Indonesia in transition: Some parting thoughts<\/p>\n
By J. Stapleton Roy<\/p>\n
This is the first of a two-part presentation by the outgoing
\nU.S. Ambassador to Indonesia at the Indonesian Council on World
\nAffairs (ICWA) in Jakarta on Wednesday. The second installment
\nwill appear on Friday.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): I have been privileged to serve in Indonesia
\nduring a period of extraordinary crisis and change. My purpose
\ntoday is to share with you some personal thoughts on the sweeping
\nchanges that have occurred in Indonesia over the past three and a
\nhalf years and the challenges that loom ahead.<\/p>\n
Four years ago when I was preparing to come to this country,
\nmany of the best experts on Indonesia in the United States were
\ngenerous with their time in helping to prepare me for this
\nassignment. Their advice was invaluable. Indeed, one of my
\npredecessors warned me that I would fall in love with Indonesia.
\nHe was very close to the truth since I have indeed been both
\ncharmed and fascinated by Indonesia. In fact, when I think of
\nIndonesia's beauty as a country and the charm of her people, I am
\nalways reminded of the Shakespearean phrase describing Mark
\nAnthony's fascination with Cleopatra: \"age cannot wither her, nor
\ncustom stale her infinite variety.\"<\/p>\n
For nearly two years, I have read articles and news reports
\nabout Indonesia that have highlighted this country's
\ndifficulties. As we all know, those difficulties have been real,
\nnot imagined. But they have not been any more formidable than the
\ndifficulties faced by Indonesia when it became independent. And
\nyet the country has established a remarkable record of dealing
\nwith these problems successfully.<\/p>\n
Let's begin by looking at some of the things that Indonesia
\nhas done right.<\/p>\n
* No country so poorly prepared for independence as was the
\ncase for Indonesia has done as well at creating better social and
\neconomic conditions for its people, an achievement all the more
\nremarkable given this country's size and population.<\/p>\n
* Indonesia's extraordinary economic growth over the last
\nthirty years was real and has benefited all Indonesians, although
\nadmittedly some more than others.<\/p>\n
* Education and health standards have made impressive
\nprogress.<\/p>\n
* Indonesia put its resources into economic development rather
\nthan into expensive military hardware, with the result that
\nIndonesia's per capita military spending is among the lowest in
\nthe world.<\/p>\n
* The country has consistently promulgated a philosophy that
\ncelebrates diversity and preaches the tolerance necessary for
\ndiversity to work.<\/p>\n
* Indonesia made major strides in family planning largely
\nwithout resorting to the coercive methods that have marred
\nsimilar policies elsewhere.<\/p>\n
None of these accomplishments was predictable 30 years ago,
\nand indeed no one predicted they would happen. But they did.<\/p>\n
So the fact that I did not anticipate the experiences that I
\nhave faced in Indonesia is no fault of the experts who helped
\nprepare me for this assignment. Indonesia has conclusively
\ndemonstrated over the past two years that it is a country that
\ndefies predictability. This always gives me comfort when I find
\nthat my views about the future of this country are more
\noptimistic than those of the pessimistic prophets of gloom and
\ndoom.<\/p>\n
The failure of most observers to foresee the economic downturn
\nhere and the political changes that followed cannot obscure the
\nfact that strong impulses for change were already evident even in
\n1996, and these obviously had a major impact on subsequent
\ndevelopments. Even though Indonesia was stable and prosperous
\nwhen I arrived in January 1996, I had barely been here a few
\nweeks before it became apparent how strong the desire was in all
\nstrata of the population for political change. Under President
\nSoeharto, Indonesia had established a remarkable record of
\neconomic growth, but the President had held power for 30 years
\nand showed no signs of willingness to relinquish his grip on the
\nhelm of government. Moreover, evolutionary political change under
\nthe New Order had not kept pace with the rapid economic growth of
\nthe country. Nor had any preparations been made for a transfer of
\npower. These were obvious problems that were clearly visible in
\n1996, but no immediate solutions were evident.<\/p>\n
In essence, what has happened over the past two years is that
\nIndonesians have created an opportunity for change that
\npreviously did not exist. By and large, this has been achieved
\npeacefully, although there have been serious eruptions of
\nviolence. A similar opportunity existed in the mid 1960s, and two
\nextremely significant changes were among the results: first, the
\ncountry set out on a new economic course that proved remarkably
\nsuccessful; and second, Indonesia gave high priority to
\ndeveloping good relations with its neighbors in the region. This
\nin turn was an important factor enabling ASEAN to become a
\nthriving organization that has played a critically important role
\nin keeping regional tensions under control and that has earned
\nrespect throughout the world President Soeharto deserves enormous
\ncredit for these changes.<\/p>\n
Despite the high hopes of reformers at the time, however, the
\npolitical system under the New Order remained authoritarian
\nrather than open and participatory, even as economic development
\nand strides in education contributed to an information
\nrevolution. Over time, this contributed to distortions in
\neconomic policy and built up political tensions that finally
\nfound an outlet in the events of 1998.<\/p>\n
Just as in 1966, the new government will have an unprecedented
\nopportunity to put Indonesia on a new course. Decisions made
\nearly in the new administration could well determine how long and
