Indonesian democracy: No turning back<\/p>\n
Part 1 of 2<\/p>\n
Satish Mishra, Chief Economist, UNSFIR\/UNDP, Jakarta<\/p>\n
All adult Indonesians who choose to do so go to the polls
\ntoday to elect a new House of Representatives,the Council of
\nRegional Representatives and local legislatures at provincial,
\nregency and municipal levels.<\/p>\n
They will again exercise their voting rights in May and
\npossibly in September to elect a new president and vice
\npresident.<\/p>\n
In such a historic expression of the people's will, it is
\nworth thinking about what we should vote for and what we should
\nvote against. The way we chose will determine the course of
\nIndonesia's future over the coming decade or more. The reason is
\nsimple. The coming elections represent an important next step in
\nthe consolidation of Indonesia's young and fragile democracy. We
\nare not used to such open elections.<\/p>\n
Over the last thirty or more years we have grown used to
\nletting our civil servants, our commanders or our community
\nleaders do the thinking for us. Now we have to take our future in
\nour own hands. It is time to begin thinking and choosing for
\nourselves.<\/p>\n
This is not easy. The long economic crisis has greatly eroded
\nour self confidence. It has changed our view of our selves. Only
\nyesterday, the world was praising our economic growth and
\ndevelopment. Foreign money and foreign businesses were flooding
\ninto the country. We were being held up as a model for other
\ndeveloping countries to emulate.<\/p>\n
Today, our large businesses are close to bankrupt, our banks
\nremain in distress, our workers out of jobs. An entire generation
\nof our young are threatened by a life time of economic
\ninsecurity.<\/p>\n
Democratic elections however confer not just a right but also
\na responsibility. That responsibility is the duty of every
\ncitizen to think in terms of the public interest, to play a part
\nin providing a national mandate by which the country should be
\ngoverned.<\/p>\n
In times of crisis and urgency, it is not only the leaders who
\nmust play a part in implementing sensible policies and in
\ncontaining the eruption of social violence. The citizen must also
\nguide the leadership and help to ensure that public institutions
\nremain open and honest. The democratic political system is a
\npartnership of state and the citizen. It is neither just citizen,
\nnor is it just state.<\/p>\n
Despite a sharp decline in national self confidence both State
\nand Citizen, must accept the historical responsibility that the
\ncollapse of the former political system has placed on us. We must
\nthink about what to do next. And we must think of it together.<\/p>\n
Climbing out of the abyss of a national crisis involves two
\nessential skills, the ability to learn from the past and the
\nability to look into the future. We need to do the first to avoid
\nrepeating expensive mistakes. We need the second to avoid
\nmistakes yet to come. Both are important in building a new
\nIndonesia. Let us begin with the lessons of history.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian national liberation struggle was founded on the
\nbelief that Indonesians had a right to self government. That
\nmeant a belief that all Indonesians, and not just the privileged
\nfew, had a right to have a voice in constructing the new post-
\nindependence Indonesia. This was a powerful emotion. Many died
\nfor it. In the end they succeeded. Indonesia was free. The
\nliberation spirit dominated immediate post-independence politics.<\/p>\n
Yet the passion that brought down the Dutch empire could not,
\nleft to itself, build the foundations of effective government.
\nGoverning institutions remained weak. The economy faltered.
\nSocial and political divisions could not be kept in check. The
\nresult in 1965 was the collapse of the regime and the death of
\nthousands of Indonesian citizens.<\/p>\n
The New Order was borne out of a fear of disorder. It played
\ndown the liberation spirit and built a powerful state. Political
\nlife was circumscribed. Attention was diverted to bread not
\nfreedom. Economic growth was heralded as the key to political
\nlegitimacy. Growth was to be driven by stability, order and a
\nconsensus imposed from above. The system proclaimed itself to be
\nrooted in Indonesian culture and psyche. In a tragic reversal of
\nhistory, it was assumed that most Indonesians preferred obedience
\nto self-determination.<\/p>\n
The obsession with order and control on the one hand and the
\ngreed unleashed by economic growth at any cost, on the other, led
\nto a hollowing out of key national institutions. Private business
\ndominated public life. ABRI, a renowned national institution
\nwhich had contributed so much to national independence was both
\nrobbed of adequate funding and infected with the divided
\nloyalties of political management.<\/p>\n
Centers of higher learning were turned into establishments of
\nstate ideology. The judiciary, normally a keeper of laws and an
\nindependent arbiter of disputes, was used to turn the scales of
\njustice in the favor of the economically and politically
\npowerful. The civil \"service\", turned it self into a secret
\nconclave of technical specialists far removed from those that it
\nwas expected to serve.<\/p>\n
To be sure, the New Order System, as have dictatorships in
\nmany parts of the world, did, for a time, deliver high economic
\ngrowth. For a while it was also lucky. In its first decade, oil
\nprices rocketed. The sharp increase in government revenue helped
\nconsolidate the new political system. Early growth was also
\nlabor intensive. It was driven by the green revolution and by the
\nemergence of labor intensive textile production. Labor moved from
\nthe village to the city. People got jobs even if wages remained
\nlow.<\/p>\n
On the whole, economic growth gave much to the few. It gave
\nvery little to the many. Despite high economic growth for over
\ntwo decades the lives of the majority of our people barely
\nhovered over absolute subsistence. Relative priorities given to
\nprograms which benefited the poor: In education, health and
\nsanitation remained well below even less well off neighboring
\ncountries.<\/p>\n
In other ways too, economic growth came at a heavy price. It
\nwas the product of a system of governance which had turned
\npersonal greed into public policy. It stifled initiative and
\ncreativity. It saw obedience to the authoritarian state the prime
\ncivic virtue and thus robbed the political system of a means of
\npublic criticism and correction.<\/p>\n
At the end of the day, the New Order collapsed like a large
\nand familiar tree, strong and everlasting from the outside but
\nhollow and weak from the inside.<\/p>\n
The lesson is clear. The liberation spirit which had brought
\nIndonesia its independence could not be ignored for ever. Its
\npower was seen in the first wave of Reformasi which ended
\nSoeharto's long rule. Times of economic shock often bring about
\nchanges in government.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, however, they brought about the collapse of an
\nentire socio-political system. Clearly, under the New Order the
\npendulum had swung too far. The State was given primacy over
\ncitizen. Growth, not freedom, became the source of political
\nlegitimacy. It was not a contract which the Indonesian people
\nwere willing to accept for ever.<\/p>\n
This article does not represent the views of UNSFIR, UNDP or
\nany other UN organization. The views expressed here are strictly
\npersonal.<\/p>",
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