Indonesia-Australia ties: What went wrong?<\/p>\n
By Hal Hill and Chris Manning<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles exploring the low ebb in the
\nJakarta and Canberra ties.<\/p>\n
CANBERRA (JP): As the Timor crisis deepened in 1999, relations
\nbetween Australia and Indonesia soured, and then deteriorated
\nseriously, sharply and unexpectedly in September-October.<\/p>\n
After a decade of seemingly positive and broad-based
\nexpansion, developing into what some came to regard as an
\nemerging 'special relationship', these two months witnessed
\nunprecedented recrimination and antagonism.<\/p>\n
Although an open, formal rift was avoided, the cooling of
\nrelations was reflected in public statements made at the highest
\nlevel.<\/p>\n
President Habibie referred in the Indonesian parliament to
\nAustralia's unwelcome 'interference in Indonesian affairs', while
\nPrime Minister Howard spoke of the need to assert 'Australian
\nvalues' in the region rather than kowtowing to the policies of
\nneighbors, referring (implicitly) especially to Indonesia.<\/p>\n
At the heart of the matter was the crisis in East Timor. The
\nextensive and almost instantaneous coverage by the international
\nelectronic media of the tragic events in Timor, together with its
\ntendency to highlight isolated and extreme reactions in both
\ncountries, heightened the sense of crisis.<\/p>\n
It contributed to emotional responses. Australian unions
\nboycotted Indonesian ships and Garuda passengers were harassed,
\nthe Indonesian flag was burnt and the Indonesian Ambassador could
\nnot enter his office for over a week.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, in response, there was an almost continuous
\ndemonstration outside the Australian embassy, seemingly (if TV
\nshots were to be believed) verging on violence.<\/p>\n
Australian offices were attacked and Australian citizens
\nthreatened. At the nadir of the relationship in early October
\n1999, Indonesians saw Australia -- seemingly too enthusiastically
\n-- take the lead in the formation of a multinational force,
\nUNAMET, to restore order following the post referendum militia
\nrampage in Timor.<\/p>\n
But many Indonesians saw Australians zealously entering 'their
\nterritory' (as most Indonesians regarded East Timor then), and
\nbehaving in a militaristic and bellicose fashion -- the armed
\nAustralian soldier standing over the defenseless Timorese youth,
\nfor example.<\/p>\n
How and why was the relationship so easily and quickly
\nderailed? And where do we go from here?<\/p>\n
Answers to these questions are important, not just for
\nAustralia and Indonesia but, more broadly -- since the two
\ncountries are the dominant powers of the South Pacific and
\nSoutheast Asia respectively -- for the harmony of the region.<\/p>\n
It was not just the Australian actions which angered many
\nIndonesians. Australia's style was unpalatable. Indonesia
\nexpected its neighbor to show some understanding of Jakarta's
\npredicament (at least that of a weak civilian government), and to
\nhelp calm the situation.<\/p>\n
But instead Australia appeared to take the lead in condemning
\nIndonesia. The voice of Australia -- its media, its politicians
\nand its people -- appeared more strident than any other. Even
\nliberal-minded and sympathetic Indonesian figures, such as
\nSarwono Kusumaatmadja and journalist Wimar Witoelar, saw
\nAustralian reactions as 'arrogant' or 'insensitive', its words
\nand actions smacking more of a colonial power than an
\nunderstanding neighbor.<\/p>\n
Conversely, in September, Australians watched each night on
\ntelevision the abuse of a poor and innocent people, whose only
\n'crime' was that they clearly and decisively voted for
\nIndependence.<\/p>\n
Why couldn't the all-powerful Indonesia military assist these
\npeople and control the violence, Australians (and indeed the
\nworld) asked.<\/p>\n
Why was the government in Jakarta so seemingly two-faced in
\nresponse to international criticism?<\/p>\n
The immediate cause of tension -- a process of decolonization,
\nstrongly opposed by elements of the Indonesian military and
\nequally strongly supported by large sections of the Australian
\npublic, and by their government -- which erupted in violence, was
\nas difficult a problem as most neighbors will ever face.<\/p>\n
In one sense, it was a credit to the leaders of both countries
\nthat diplomatic relations remained open, despite many calls from
\ntheir domestic constituencies for radical action.<\/p>\n
But beyond the immediate rift, ill-informed recriminations and
\nthe proliferation of stereotypes revealed that there is still a
\nfundamental lack of understanding of national characteristics and
\npolitical processes in each country -- a lack of understanding
\nwhich was all too easily manipulated by mischievous elements on
\nboth sides.<\/p>\n
Among these caricatures of each other, Indonesians often view
\nAustralians as white, racist, rich, arrogant, and possessing an
\nunrivaled propensity to lecture other countries.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, many Australians continue to view Indonesia
\n(even after fall of the Soeharto) as corrupt, brutal,
\nmilitaristic, authoritarian, and maintaining an iron grip on a
\nreluctant non-Javanese citizenry in the eastern provinces.<\/p>\n
Like all caricatures, there is an element of truth in these
\nviews. But as generalizations they are seriously distorted.