\nhow open opportunities for further change remain. Whoever becomes
\npresident of Indonesia at the November session of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) will need to demonstrate quickly both
\nthe pace and the direction of the reform measures he or she will
\npursue. Otherwise, old ways and habits will just as quickly
\nregain their hold. As an outside observer, I would place these
\nchallenges into three broad categories: strengthening
\ninstitutions, including the present democratic political
\ntransition; continuing economic reform; and managing diversity.<\/p>\n
No aspect of strengthening institutions is more important than
\nconsolidating the present democratic political transition. Over
\nthe last four decades, I have served in nine different foreign
\nlocations and held 18 different jobs in the diplomatic service,
\nbut until eight weeks ago, I had never served abroad during a
\nfree and open multi-party democratic election. I am grateful to
\nthe people of Indonesia for giving me that experience for the
\nfirst time.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's stunning transition toward becoming the world's
\nthird largest democratic nation is a significant event for the
\ninternational community. Through their enthusiastic embrace of
\ndemocratic elections, Indonesians have shown that like South
\nAfricans, Nigerians, Venezuelans, Koreans, and others all over he
\nworld, they recognize that this is the fairest and most effective
\nway to provide for legitimate government that is accountable to
\nthe people.<\/p>\n
Obviously, if democracy is to flourish, both those elected to
\nlead the country, and those who are not, must participate in
\ngovernment and politics constructively, settle differences
\nhonorably, and place the best interests of the people first. As
\nSecretary Albright said in her speech here in Jakarta on March 5,
\n\"So every election participant should take heart. Today's losers
\nmay become winners tomorrow.\"<\/p>\n
International attention is now turning to composition of the
\nMPR, which will chose the new president and vice president later
\nthis year. We hope everyone involved in the MPR process elected
\nmembers of the parliament, appointed TNI members, and the
\nrepresentatives of regions and groups in the Assembly -- will
\nensure that the presidential and vice presidential selection
\nprocess is transparent and reflects the desire of the Indonesian
\npeople for continuing democratic reform.<\/p>\n
As we have said many times, the U. S. does not support any
\nindividual or party. Our interest is in seeing a credible,
\ntransparent democratic process take place that reflects the will
\nof the Indonesian voters. We believe that the Indonesian people
\nand their new political institutions, including a free press,
\nwill ensure that the process is open and just. We look -forward
\nto working with whatever government emerges after the MPR
\nsession, which we hope will meet and complete its work as
\nscheduled. As all of us recognize, political stability and a
\nlessening of current uncertainties will facilitate resolution of
\nother political, economic, and social issues.<\/p>\n
Indonesia now has the opportunity to create its own
\ndistinctive form of democracy. If the Indonesian people create a
\nsociety in which national policy decisions are made after
\ninformed public debate, in which leaders are selected through the
\nballot box; in which election winners and losers put aside
\npersonal and party interests for the good of the nation; in which
\ndissenting voices are accepted as vital to testing the validity
\nof ideas, then Indonesia will indeed be the world's third largest
\ndemocracy. Honest differences of opinion are normal in a
\npluralistic democracy. There must be a balance between necessary
\ngovernment authority and the freedom of citizens to pursue their
\nown interests, to express their opinions without unnecessary
\ngovernment interference, and to influence public policy.<\/p>\n
In my country, America's founders wanted government to have
\nthe authority to maintain public order and advance the national
\ninterest, but with no powers beyond the minimum needed for those
\nfunctions. James Madison wrote, \"If men were angels, no
\ngovernment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
\nneither external nor internal controls on government would be
\nnecessary. But in framing a government which is to be
\nadministered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this
\n-- you must first enable the government to control the governed,
\nand next, oblige it to control itself.\" It seems to me that this
\nis one of the basic issues to be considered here during the era
\nof reform.<\/p>\n
Change, of course, cannot be accomplished overnight. To ensure
\ncontinuity to this process, one of the biggest challenges facing
\nIndonesia's new government will be to use this opportunity wisely
\nto strengthen the country's institutions so that the country is
\ntruly governed by the rule of law and not by the whim of powerful
\nleaders or groups. During your first 50 years of independence,
\nyour leaders successfully established Indonesia as an independent
\nnation state and achieved impressive economic development.<\/p>\n
However, during this half century period virtually nothing was
\ndone to develop the parliament as a genuine legislative body, to
\nstrengthen the court system, to address the problem of deeply
\nrooted corruption, or to continue what the drafters of the 1945
\nconstitution recognized was unfinished business, which was to
\nthink creatively and imaginatively about what type of
\nconstitution would best suit the country.<\/p>\n
At Indonesia's present stage of development, these have become
\nurgent tasks. Fortunately, you are now able to draw on the
\nexperience you have accumulated over the past five decades to
\nunderstand the strengths and weaknesses of the 1945 constitution.
