{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1399743,
        "msgid": "indonesias-flight-from-modernity-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-05-30 00:00:00",
        "title": "Indonesia's flight from modernity",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Indonesia's flight from modernity Our Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin remembers Gen. Ali Moertopo against the background of Indonesia's current crisis. This is the second of two articles. HONG KONG (JP): Some day, somebody should write a book on \"Sycophancy In Asian Politics\". If it was properly done by an author of stature, who felt no obligation to please anybody , it could be an invaluable as well as a wide-ranging volume.",
        "content": "<p>Indonesia's flight from modernity<\/p>\n<p>Our Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin remembers Gen. Ali<br>\nMoertopo against the background of Indonesia's current crisis.<br>\nThis is the second of two articles.<\/p>\n<p>HONG KONG (JP): Some day, somebody should write a book on<br>\n\"Sycophancy In Asian Politics\". If it was properly done by an<br>\nauthor of stature, who felt no obligation to please anybody , it<br>\ncould be an invaluable as well as a wide-ranging volume.<\/p>\n<p>This is not to suggest in any way that sycophancy is merely an<br>\nAsian problem. Sycophancy, it goes without saying, is a universal<br>\nphenomenon.  For example, I know of one long-reigning husband and<br>\nwife team, in charge of a famous Western company, who receive,<br>\nand probably by now expect, a degree of sycophancy similar to<br>\nthat which once afflicted the two Marcoses.<\/p>\n<p>But at least that company exists in a society which is heading<br>\ntowards modernity, and which provides, in the political arena,<br>\nimpersonal checks and balances, whereby dissenting views are<br>\nheard, differing viewpoints are considered, and it is very<br>\ndifficult indeed for a leader to become too puffed-up with his<br>\nown infallibility.<\/p>\n<p>Colonialism often instituted a veneer of modernity. But the<br>\ncolonialists, fearing for their legitimacy, usually tried to<br>\nencourage political indifference among the masses in their<br>\ncolonies, plus a high degree of sycophancy within the local<br>\nelite. The tragedy has been that too many of the post-<br>\ncolonialists have behaved in a broadly similar way.<\/p>\n<p>Essentially, having established himself politically, having<br>\ninstituted a degree of Indonesian political stability and<br>\ninitiated progress towards economic development and regional<br>\ncooperation, President Soeharto led Indonesia on a flight away<br>\nfrom modernity.<\/p>\n<p>That was Indonesia's, not just Soeharto's, fundamental<br>\npolitical and economic failure.  Excessive sycophancy became the<br>\nfundamental political principle of a deeply flawed authoritarian<br>\nregime.  The leadership demanded it. The elite provided it. The<br>\nflight away from modernity gathered pace particularly in the last<br>\ndecade and a half.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, Soeharto set about providing the trappings of an<br>\neconomically developed state. But the more he succeeded in<br>\nproviding the outward shows, the more profound was his failure to<br>\nalso endow Indonesia with the inner substance of modernity: a<br>\npress than can fully and freely print differing views; an elite<br>\nthat is used to discussing and debating the complexities of<br>\ndevelopment; a bureaucracy which can impersonally and uncorruptly<br>\nregulate the economic growing pains accompanying globalization; a<br>\npolitical system which allows various interests to openly<br>\ncompete, and reconcile their differences.<\/p>\n<p>Even here, the blame does not simply lie either with<br>\nIndonesians or even just with Soeharto. Foreign investors were<br>\namong the worst of sycophants as they over-extolled the<br>\nIndonesian economic achievement in their pursuit of profit and<br>\nrushed into the arena, choosing which of Soeharto's six children<br>\nwould be their partner.<\/p>\n<p>They should have known that, by doing this, they were<br>\nparticipating in a dangerous political game -- and actually<br>\nweakening a house built precariously on shifting political sands.<br>\nWhen those sands did begin to shift, then another form of<br>\nsycophancy took hold, as investors rushed for the exits like a<br>\nmindless herd of thoughtless cattle.<\/p>\n<p>The blame does not simply lie with greedy businessmen either.<br>\nForeign governments, especially the world's sole superpower, the<br>\nUnited States, allowed themselves, whenever they thought about<br>\nIndonesia -- which was actually very rarely -- to be lulled, as<br>\nIndonesians also were, by the bald statistics of economic growth.