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    "data": {
        "id": 1124711,
        "msgid": "indonesian-perception-of-australia-it-really-isnt-a-laughing-matter-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-11-15 00:00:00",
        "title": "Indonesian perception of Australia: It really isn't a laughing matter",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Indonesian perception of Australia: It really isn't a laughing matter S.P. SETH, Sydney In the last month or so, Indonesia has featured quite a few times on prime-time Australian television. The context for these stories has been terrorism in Indonesia, particularly with reference to the Bali bombings.",
        "content": "<p>Indonesian perception of Australia: It really isn't a laughing matter<\/p>\n<p>S.P. SETH, Sydney<\/p>\n<p>In the last month or so, Indonesia has featured quite a few<br>\ntimes on prime-time Australian television. The context for these<br>\nstories has been terrorism in Indonesia, particularly with<br>\nreference to the Bali bombings. One of these programs was<br>\nrecorded in Jakarta with the participation of some high profile<br>\nIndonesian media personalities, including some Indonesian<br>\nstudents with Australia as their special subject. It was intended<br>\nto assess for the Australian audience back home Indonesian<br>\nperceptions of Australia around the anniversary of the first Bali<br>\nbombings.<\/p>\n<p>It was a good humored debate, with some Indonesian<br>\nparticipants taking a dig at Australia for its arrogance and<br>\ninsolence by stereotyping Indonesia as a terrorist territory,<br>\nwith its nearly 90 percent Muslim population. One intervention<br>\nwas particularly interesting, when someone pointed out how<br>\nrespectful Australia was toward Indonesia under the Soeharto<br>\nregime. When the Australian host of the program jokingly asked if<br>\nthis meant that Indonesians might like to revert back to those<br>\ntimes, everyone simply laughed it off.<\/p>\n<p>But it is not a laughing matter. Let us see why Soeharto had<br>\nto go. There were many reasons. But two stand out, in terms of<br>\nthe immediacy of his departure from power. First: there was the<br>\nAsian economic crisis of 1997\/98 which Soeharto could not<br>\novercome, as the West (International Monetary Fund et al.)<br>\nrefused to bail out his regime. Second: they would not do it<br>\n(except through the IMF austerity regime, making Indonesia an<br>\neconomic basket case) as Indonesia was no longer strategically as<br>\nimportant after the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p>Imagine such a crisis at the height of the Cold War with the<br>\nprospects of communists, at home and abroad, exploiting it for<br>\npolitical and strategic gains. The U.S. would have done<br>\neverything to ward it off. There was no such strategic compulsion<br>\nfor the U.S. in the late 1990s.  With Indonesia in economic and<br>\npolitical crisis, Soeharto had nowhere to go but quit to escape<br>\nbeing thrown out. And he wisely chose the former.<\/p>\n<p>But how is this related to the present situation? Like in the<br>\nCold War period when communism was the enemy, it is now<br>\nterrorism. In some ways, terrorism is even more pernicious<br>\nbecause it appears to be anywhere and everywhere. Its<br>\npractitioners are Muslim extremists, keen to blow up the world to<br>\ncreate a new paradise for those who share their beliefs.<\/p>\n<p>In this sense, they are self-appointed. And their natural<br>\nhomes are in predominantly Muslim countries. Among them Indonesia<br>\nhas the largest Muslim population in the world. It has Jamaah<br>\nIslamiyah, the ideological fountainhead of Indonesian and South<br>\nEast Asian extremism. The terrorists in Indonesia are real as<br>\nproven by the two Bali bombings, and other attacks at a hotel and<br>\nthe Australian embassy. Therefore, it is imperative that this<br>\ndanger be dealt with effectively.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia has only recently transited into a democratic system<br>\nfrom a 30-year dictatorship. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has the<br>\ndistinction of being the first directly elected president after<br>\nthe long Soeharto tyranny. It is a great achievement in the<br>\ncountry's democratic functioning.<\/p>\n<p>The Soeharto oligarchy was a wasted period in political terms<br>\nbecause its very arbitrary nature did not allow a self-sustaining<br>\nlegitimate pluralist system to flower and mature. Since his<br>\npolitical demise, a pluralist political culture is growing to<br>\nprovide the foundations of a healthy constitutional and<br>\ninstitutional structure. It has a long way to go, though, before<br>\nit can withstand pressures to whittle or manipulate it.<\/p>\n<p>There is always a tendency, anywhere in the world, to find<br>\nshort cuts to deal with terrible times and crimes. It is<br>\nhappening in old democracies like Britain, the U.S. and<br>\nAustralia, where a panoply of antiterror laws to over-ride civil<br>\nliberties have been enacted. There is no convincing proof,<br>\nthough, that repressive laws will do the job of tackling<br>\nterrorism any better than the existing laws. But it is still<br>\nhappening.<\/p>\n<p>The only consolation, if at all, is that with older<br>\ndemocracies their institutional maturity, combined with public<br>\ndebate (even though constrained under new laws) provides some<br>\nchecks and balances. The new antiterror laws in countries<br>\nchampioning democracy for the world are a poor reflection on<br>\ntheir credentials, when their governments are prepared to abridge<br>\ntheir own democracy when faced with challenges.<\/p>\n<p>But for new democracies, like Indonesia, such short cuts are<br>\nperilous, because of the danger of relapsing into the dreaded old<br>\nsystem. The case in point is the presidential order to reactivate<br>\nthe TNI's old role to tackle internal security, such as<br>\nterrorism. As TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto said, \"we will<br>\nalso activate the territorial command up to the village level.\"<\/p>\n<p>As is well known, under Soeharto the Army's territorial role<br>\nwas mostly used to create a climate of fear, intimidation and<br>\npolitical repression. And that mind-set in the Army will take a<br>\nlong time to change.<\/p>\n<p>It is not suggested that Susilo has any dark political motives<br>\nbehind his order to involve the army in the fight against<br>\nterrorism. He is saddened and angry at the terrorist bombings for<br>\nits indiscriminate killings and for tarnishing Indonesia's<br>\ninternational image. And he apparently believes that the Army<br>\nwill do a better job of eliminating terrorism. But there is need<br>\nfor extreme caution, knowing that Soeharto used similar<br>\ninstrumentalities to deal with communism and communists, when an<br>\nestimated 500,000 so-called communists were eliminated. Indonesia<br>\nis still bearing the scars of it.<\/p>\n<p>Susilo is no Soeharto, and the times are now different. But<br>\nSusilo is under pressure by the United States and Australia to<br>\ntighten his country's antiterror regime, which will inevitably<br>\ncurtail civil liberties, leading to the use of arbitrary powers.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia embarked on democracy when the Western countries<br>\nrefused to bale out the Soeharto regime during the Asian economic<br>\ncrisis. Now, as in their own countries, they are pressuring<br>\nIndonesia's new democracy to curtail, if not reverse the process.<\/p>\n<p>In an earlier era, during the Cold War, Soeharto's anti-<br>\ncommunist credentials and crusade won him support and plaudits<br>\nfrom the United States and Australia. Today, Susilo is being cast<br>\nin the role of a fighter against global terrorism in his country.<br>\nHow this will square with Indonesia's nascent democracy would<br>\nremain to be seen!<\/p>\n<p>The writer is a freelance writer based in Sydney.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesian-perception-of-australia-it-really-isnt-a-laughing-matter-1447893297",
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