Indonesia: How to restore confidence<\/p>\n
This is the second article on restoring confidence by
\nLaksamana Sukardi, former state minister of investment and state
\nenterprises development.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Transparency is obviously a key component of
\ngood governance. It refers to open information and procedures.
\nCorruption and dictatorship thrive on secrecy. Secrecy and
\ndemocracy are completely incompatible. There can be no such thing
\nas government of, by, and for the people if the people have no
\nidea what those in government are doing.<\/p>\n
If the people are not able to see how positions are awarded or
\npolicies are decided, they are disempowered and legitimacy is
\nlost.<\/p>\n
The current government has not gone far enough to increase
\ntransparency. Although we have a more open press in Indonesia,
\naccess to information is still a problem and reporters are still
\nkept in the dark about many key decisions and procedures.<\/p>\n
This is a dangerous combination: an open press but a non-
\ntransparent government. Over time, the legitimacy of the new
\ngovernment will collapse. We see the process of erosion already
\nstarting.<\/p>\n
A key area for immediate action must be the reform of
\nIndonesia's rotten legal system. The people get to express their
\ncommitment to change only once every five years in the national
\nelections. But it is through the legal system that the struggle
\nfor rule of law can and must be an on-going endeavor.<\/p>\n
Nearly all judges in Indonesia today are products of the New
\nOrder military regime. As a result, they are thoroughly corrupt.
\nWhere should we start in rebuilding the system?<\/p>\n
There are two broad choices we face, and both are going to
\ntake time: either we should try to reform the judges already in
\nthe system or we should sweep all of them out and start from
\nsquare one.<\/p>\n
All the evidence so far suggests that keeping the current
\njudges and trying to rehabilitate them (it's like sending a drug
\naddict to a detoxification center -- in this case addiction to
\nmoney for judgments) is not working and not likely to work.<\/p>\n
Just consider the Bank Bali case, the Texmaco case, and the
\ntrials involving the Soeharto family members. It is clear to
\neveryone that Indonesia's courts are a joke.<\/p>\n
We would be better off firing all the judges at one time and
\ninstalling inexperienced young judges, elderly legal
\nprofessionals, and even law professors. I would rather have a
\nlegal system where the main problem was inexperience rather than
\ncorruption.<\/p>\n
Inexperience is something which corrects itself over time with
\nmore and more experience. The opposite is true with corruption.
\nIt only gets worse as judges get more and more experienced at the
\nfine art of demanding and accepting payoffs.<\/p>\n
The best hope for rapid legal reform in Indonesia is starting
\nfrom scratch. Any other approach is likely to take much longer
\nand not likely to yield positive results because the vested
\ninterests in the legal system are too deep.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has a long way to go before we can call the country
\ntruly democratic. The quality of the political parties is
\nmiserably low. Their internal structures are weak and the
\ndefinition of their positions and issues is almost impossible to
\nunderstand. For the masses, the focus is still on abstract
\nsymbols from the past, primordial sentiments, or the emotional
\nadoration of individuals who lead the parties.<\/p>\n
This is a fragile and dangerous situation because major shifts
\nin loyalty can occur suddenly when institutional organization is
\nweak.<\/p>\n
As another sign of our weak democracy, we still do not elect
\nindividual candidates in Indonesia. This means that there is
\nalmost no accountability between our elected leaders and their
\nso-called constituencies.<\/p>\n
What happened last October in the meeting of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly was constitutional, but not very
\ndemocratic. A man was chosen as president without having run for
\nthe office and without being the leader of any party. His party
\nwas not even among the top three winners of votes in the
\nelection.<\/p>\n
Democracy in Indonesia is designed to give maximum power to
\nelites to broker backroom deals. The voters play only a minor and
\ntemporary role in the process. The people can express their
\nchoices through voting, and yet anything is possible in the MPR
\nmeeting.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has a strange mix of parliamentary and presidential
\nelements. The current President rose to office based on a
\ncoalition that excluded the largest winner in the election, the
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). He then
\nproceeded to include individuals from various parties in his
\ncabinet to reflect the power-sharing that made his presidency
\npossible in the first place.<\/p>\n
In subsequent cabinet reshuffles, the President has
\nsystematically undercut the power-sharing arrangement and put
\nmore and more of his own people in place.<\/p>\n
There are several things that need to be considered about this
\nprocess. The first is, on what basis were ministers pushed out?
\nWere the reasons legitimate and was the process transparent? His
\nlast reshuffle, for instance, caused a major public uproar and
\ndestabilized the financial markets. The way in which the
\nreshuffle was handled was particularly disruptive.<\/p>\n
A second consideration is whether a president should have a
\nfree prerogative to set up his cabinet as he wishes. In a
\nstrictly legal sense, he does. And one could even argue that
\nparticularly for the economic portfolios, it is a very good idea
\nthat the minister be able to work in close coordination with each
\nother and with the president.<\/p>\n
But there are considerations beyond narrow legalities and
\nteamwork. Indonesia is a new democracy and broad political
\nsupport is crucial for any leader who wants to push through basic
\nchanges in the system. This is the dilemma for the President to
\nconfront and solve.<\/p>\n
Where is Indonesia heading?<\/p>\n
To close, it must be recognized that negative perceptions of
\nIndonesia, both at home and abroad, are building. Other than
\nrolling back the military and the investigation of human rights
\nviolations in East Timor, there has been very little good news
\ncoming from this government.<\/p>\n
And even the military rollback cannot be viewed as permanent
\nif no progress is made on the other fronts that are crucial for
\nmoving the country forward politically and economically. There
\nare already signs that confidence among the top brass of the
\nmilitary is being restored as they watch the civilians spinning
\ntheir wheels in the mud.<\/p>\n
Although the danger of a military take-over seems low at the
\nmoment, it remains a real possibility in Indonesia, and one that
\ncould grow more likely if the government's performance over the
\ncoming seven months is as poor as we have seen during the first
\nseven months.<\/p>\n
Restoring confidence in Indonesia depends on taking serious
\nand dramatic action and engaging in less talk.<\/p>\n
Legal reform remains the single largest priority. Everything
\nelse, including bank restructuring and private sector work outs,
\ndepends on the legal system. The public and private investors are
\nhungry for immediate action.<\/p>\n
The distortions in the democratic system must also be
\nrectified. This means making sure the government has broad
\nsupport in the legislature.<\/p>\n
And setting a standard of integrity and transparency at the
\nhighest level of government is also desperately needed if
\nanything else is to succeed. Cases like the Bulog affair and
\nother rumors of rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism at the
\nhighest levels do major damage to confidence.<\/p>\n
If the government fails to rise to these challenges, there can
\nbe no restoration of confidence in Indonesia.<\/p>",
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