<br>\nThe GNP was going up by leaps and bounds, so why worry?<\/p>\n<p>But Indonesia's real GNP -- its Growth in National Politics --<br>\nwas sinking fast. Indonesia's erstwhile allies like the United<br>\nStates said nothing.<\/p>\n<p>There was something dreadfully shabby, even despicable, as<br>\nSecretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered a verbal hint<br>\nthat Soeharto should go, at the very last minute of his<br>\npresidency, while President Bill Clinton was too cowardly to say<br>\nwhat he was probably thinking out loud.<\/p>\n<p>The time for telling Soeharto that he had gone too far along<br>\nthe path of one-man rule was long since past. As in Manila in<br>\n1986, so in Jakarta in 1998, the U.S. it seemed, rushed in to<br>\nclaim a wholly undeserved \"success\" for itself, when, in reality,<br>\nthe effort of poor Indonesians, mainly students, was belatedly<br>\nmaking up for all those years when the United States was content<br>\nto co- exist with the ever more willful dictator.<\/p>\n<p>Yet the greatest blame must still lie with the weak-kneed<br>\nsycophancy of the Indonesian elite. The demonstrations by the<br>\nstudents in the House of Representatives, and the rampages of the<br>\nmobs of poverty stricken slum dwellers in Medan, Jakarta and Solo<br>\n(and maybe other places we do not yet know about) had to make up<br>\nfor, at the cost of many lives lost, the craven sycophancy of the<br>\nelite.<\/p>\n<p>Were Ali Moertopo alive today he would be insisting that,<br>\nMarch 1998 should never be forgotten. The Indonesian People's<br>\nConsultative Assembly was in session. 1000 members of the elite<br>\nwere appointed to it. To be sure, they had to sign certificates<br>\nof allegiance to Soeharto before they could take their seats.<br>\nThe harsh -- and infamous -- fact remains that not a single<br>\nmember raised any solid objection whatsoever, when Soeharto was<br>\nnominated for a seventh term for which he was manifestly unfit.<\/p>\n<p>That was sycophancy gone mad. Soeharto responded in kind.<br>\nAll the endless servile sycophancy had implanted his conviction<br>\nthat he could reestablish the Javanese monarchy, and make his<br>\ndaughter his successor. Sycophancy had its most dangerous result.<br>\nHe thought -- and perhaps still thinks -- that he was the King<br>\nwho could do no wrong.<\/p>\n<p>Ali Moertopo knew in his bones that all leaders inevitably do<br>\nwrong unless their advisers give them the truth as the advisers<br>\nknow it.<\/p>\n<p>He saw the sad writing on the Indonesian wall as to where<br>\nSoeharto's ego and susceptibility to flattery would inevitably<br>\nlead. The Moertopo-Soeharto teamwork that had built the regime<br>\nfeel apart as sycophancy increasingly sustained it.<\/p>\n<p>The clearest sign that Soeharto was all set to go wherever<br>\nsycophancy would take him came when Soeharto had his<br>\nautobiography ghost-written for him, telling of his great<br>\nachievements. There was no mention anywhere in its pages of the<br>\ncrucial political role played by Ali Moertopo, and another Gen.<br>\nSudjono Humardhani, in establishing Soeharto in power.  They were<br>\nabsolutely crucial advisers -- but they were eliminated from the<br>\nstory. In the book Soeharto, of course, did it all himself.<br>\nSycophancy had reached its ultimate stage -- the rewriting of<br>\nhistory.<\/p>\n<p>Hence the brief retelling of what really happened, at the<br>\nbeginning of this article.<\/p>\n<p>After that small but so significant incident, in which<br>\nMoertopo, the honest ally, became a non-person, it became<br>\nvirtually inevitable that Soeharto would never step down in time<br>\nto save his achievements. Soeharto, surrounded by sycophants,<br>\nended up with virtually the same accomplishment as Sukarno. Both<br>\nleaders took the nation from the mountain-top of expectation to<br>\nthe depths of economic devastation.<\/p>\n<p>Moertopo died suddenly in the mid 1980s. To their shame, the<br>\nsycophants paid scant attention to his passing. He was the only<br>\nIndonesian I know who could have told Soeharto to his face that<br>\nhe risked ruining his record and his nation. But had Moertopo<br>\nlived, the Indonesian sycophantic state would almost certainly<br>\nhave prevented Ali from ever delivering such a message in person.<\/p>\n<p>Window: Colonialism often instituted a veneer of modernity. But the<br>\ncolonialists, fearing for their legitimacy, usually tried to<br>\nencourage political indifference among the masses in their<br>\ncolonies, plus a high degree of sycophancy within the local<br>\nelite.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesias-flight-from-modernity-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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