\nMoreover, the country's stronger economic foundation and better-
\neducated population will contribute to the proper working of
\nrepresentative government.<\/p>\n
Most importantly, only now, in 1999, has the 1945 constitution
\nbeen used to hold genuinely free and fair elections for the
\nparliament. One of the strengths of the constitution is that it
\nproved capable of providing the framework for democratic
\nelections. But it would be unwise to forget that in previous
\nyears it has also provided a framework for implementing
\nauthoritarian government. The experience of using it for its
\nproper purpose has, more than anything else, revealed what needs
\nto be changed and where it would be dangerous to tinker.<\/p>\n
From my perspective as a foreigner, much of the debate about
\nconstitutional change has been far, too abstract. Even a casual
\nreading of the constitution in the light of the experience
\nprovided by the June 7 parliamentary elections would suggest some
\nof the basic areas that need to be addressed. These become even
\nclearer when we look at the problems that arise when the
\nconstitution is used as the basis for a multi-candidate
\npresidential selection process, as it will be this year for the
\nfirst time in your history as an independent country.<\/p>\n
I am not a constitutional scholar, of course, so these
\nobservations should be treated as an effort to contribute to an
\ninformed debate. It is obviously for Indonesians themselves to
\ndecide what should be done. In that spirit, let me offer some
\nthoughts on various aspects of the 1945 constitution.<\/p>\n
Based on your experience this year, the public discourse on
\npolitical change that we have heard from across the political
\nspectrum here, and international experience with constitutional
\ndevelopment, there are at least four broad areas where changing
\nthe 1945 Constitution, or using its own provisions, would
\nstrengthen its commitment to making Indonesia a state in which
\nthe people are sovereign and where democracy will ensure social
\njustice for the whole Indonesian people. These include the
\nsections of the Constitution dealing with:<\/p>\n
* Choosing the people's representatives through a democratic
\nprocess;<\/p>\n
* Limiting power and providing checks and balances among
\ninstitutions of government to prevent or curb abuses of power;<\/p>\n
* Guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms; and<\/p>\n
* Keeping the Constitution a living document by using its
\nprovisions for amendment.<\/p>\n
Let us briefly look at these for areas<\/p>\n
First is the question of how your national leaders are
\nselected. Article 2 of the constitution provides that the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly or MPR will consist of the Council
\nof People's Representatives, that is, the parliament or DPR,
\naugmented by delegates from the regional territories and groups
\nas prescribed by statute. The constitution does not specify the
\nnumber of such delegates who can participate in electing the
\npresident. Under President Soeharto it was 500. Now it is 200. It
\ncould be 20. It could be 2,000. All would be constitutional if
\nthe electoral law was drafted that way. Nor is it specified that
\nthese delegates be elected rather than appointed. Not
\nsurprisingly, this vagueness provides a giant loophole that
\nundermines the constitution's utility as a guarantor of
\ndemocratic governance.<\/p>\n
Similarly, Article 19 does not provide that members of the DPR
\nshould be elected, a fundamental requirement of any democratic
\nsystem of government. It merely specifies that the structure of
\nthe DPR shall be established by law. Such vagueness is an
\ninvitation to abuse. Surely, by their performance in the June 7
\nelections, Indonesians have earned the right to have the
\nConstitution specify that the DPR must be an elected body.<\/p>\n
On the question of selecting the President and Vice President,
\nArticle 6 does provide that the President and Vice President
\nshould be elected by the MPR by majority vote, but there is even
\ndisagreement over the meaning of the term \"by majority vote\"
\n(dengan suara yang terbanyak). Moreover, some are now proposing
\nthat the president should be elected-directly by the people. How
\nto revise the constitution to accomplish this will require
\ncareful study since electing the president and vice president is
\none of the principal functions of the MPR, along with drawing up
\nthe broad outlines of state policy (GBHN) and determining the
\nconstitution. Aside from this question, Article 7, as many have
\nalready pointed out, does not specify how many times the
\npresident and vice president can be reelected. Many countries
\nwith democratic systems of government have found it desirable to
\nlimit terms in some fashion.<\/p>\n
Of lesser importance, but potentially significant in a
\nsuccession scenario, the constitution does not specify that the
\npresident and vice president should be politically compatible
\nwith each other. In theory, the MPR has the authority to elect a
\npresident from one party and a vice president from an opposing
\ngroup. This would raise serious succession issues. The United
\nStates encountered this problem at an early point in our history,
\nand we found it necessary to amend our constitution to correct
\nit.<\/p>",
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