Indonesia must see facts in East Timor saga<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA: It is time for the Indonesian elite, and the military
\n(TNI) in particular, to get over Australia's role in concluding
\nthe sorry East Timor episode. That means acknowledging that in
\n1999 it was the TNI and the Habibie Government -- not the Howard
\nGovernment -- that were primarily responsible for the souring of
\nAustralia-Indonesia relations.<\/p>\n
President B.J. Habibie was irate in December 1998 when he
\nreceived a letter from John Howard suggesting that an offer of
\nwider autonomy to East Timor should also include the possibility
\nof independence at the end of a five-year to 10-year transition
\nperiod. Instead of Howard's proposal, he instructed his cabinet
\nto agree to give East Timor immediate independence if it so chose
\nin the plebiscite on autonomy then being negotiated with
\nPortugal, the original colonial power in the territory.<\/p>\n
Habibie did not want to take care of East Timor anymore
\nbecause he considered the cost too high, and because he felt he
\ncould not depend on Catholics there to remain loyal to the
\nrepublic at the end of the transition period.<\/p>\n
The manner in which he \"lost\" East Timor became one of the
\nmain reasons why, later in 1999, Habibie lost any chance of being
\nre-elected as president by the People's Consultative Assembly.<\/p>\n
It was obvious the TNI was never going to accept independence
\nfor East Timor, even though it did not protest openly against
\nHabibie's decision. Instead, it sabotaged the process by using
\nthe clandestine operations of pro-Indonesian leaders and militia
\ntrained by its intelligence agencies throughout the previous
\ndecade.<\/p>\n
When, against TNI expectations, the plebiscite was
\noverwhelmingly pro-independence, the TNI allowed the militia to
\ngo on the rampage.<\/p>\n
Western countries, including Australia, had completely failed
\nto appreciate that the weak Habibie government could not deliver
\non its promises. The East Timorese got their independence but at
\na tremendous -- and continuing -- cost.<\/p>\n
The East Timorese made the choice they did because of the
\nIndonesian military's history of abuses and excesses since
\nIndonesia annexed East Timor in 1976.<\/p>\n
And because the TNI kept East Timor as its special domain for
\nso long, it is possible that the military is the only part of the
\nIndonesian elite that is today really upset with the results of
\nthe plebiscite. The damage and humiliation is confined to it.<\/p>\n
Except for some TNI elements which organized anti-Australian
\ndemonstrations in Jakarta, the international intervention has not
\ncreated a widespread or deep enmity against Australia among the
\nIndonesian elite or the general population. The Indonesian elite
\nhas been more disturbed by Australia's rhetoric than its actual
\ninvolvement in and leadership of the East Timorese peacekeeping
\nforce, Interfet.<\/p>\n
In the end, Australia's actions and involvement in East Timor
\nhelped to limit TNI abuses and save the East Timorese from more
\ncalamities.<\/p>\n
Australia's intervention was with UN support and Indonesia's
\nconsent, however reluctantly given. Also, the Interfet commander,
\nGen. Peter Cosgrove, has himself said his operations could not
\nhave been as successful without the cooperation of the TNI under
\nGen. Kiki Syahnakri.<\/p>\n
Had the autonomy\/independence process happened over an
\nextended period, as suggested in Howard's 1998 letter, the
\nsituation might have been completely different. It might have
\nprepared the parties for reconciliation, and it might have
\nprepared the East Timorese to govern themselves. It could have
\nprevented civil war and the violent reaction from the TNI,
\nbecause the TNI needed time to come to terms with the idea of an
\nindependent East Timor.<\/p>\n
Independence would have been the most likely outcome after a
\nperiod of transition but it could have been peaceful, with all
\nparties prepared for the outcome.<\/p>\n
Australia-Indonesia relations are recovering. However, one
\naspect of the relationship that will need nurturing is military
\ncooperation. The TNI still hopes to have the Australian military
\nas a concerned partner, despite the recent cooling of relations.<\/p>\n
Australia has a strategic interest in improving the
\nrelationship, because Indonesia is an important neighbor and
\nstrategic friend and partner. This is not only true in bilateral
\nterms, but also in regional terms. Not only is Indonesia in
\ncrisis today, the region is in crisis. Cooperation between the
\nmilitary establishments of the two countries makes sense.<\/p>\n
However, if this cooperation is to be deepened, the TNI has
\nto cut its losses in East Timor and move on. That means stopping
\nthe activities of the militia along the border of West Timor,
\nrepatriating the refugees in West Timor and bringing the
\nperpetrators of human rights violations to court.<\/p>\n
The TNI has a long way to go on this, because it is still not
\nwilling to accept completely that independence is what the East
\nTimorese have decided on.<\/p>\n
There is an opportunity to deepen the relationship in the
\nfuture, because Indonesia is on its way to becoming a more
\nmatured democracy -- however difficult that process looks today.
\nSince this is a cathartic period for Indonesia, it is important
\nthat Australia is patient, and assists wherever it can to make it
\npossible for Indonesia to complete a transition that hopefully
\nwill not take too long.<\/p>\n
The writer is a board member of the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies in Jakarta. This article first appeared in
\nThe Sydney Morning Herald.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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