Indonesia versus GAM: A diplomatic puzzle<\/p>\n
Teuku Faizasyah, Ph.D. Candidate, Diplomatic History
\nand Conflict Resolution, Waikato University, Hamilton, New Zealand<\/p>\n
The hardening position of the Indonesian government over the
\nrecalcitrant Free Aceh Movement (GAM) raises the question: Is a
\npeaceful solution to the Aceh conflict still feasible?
\nUndeniably, efforts to prepare the public for a military
\noperation take place on a daily basis. The military
\nestablishment, officials and also legislators appear to favor the
\nmilitary option. A "declaration of war" by the government of
\nPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri is only a matter of time.<\/p>\n
Apparently, today's hawkish attitude has sidelined the peace
\nefforts, and so the concern of Indonesian doves seems irrelevant.
\nUnfortunately, we are now living in an international structure
\nthat places faith in "military might". Is there still hope for
\ndiplomacy and peaceful negotiation? And can the Geneva-based
\nHenry Dunant Centre (HDC) remain a reliable third party?<\/p>\n
Questioning the validity of military operations when the
\ngeneral mood is for punitive action, would appear less than
\nnationalistic. But, to go for war without pondering other
\nalternatives is suicidal for at least two reasons.<\/p>\n
Firstly, a military operation would not guarantee a quick and
\na lasting solution to the problem.<\/p>\n
Secondly, a prolonged military conflict with excessive
\n"collateral damage" will further tarnish Indonesia's reputation
\ninternationally and renew domestic debate on the government's
\napproach to the Aceh problem. Moreover, the government and
\npolitical parties need to calculate the political cost of a
\npossible prolonged military conflict when an election year is on
\nthe horizon.<\/p>\n
So why what prevents us from giving peace through diplomacy
\nanother chance? Although diplomacy is concerned with peace, its
\ntraditional sphere is mainly in international relations.
\nTherefore, to use diplomacy in dealing with domestic problems,
\nespecially on the issue of separatism, is susceptible to
\ncriticism. Any contact is interpreted as a tacit recognition of
\nthe separatists.<\/p>\n
Indeed, by negotiating peace with GAM, assisted by the HDC,
\nIndonesia's diplomatic community dares to challenge the rigidity
\nof the established convention. At the least, from the perspective
\nof humanitarian concerns, the government with their good
\nintention and purpose signaled a willingness to meet their enemy
\nface to face.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is not the first country in Southeast Asia which has
\ninitiated a dialog with its enemy. The Philippines, under the
\nthen government of president Fidel Ramos was willing to explore
\nconflict resolution with all separatist groups in that country.
\nRamos was very resolute in his peace efforts because he knew that
\nstability was a prerequisite for his development program.<\/p>\n
To achieve stability, Ramos let his special envoys meet the
\nseparatists. They met not only to touch base, but also to try to
\nunderstand their differing positions and concerns.<\/p>\n
In the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),
\nPresident Ramos went further by approaching Indonesia to
\nfacilitate the peace process under the umbrella of the
\nOrganization of Islamic Conference (OIC). He let Indonesia assist
\nthe conflicting parties in building the edifice for peace, brick
\nby brick, and even spearheaded the peace campaign in his country.<\/p>\n
His efforts helped the domestic constituents and the
\nPhilippines military establishment share a similar understanding
\non the peace process. Most importantly, they trusted the
\ndiplomatic process.<\/p>\n
To a certain extent, in their dealings with GAM, Indonesia did
\ntry to utilize the experience gained from assisting the
\nFilipinos. Two of the leading players in the current dialog
\nprocess, current Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirayuda and
\nWiryono Sastrohandoyo, are veterans from the Moro peace process.<\/p>\n
They know that any peace dialog is not a linear process, that
\nthere will be trepidation; thus "patience" is the key word. The
\nparties' differing interpretation of "an agreed text" is a normal
\nfeature of any negotiation. It is the role of the negotiators to
\ndiscuss all the differences and build consensus gradually.<\/p>\n
Although the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed
\nin Geneva on Dec. 9, 2002 is still far from conclusive, the
\nprocess leading to its signing was an achievement in itself. The
\nmeetings provided the two parties with the opportunity to sit and
\ntalk directly for the first time.<\/p>\n
To scrap the COHA, and perhaps the negotiating forum itself,
\nbecause of some flaws during the implementation stage, is not
\nconsidered wise. Similarly, to question the impartiality of the
\nHDC, in the wake of its inability to persuade GAM to attend the
\nrecently aborted Joint Council meeting on a prescribed date, is a
\nsetback for the process. Through the HDC's assistance, both GAM
\nand the government are now aware of their individual positions,
\non what is and is not negotiable.<\/p>\n
The controversy surrounding the role of the HDC places their
\nfuture role in limbo. In theory, all parties to a conflict need
\nto put faith in their facilitator and trust its impartiality. At
\npresent, HDC's popularity is on the decline, but to discard its
\nfuture role in the peace process is, again, unwise.<\/p>\n
Over the past few years, the HDC, GAM and the government have
\ndeveloped their working relationship and this is an asset for the
\npeace process. To look for a new facilitator is a big gamble, and
\nmost likely this will put the negotiation process back to square
\none.<\/p>\n
Wise men tell us not to burn a house to kill a mouse. Although
\nsome blame GAM for being recalcitrant and for deteriorating
\nsecurity in Aceh, still it is not sensible to reject further
\nassistance from the HDC and to burn the Agreement to ashes. As
\nthe government's chief negotiator Wiryono pointed out succinctly
\nthat the Agreement was a modest but significant victory for both
\nsides, but both sides still have to work hard (The Jakarta Post,
\nMay 7).<\/p>\n
If at the moment that seems rather bleak, we should not let go
\nof any opportunity. Nowadays the role of diplomacy -- through
\nquiet, or informal, diplomacy -- is far more significant. The
\nIndonesian diplomatic community must observe the right timing to
\nrenew the negotiation process.<\/p>\n
Every conflict has its own life cycle and therefore, the third
\nparty and those involved in the conflict need to pay close
\nattention to the cycle. Now the cycle of the Aceh conflict is on
\nits high and usually in the face of possible armed conflict, new
\nstimuli and initiatives for dialog increase. Hopefully, all
\nparties to the conflict and the third party (the HDC) are
\nprepared to swing the pendulum back from the military option to
\ndiplomacy.<\/p>\n
For this to work, both the Indonesian government and GAM need
\nto tone down their war rhetoric. Although a firm position is a
\ngood strategy for negotiation, it does not benefit peace efforts.
\nIn fact, it could diminish the chance for dialog.<\/p>\n
And just like former president Ramos, the Indonesian
\ndiplomatic community needs to increase public diplomacy. They
\nneed to let the various groups in Indonesian society become aware
\nof the cost of a prolonged armed conflict to Indonesia's image
\ninternationally, as well as how it would impact the
\nsustainability of our development program.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesia-versus-gam-a-diplomatic-puzzle-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}