Indonesian politics still a host of uncertainties<\/p>\n
By Peter Richards<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on possibilities in the
\ndevelopment of Indonesian politics up to the general election
\nplanned for May 1999.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The incumbent ruling Golkar grouping is likely
\nto have the best privileges among participants in the general
\nelection scheduled for next May.<\/p>\n
Among the three established political formations, which all
\nhave advantages of existing machinery across the country, Golkar
\nhas money as well as the entrenched grassroots' organization long
\ndenied to both the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the
\nUnited Development Party (PPP).<\/p>\n
If not carefully monitored, Golkar could become the channel
\nfor vast sums in the defense of the gains of past privileges. It
\nwill be difficult for all but the biggest new parties to meet the
\nlegal, organizational and financial requirements for a successful
\npolitical campaign in mid-1999.<\/p>\n
Golkar is the incumbent and the current president is its man.
\nIncumbency has its advantages and it would be naive to expect
\nGolkar not to use them. The reseeding of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR), for instance, is entirely within
\nGolkar's right under the present political system. So is the
\nrefusal to undo the engineered split within the PDI, particularly
\ngiven the political implications of such a reversal.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, watchful Indonesians and others may
\nperceive some of the organizational and financial advantages
\nenjoyed by Golkar as simply so unfair, however legal, that they
\nwill question the legitimacy of the ensuing government and
\nnational policy.<\/p>\n
It will be the task of those who want an election that is not
\njust direct, free and secret but also fair and reflective of the
\npeople's views, to prevent both the monopoly of access at the
\nvillage level and inundation of funds to local officials and
\nelectors in exchange for votes.<\/p>\n
Selling votes is not a political crime in hard times, but
\nbuying them is. And the best way to return ill-gotten gains to
\nthe people is through support of the nine basic commodities,
\nkeeping Indonesian children in school and paying off the enormous
\nforeign debt burden.<\/p>\n
The final danger is that a major political force, asserting
\nthat it has been betrayed by a flawed political process, might
\nrefuse to be the \"loyal opposition\", content to criticize the
\ngovernment and await the next chance to win power at the polls,
\nthus denying the legitimacy on which Indonesia's economic future
\ndepends.<\/p>\n
In the absence of massive electoral irregularities, such a
\nclaim may be a remote possibility. The current leadership of all
\nIndonesian opinion has very present memories of where
\nirreconcilable, polarized politics led in the Sukarno period.<\/p>\n
But the very possibility should sober those in the military
\nand the government who would risk all for the victory of old
\nvalues. In current circumstances, such behavior would surely come
\nuncomfortably close to treason.<\/p>\n
So what can go right? The real grassroots' formation of a
\npluralistic civil society is emerging from the shadow of the
\nmilitary-bureaucratic monolith. A year, of course, is a very
\nshort time, but people are increasingly becoming involved in the
\nformulation and negotiation of interests that make civil society
\nwork.<\/p>\n
If civil society needs to be sold top-down to bemused
\nelectors, it will probably fail. Nobody in places where civil
\nsociety exists ever thinks about it. It is more a function of all
\nthe associations free citizens devise in the absence of state
\nparticipation or state inference.<\/p>\n
There is evidence that Indonesians -- albeit with numerous
\nlocal exceptions where pent-up rage has resolved itself violently
\n-- are behaving with that patience and restraint, and good
\nmanners and good humor that are a hallmark of this country.<\/p>\n
But they are making claims that will certainly change the
\ncountry and its content. It is too bad that this is happening at
\na time of economic crisis. It would be nicer if people could
\nthink about politics without the current economic stress.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, the economic crisis achieved what nothing
\nelse but personal incapacitation could have -- the removal of
\nSoeharto as chief executive officer of Indonesia Inc. by those
\npowerful stakeholders who saw their former mentor as harmful to
\ntheir interests in the company.<\/p>\n
The crisis also weakened all the institutions on which the
\nSoeharto system rested, thereby increasing the relative power of
\ntwo groups.<\/p>\n
The first group includes farmers, factory workers and informal
\nservice sector workers who always live close to subsistence,
\nhaving gained a little during the Soeharto era and about to lose
\nit in pawnshops with its collapse.<\/p>\n
The second is those Indonesians of many characteristics --
\ncall them dissidents -- who held out for years against the denial
\nof values they believed were essential to Indonesia's being.<\/p>\n
These two long disenfranchised groups are now active in the
\n\"Jakarta spring\". Much may depend on whether they have the time
\nand the inclination to share what they know about how Indonesia
\nworks and could work.<\/p>\n
And what of the prime beneficiaries of the Soeharto years? In
\nthe first place, most of them seem quite comfortably ensconced in
\npower or at least in the wealth that nurtures power.<\/p>\n
Most Indonesians probably know that the calls for \"total
\nreform\" and the ouster of anyone implicated in the Soeharto
\nregime are excessive. The process of a thorough cleanup would
\nwaste valuable time and where would it end? Thirty years is a
\nlong time and almost everyone must have something from which they
\nwould prefer to move on.<\/p>\n
Moreover, people can change. Indonesians know from the shadow
\npuppet and from experience that characters are rarely entirely
\ngood or entirely bad. Some can rehabilitate themselves from the
\ninjury to others (and to their true selves?) of the past 30
\nyears; others cannot.<\/p>\n
Participatory democracy allows voters to judge who is who. It
\nalso encourages those seeking office in a fair election to do
\ngood (as well as sound good) if they want to catch the votes of
\nan increasingly informed electorate. An electorate which has the
\nopportunity to elect them or reject them for the first time in
\nover 40 years.<\/p>\n
The writer is a former Canadian diplomat who is now working as
\nconsultant in tourism marketing for the Indian Union Territory of
\nPondicherry. He wrote this article in his private capacity.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesian-politics-still-a-host-of-uncertainties-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}