Indonesia's democratic tug-of-war<\/p>\n
The following is the second of two articles based on a
\npresentation by Dr. Ignas Kleden of The Go-East
\nInstitute\/Institute for East-Indonesian Affairs in Jakarta. The
\nsociologist spoke at the Asian Leadership Fellow Program Reunion
\nConference 2001 in Bangkok on Aug. 7.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA: Those who wanted to see Abdurrahman Wahid toppled
\nwere those who felt uneasy with the freedom he showed in dealing
\nwith the institutional set-up and bureaucracy. He was seen as
\nsomeone who disturbed the quasi-mechanistic equilibrium of
\ndemocratic institutions through his maneuvers and improvisations,
\nmaking the whole system integration of democratic institutions
\nappear dysfunctional.<\/p>\n
The idea of system integration borrows from the systems theory
\nof the possibly most influential living sociologist, a German,
\nNiklas Luhmann. In his theory, every system is operationally
\nclosed and its operations determine what belongs to the system
\nand what is outside the system. Every system produces itself and
\nits environment.<\/p>\n
All the stimuli from outside will be selected by the system
\nand can only impinge upon its workings after these have been
\ntranslated into the system's meaning and language. However, its
\nself-closure is balanced by its cognitive openness; new
\nprogramming is created within itself to cope with the new
\nsituation. Learning is like a mechanism of maintenance.<\/p>\n
Present developments of democracy here suggest that if
\ndemocracy is to be established through institutions, it has
\ntended to become a closed system. It seems that the system of
\ninstitutional structures originating in the Soeharto regime are
\nstill there. It maintains itself, it has selected new situations
\nafter the 1998 political reform, while translating these into its
\nown meaning and its own language. There seems to be a fundamental
\ndifference in attitude between the initiators of the 1998
\npolitical reform, especially the students, and those who were
\npart of the New Order's political system.<\/p>\n
The students wanted to change the whole system by terminating
\nthe long lasting dual function of the military, the exclusion of
\nall civilian elements of the New Order from the government and
\npolitical institutions, as well as ending corruption, collusion
\nand nepotism (KKN) -- all the political wrong doings of New
\nOrder's bureaucracy.<\/p>\n
In contrast. those who were part of the New Order are trying
\nto show that they are open to political reform. However, the new
\nsituations and aspirations are translated into the meaning and
\nthe language of the New Order's political system.<\/p>\n
This has obviously happened within Golkar, the former ruling
\nparty; Golkar politicians keep talking about the importance of
\nconstitutionalism as a system of procedures in politics but
\nhardly say anything about the substance of the law -- justice.
\nThis is because justice as such will necessarily require the
\ncorrection and the elimination of past mistakes: KKN, political
\nviolence, and human rights violations in which Golkar was
\nsupposedly deeply involved.<\/p>\n
The whole legal argument of Golkar sidesteps public
\nquestioning and examination in most cases, hence they refer
\nmerely to procedures. When people asked about the huge amount of
\nmoney used by Golkar to finance its political campaign during the
\n1999 general election, chairman Akbar Tandjung answered that the
\nuse of money has been audited by an official body, without saying
\nanything about where the money came from and why Golkar could
\nhave such big amounts far exceeding the legally permitted amount.<\/p>\n
This was why a number of non-governmental organizations
\naccused Golkar of transgressing Article 14 of Law No.2\/1999 which
\nstipulates that a political party is not allowed to receive
\npersonal donations exceeding Rp 15 million, or donations from
\nprivate companies, legal bodies or organizations in excess of Rp
\n150 million. In a lawsuit lodged at the Supreme Court the
\nplaintiffs said Golkar received Rp 90 billion from the State
\nLogistics Agency (Bulog), Rp 15 billion from Bank Bali and Rp 1
\nbillion from the chief of the former Supreme Advisory Council
\n(DPA).<\/p>\n
The plaintiffs therefore demanded that Golkar be suspended as
\na political party or at least banned from joining the next
\nelection. The lawsuit was supported by most Jakarta students, but
\nwas dismissed by the Supreme Court. Despite the disappointing
\nverdict, this lawsuit clearly demonstrates public demand to have
\npast wrong doings unveiled and brought to court.<\/p>\n
In a struggle like this there is a tension and even antagonism
\nbetween a legalistic approach to the Constitution by stressing
\nlegal procedures, and the substantive approach aiming for
\njustice. Neither choice has helped much. Of course one cannot
\nignore procedures which make up and guarantee due process of law.
\nHowever, abiding by procedures without sufficient awareness and
\ninsight of what the procedures are for, is nothing but formalism.
\nIn contrast, the campaign to return to the substance of law
\nwithout taking procedures into account could result unwittingly
\nin self-righteousness, which often tends to become
\nuncompromising, one-sided, extremely militant and even fanatical.<\/p>\n
For the time being the political and legal struggle in
\nIndonesia has to seek a middle path between empty formalism and
\nself-justifying substantiveness. The last conflict between
\nAbdurrahman, the House and the Assembly might exemplify the
\ntension between the two approaches. Abdurrahman was obviously
\nvery convinced of the righteousness of his struggle for
\ndemocracy, equality, freedom from fear and political repression,
\nand justice for all. Yet the legislature and the Assembly
\nstressed procedures to terminate his administration. Both sides
\nspoke for and on behalf of constitutionalism.<\/p>\n
The future of Indonesian politics will depend very much on an
\noptimal equilibrium between political stability, due process of
\nlaw and good workings of political institutions on the one hand
\nand political rationality, serious commitment to justice for all,
\nand continuous discourse on the norms and values of democracy.
\nValues make up the rules or facts of democratic behavior which
\nhas something to do with its empirical aspects; whereas norms
\nmake up the ideal of democracy as something worth fighting for.<\/p>\n
However, one has to be very careful to differentiate between
\ntwo different, albeit closely related, things: justice and good
\nlife -- both implicit in the ideals of democracy.<\/p>\n
The good life belongs to the private domain, giving as much
\nfreedom as possible to those concerned, to choose from among the
\nexisting values which support pursuit of happiness. Meanwhile
\njustice is a norm which gives as much obligation as possible to
\neverybody to abide by its principle. Good life is something which
\nholds good for a certain group of people and must not be
\ngeneralized. A set of cultural values instrumental to achieving a
\ngood life in, say, Japan, must not necessarily apply to people
\nfrom other countries.<\/p>\n
In contrast, norms are principles which can and should be
\nuniversalized. So what is just for a Japanese must be just also
\nfor anybody else regardless of country or culture.<\/p>\n
Our political experience in the last four decades has showed
\nclearly that the Soeharto regime made big mistakes in pushing
\ncultural values as political norms. Key words were then national
\nidentity, eastern culture and finesse.<\/p>\n
All these were emphasized as Indonesian political norms,
\nwhereas the normative principles of democratic politics such as
\nequality before the law, individual freedom, justice and human
\nrights were mistakenly played down as being merely western
\ncultural values.<\/p>\n
This tension between fact and norms, between values and norms,
\nbetween institutions and rationality, will become one which will
\ncome up again and again in the years to come. This does not imply
\nthat the democratic struggle is doomed.<\/p>\n
Rather it implies that the struggle for democracy is a
\npolitical way to realize the perfection of human beings by
\novercoming human fallibility, time and time again.<\/p>",
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