Indonesia will survive, but needs fresh leadership<\/p>\n
By Michael Vatikiotis<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): When the Soeharto regime collapsed in May
\n1998, the world was in a hurry to herald a new democratic era in
\nIndonesia. But, two years on, one transitional government, a
\nhastily held general election, and an indirectly elected
\npresident hardly constitute a political transformation.<\/p>\n
Optimists say give the process time; at least it's moving in
\nthe right direction. They applaud President Abdurrahman Wahid for
\nkeeping the military out of politics. \"He's our Yeltsin,\" says
\none Indonesian senior editor, admiringly.<\/p>\n
But successful political change needs constant momentum, and
\nRussia is not the model. More realistically, reflecting on the
\npast two years, not enough has changed. If anything, some of the
\nworst aspects of New Order political culture have, like lingering
\nbacteria, survived and now threaten reform.<\/p>\n
Abdurrahman Wahid's government has employed some of the extra-
\nlegal and autocratic ways of the New Order regime to consolidate
\npower and pursue its aims.<\/p>\n
Parliament is investigating allegations that the President
\nabused his power, bent laws, and engaged in corruption. Gus Dur's
\nposition in the political party he leads, PKB, has been compared
\nto that of Soeharto in Golkar. He shows little respect for
\nparliament and threatens to use a loyalist mob if his position is
\nchallenged.<\/p>\n
His protection of crony businessmen is no secret -- he has
\nnamed them in cabinet meetings. On his numerous overseas trips,
\naides complain that his family's shopping habits are already more
\nextravagant than anything seen under Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The failings of Gus Dur's presidency reflect to a great extent
\nthe shortcomings of democratization in Indonesia, which has been
\nerratic and half-hearted.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's political and business elite simply does not have
\nthe courage or the imagination to push for real democratic reform
\nand are happy with a presentable status quo. Look no further than
\nthe leadership of Golkar, or the PDI-P.<\/p>\n
What's more, the conservative leadership of these parties find
\nsupport in the wider region for not rocking the boat too hard
\nbecause no one wants to see another political upheaval in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
The international community is more or less impotent.
\nAmericans bark and bay, but seem incapable of biting where it
\nhurts.<\/p>\n
Likewise the IMF and World Bank issue stern warnings, but
\ncannot afford to cut off the money. Foreign powers are afraid of
\nbeing labeled colonial.<\/p>\n
Singapore, where leaders tried to impress upon Gus Dur that it
\nis time to get serious, earned a vitriolic riposte from the
\npresident.<\/p>\n
The result is a disappointing array of half-measures. For most
\nof the country's political leaders, reform is simply a matter of
\nchanging clothes. There simply isn't the will to change, and here
\nlies the source of Indonesia's political problems and perhaps the
\nkey to its survival.<\/p>\n
Of course, it may be unfair to give this government a negative
\nreport card in the face of all it has to cope with: feed and
\nsettle over one million internal refugees, deal with fractious
\npoliticians, as well as appease foreign creditors.<\/p>\n
It may also be too much, after just two years cleaning up
\nafter the Soeharto era, to expect the emergence of a tidy
\ndemocracy with all the trimmings.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, it is time for some real change in Indonesia.
\nThe world is tired of hearing about the obstacles to reform posed
\nby the old guard, the need to consolidate power and deal with
\nunrest or secession.<\/p>\n
Apologies for Gus Dur generally dwell on his ability to keep
\neveryone off-balance-keeping the old guard at bay. Yet even his
\nclosest advisors have given up hope that he can implement real
\nreforms and they wait despondently for the next political crisis.<\/p>\n
Gus Dur flies around the world telling people that things are
\nimproving. He tells his advisors divine voices assure him that
\nthis period of upheaval will be followed by a long period of
\npeace and prosperity.<\/p>\n
Who is the president fooling? The knives are out, and guess
\nwhat? The cast of characters waiting in the wings to replace him
\ndoesn't have a radically different plan. The real threat to
\nIndonesia comes from the people who claim to be its leaders.<\/p>\n
Old elite survives<\/p>\n
Long term stability in Indonesia will only be assured if
\ndemocratic reforms lead to more direct representation to reflect
\nthe popular will on the one hand, and real legal and
\nadministrative reform on the other.<\/p>\n
Presently, the president is elected by the People's
\nConsultative Assembly, which itself is not wholly comprised of
\ndirectly elected representatives. The status quo suits the elite
\nfor two reasons.<\/p>\n
Firstly, it ensures that the country's leadership is
\ndetermined by a narrow group of vested interests. Secondly,