\nMany Australians, especially in the media, failed -- or didn't
\nwant -- to recognize, the broad-based improvements in Indonesian
\nliving standards since the mid 1960s, across both socio-economic
\ngroups and its far-flung regions.<\/p>\n
Australians have also tended to pay scant attention to deep
\nhistorical and cultural sensitivities. Having never been a
\npoverty stricken colony, never been invaded by a foreign power,
\nand never had to fight a protracted and bloody war of
\nIndependence, most Australians don't have the historical
\nperspective to understand Indonesian sensitivities on key issues.<\/p>\n
Flag-burning, for example, arouses little passion in
\nAustralia, yet for most Indonesians it is a highly provocative
\naction.<\/p>\n
With a hard-fought Independence achieved just two generations
\nago, destruction and defamation of national symbols by a
\nneighbor is quite shocking to many Indonesians.<\/p>\n
The fact that Australians are predominantly rich and white,
\nand are culturally disposed towards frank and blunt expressions
\nof opinion abroad -- mirroring the style of domestic debate --
\nfurther complicates the issue.<\/p>\n
These misperceptions work in both directions, however. It is
\ntrue that Australia maintained a discriminatory immigration
\npolicy until about 1970 (the so-called 'White Australia Policy'),
\nand that for the first 180 years of European settlement the
\ntreatment of aboriginal people was disgraceful.<\/p>\n
But things have changed much in Australia over the past 30
\nyears. Australia now has an open, non-discriminatory immigration
\nprogram, matched by very few countries.<\/p>\n
The resulting societal transformation has been rapid and
\nAustralia is arguably one of the world's most vibrant multi-
\ncultural societies.<\/p>\n
Its generous refugee program has few parallels, certainly in
\nthis region. It is true that this 'multiracialism has been
\nstrongly criticized at home -- the 'Pauline Hanson' factor.<\/p>\n
But the immigration program continues to attract bi-partisan
\npolitical support. The One Nation party is now in decline and
\nnever captured votes on a scale comparable to similar parties in
\nthe U.S. and Europe.<\/p>\n
It is also true that Australia's aboriginal community
\n(numbering about 250,000 persons) have unacceptably low living
\nstandards. But there are many 'positive discrimination' programs
\nand the community's problems are openly acknowledged and debated
\nwithin and outside government.<\/p>\n
In addition, Australia continues to be one of the major donors
\nto Indonesia, including a generous scholarship program. It
\nstrongly supported the international financial rescue effort in
\nthe wake of the economic crisis and, despite fiscal austerity at
\nhome, the real value of aid has been broadly maintained.<\/p>\n
Australia's per capita income is now below both Singapore and
\nHong Kong, neither of whom provides aid to Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The Australian press is often seen as a complicating factor in
\nbilateral relations. It is easy to understand Indonesians' anger
\nhere: in recent times, the extraordinarily rude and ill-informed
\ntelevision interview with the Indonesian ambassador on a
\ncommercial network, and the 60 Minutes team crassly walking into
\na 'minefield' by asking queuing East Timorese how they would vote
\nin the referendum.<\/p>\n
More generally, many Australian journalists, with their
\nsingle-minded focus on human rights, East Timor, and corruption,
\nhave failed dismally to present a balanced picture of the
\ncomplexity of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
There is no doubt that, rightly or wrongly, the murder of five
\njournalists in Balibo in late 1975 has contributed to this press
\nhostility towards Indonesia. But, while Indonesian dismay is
\nquite understandable, here too the issue is not amenable to
\nsweeping generalizations. There have been some very fine
\nAustralian journalists in Indonesia, particularly in the print
\nmedia.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's sometimes heavy handed press controls needlessly
\nantagonized the foreign (and of course the domestic) press. And
\nthe problems with the Australian press have arisen in part from
\nproximity and familiarity.<\/p>\n
The New York Times, London's Guardian, Dutch papers, the BBC
\nand CNN have often been just as critical as Australian outlets.
\nBut because there are not as many of them, and they don't report
\nas often, the tensions have not been so great.<\/p>\n
The authors are respectively professor of economics and head
\nof the Indonesia Project, Research School of Pacific Studies and
\nAsian Studies, and Asia-Pacific School of Economics and
\nManagement, the Australian National University.<\/p>",
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