocratic and just society to take root and flourish.<\/p>\n
The third objective is social justice. This is a long-term
\nobjective and should be undertaken gradually and with
\ntransparency based on the rule of law. It should not involve a
\nforced transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor.<\/p>\n
The challenge is to have more inclusive economic development
\nand empowering the small people, while at the same time
\nguaranteeing there is healthy competition among the big
\nenterprises. This is a politically loaded issue in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
At issue is not only the establishment of economic democracy,
\nbut also the racial connotations of the problem. It has been
\nargued, wrongly, that the Chinese-Indonesian minority controls up
\nto 70 percent of the economy. It is a myth. At the most, about 30
\npercent of the gross domestic product (GDP) is contributed by
\nactivities under the control of Chinese-Indonesians. And this
\nappears to be rapidly diminishing because many of their companies
\nthat have been severely affected by the financial crisis will
\nsoon end up becoming foreign owned.<\/p>\n
However, their involvement in the economy will remain
\nsignificant. They also believe that it is important to
\nprogressively increase the share of indigenous Indonesians in the
\neconomy, as long as this is undertaken in a transparent way and
\nbased on the rule of law.<\/p>\n
Malaysia's affirmative policy for the bumiputra is one model,
\nalthough it would result in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic
\n(KKN) practices if not implemented correctly. Nelson Mandela's
\nmodel for South Africa also has been mentioned as an alternative,
\nwhere big White African companies are placed under a better
\ncompetition regulation while small Black African companies are
\ngiven greater opportunities and are being empowered.<\/p>\n
Whatever strategy is chosen, it should result from a thorough
\nexamination among mainstream economists and then among the public
\nin order to get the necessary support for its implementation.
\nBut, first, the economic reforms have to be resolutely in place.<\/p>\n
And a new team of economists, partly technocratic and partly
\npolitical, has to cooperate in implementing a common strategy of
\neconomic reforms and development.<\/p>\n
Adoption of different and conflicting strategies and policies,
\nwhich is characteristic of the Habibie Cabinet, is damaging to
\nthe economy and to restoring confidence in the economy. Indonesia
\nwill be in a critical state of affairs economically for some time
\nto come, and it just cannot afford a division among its policy
\nmakers.<\/p>\n
The proposed group of economists in the new coalition
\ngovernment has to be able to formulate a new strategy and propose
\nit to the public for debate. Among the issues involved should be
\nthe new strategy of overcoming discrepancies in income among
\ngroups in society, including among ethnic groups.<\/p>\n
Additionally, there is the issue of establishing a social
\nsafety net and the future social welfare system.<\/p>\n
The new strategy also should be based on the recognition that
\nglobalization is here to stay and that the Indonesian economy is
\ninevitably going to become more integrated into the global
\neconomy. The challenge is to be able to involve the Indonesian
\npeople at large, and in so doing make them aware of and accept
\nthese new realities. They must realize that there is no
\nalternative to growth and development in the future than by
\nriding the wave of globalization.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the supervisory board of the Center
\nfor Strategic and International Studies.<\/p>",
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