\nit keeps popular concerns at bay. We must assume that if
\npoliticians were more directly elected, the people would demand
\nswifter and deeper changes.<\/p>\n
The current system of indirect election means that the old
\npolitical elite survives, and therefore not much changes in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Why is Indonesia's elite so selfish? First of all, there are
\nmany reasons to hide the past and seek protection from it. The
\nnation's founding fathers were already divided one upon the
\nother.<\/p>\n
There were civil military tensions from the start -- Remember
\nGeneral Sudirman: \"the government can change everyday, but the
\narmy stays the same\". There were tensions between those who
\nfought the Dutch and those who collaborated; and there were
\nethnic and religious tensions.<\/p>\n
Then came 'Gestapu' and the upheavals of 1966. The trauma of
\nanti-communism and the rise of military rule created an overlay
\nof new fissures and a debt of blood.<\/p>\n
Hence today, we see Gus Dur struggling to reconcile his record
\nof support for human rights and religious tolerance with the
\nbloody legacy of his religious organization's role in the anti-
\ncommunist purges of 1966. Indonesia's history is littered with
\nunresolved and unreconciled conflicts.<\/p>\n
History has been hidden for so long that these conflicts are
\nonly now surfacing.<\/p>\n
Another reason why the elite finds it hard to embrace
\ndemocracy is that it is far too rich. Wealth creation in
\nIndonesia has been fantastically lopsided from the beginning. The
\nrhetoric of liberation was unaccompanied by a real re-
\ndistribution of wealth.<\/p>\n
The old elite, which was supported and patronized by the
\nDutch, continued to take shelter in a legal system after
\nindependence that drew on colonial Dutch law, which was framed on
\nprinciples of inequality.<\/p>\n
This situation remains basically unchanged, and no one wants
\nto see the system reformed overnight, because it would mean
\nhanding over their wealth and yielding to popular scrutiny and
\njustice. That's the basic fear.<\/p>\n
Key to survival<\/p>\n
Without a genuine commitment to democratic reform, it's hard
\nto imagine a stable outlook for Indonesia. But the country can
\nsurvive without democracy. How?<\/p>\n
By employing tried and trusted tools of authoritarian
\npolitical control. This means in all likelihood that the military
\nwill continue to play a role in politics and civilian supremacy
\nwill be hard to achieve.<\/p>\n
The army was unhappy about being sidelined politically and
\nnever had much faith in the democratic political process. Asked
\nrecently if he felt the civilians could succeed in stabilizing
\nthe situation in Indonesian, a senior army general replied: \"Make
\nme believe it.\"<\/p>\n
Sudirman's \"diktat\" lives on.<\/p>\n
Now, because the political elite is fearful about the future,
\nit has no choice but to protect the army's role in politics. This
\nexplains why the politicians agreed to preserve the military's
\npresence in parliament until 2009.<\/p>\n
That's why Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri is seen riding
\nin tanks and sporting military uniforms. She has acquired a
\ncoterie of former generals on her political staff.<\/p>\n
Gus Dur has angered the military by failing to manage the
\nthreat of secession in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The army has felt
\nhamstrung by the forced surrender of its security duties to the
\npolice.<\/p>\n
Senior generals are now openly calling for a new strategy,
\none that involves a greater measure of military security. Even
\nthe president's cabinet colleagues wish that he would, in the
\nwords of coordinating economics minister Rizal Ramli, \"bring in
\nofficers who can lead the troops.\"<\/p>\n
Firm leadership is a refuge of those who fear exposure to
\nthe popular will. Of course, in Aceh and Irian Jaya, they may
\njust be too late and political compromises that make concessions
\nto the separatists will need to be hammered out.<\/p>\n
Another major area of concern for the future is
\ndecentralization. Although few members of elite acknowledge it,
\nthe way Indonesia is governed is on the brink of change.<\/p>\n
From January 2001, all the country's districts will gain
\nmore autonomy. But again, the way Indonesia's elite works, this
\nmay obstruct rather than promote democracy. No one expects the
\nprovinces to have the resources to govern themselves -- the
\ncurrent budget does not provide for it.<\/p>\n
Local officials are if anything a thousand times more corrupt
\nthan their colleagues at the center, and consensus on how to
\ndivide up resources will be hard to reach.<\/p>\n
The prospect of local factions seeking help to resolve their
\ndisputes from powerful figures at the center has many observers
\nalready expecting Jakarta's power to be enhanced, not weakened.<\/p>\n
Bad name<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the legacy of a full year of \"democratic rule\", has
\nleft many people wondering if the exercise was worth it.<\/p>\n
Democracy means little to ordinary Indonesians whose
\nlivelihoods have not improved; democracy means nothing to Chinese
\nIndonesians who have not seen their opportunities to integrate in
\nsociety widen appreciably. Democracy means nothing to those in
\nthe business community, which sees missed opportunities to stamp
\nout bribery and corruption.<\/p>\n
The number of passive reformers, those who would support
\ndemocratic change, but not fight for it, far outnumbers committed
\nactivists.<\/p>\n
To many ordinary Indonesians or visitors to the country,
\npolitical freedom has brought anarchy and a breakdown in law and
\norder. Petty thieves are lynched in broad daylight, nightclubs
\nand bars are ransacked for staying open late, and dubious Islamic
\nactivists threaten to expel Americans, or worse.<\/p>\n
Government isn't working. Even the president's own spokesman
\nadmits that Gus Dur \"doesn't have the competence to govern.\"<\/p>\n
\"With democracy what you get is chaos,\" says a recently
\nretired army general. \"So people begin to think maybe the Chinese
\nare right, perhaps the Pakistanis are right.\" In short, democracy
\nIndonesian-style is giving democracy a bad name.<\/p>\n
After a recent visit to Indonesia, a Malaysian said he feared
\nthe \"the spillover effect all this uncertainty and instability
\nwill have on Malaysia and Singapore.\" Although critical of Prime
\nMinister Mahathir Mohamad, he said that \"one thing I see truth in
\nnow is what he has always said -- there are some people who are
\nnot ready for a full-fledged democracy.\"<\/p>\n
Fresh blood<\/p>\n
So, what can be done to save Indonesia's democracy and restore
\nthe region's faith in democratic values? Top of the list has to
\nbe a replacement of the current political elite.<\/p>\n
Avoiding messy conflict with the old guard by allowing them to
\nstay on may be appropriate in cultural terms, but it is holding
\nthe country back.<\/p>\n
Fresh blood is needed to remove lingering obstacles to reform.
\nSadly, under the current government or legislative arrangement
\nthis is hardly a realistic prospect.<\/p>\n
Proportional representation protects the old political elite
\nby ensuring they continue to be elected. \"In the proportional
\nsystem so long as you are close to the party leadership, you are
\nassured of a place,\" says Andi Mallarangeng, a young politician
\nwho is staying out of the fray for now.<\/p>\n
The MPR is constitutionally empowered to elect the president
\nand vice-president, but is virtually powerless to remove them.
\nGus Dur is out of touch with the country's youth; so is Golkar
\nand all the other major political parties. Their game is self-
\npreservation.<\/p>\n
Many of the smartest young political aspirants, figures like
\nAndi Mallarangeng, Faisal Basri, and others who made names for
\nthemselves at the dawn of \"reformasi\", are steering clear of the
\npolitical arena until closer to 2004, when fresh
\nelections are due.<\/p>\n
They are practicing a form of political cryogenics -- trying
\ntheir best to stay fresh and untainted so that when political
\nconditions improve they will be able to emerge.<\/p>\n
The only way to improve conditions sooner is to change the
\nrules. Indonesia needs a new constitution, and perhaps more
\nimportantly a fair and transparent constitution-writing exercise,
\nsimilar to the mechanism by which Thais accommodated public
\nopinion in the framing of Thailand's 1997 Constitution.<\/p>\n
There is nothing wrong with the principles enshrined in the
\n1945 Constitutions. But a new charter, building on the old one,
\nwould elaborate on the rights and obligations of the Indonesian
\npeople; it would make less ambiguous the form of democracy the
\ncountry now has.<\/p>\n
Skeptics thought that the new Thai constitution would be
\nineffective in the face of an ingrained tradition of patronage
\nand corruption. Yet powerful politicians have been hauled up on
\ncorruption charges and lost their jobs.<\/p>\n
Democracy would be served well by true legal reform. It simply
\nisn't possible to have any faith in the courts or law enforcement
\nagencies if members of the elite can flaunt authority and escape
\njustice by paying for protection from the law.<\/p>\n
The military would have done well to help enforce the law,
\nrather than standing aside and allowing the police to expose its
\ninstitutional weakness.<\/p>\n
Finally, Indonesians need to be properly enfranchised. Direct
\nelections are a must. It isn't sufficient to create layers of
\nrepresentation that insulates the elite from popular anger and
\nfrustration.<\/p>\n
All politicians must be accountable. Given the history and
\ntrack record of Indonesia's politicians, this will be the hardest
\nchange of all to swallow. For despite enjoying almost six decades
\nof freedom, the majority of Indonesians have yet to have a real
\nsay in how they are governed.<\/p>\n
The writer is Managing Editor of the Far Eastern Economic
\nReview in Hong Kong. A former Jakarta Bureau Chief for the
\nReview, he is the author of Indonesian Politics Under Suharto and
\na regular writer on Indonesian affairs.<\/p>",
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