Indonesia at crossroads after 53 years of independence<\/p>\n
By Mohammad Sadli<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): As it turns 53, Indonesia finds itself at a
\ncrossroads. It is not the first time. Our country went through
\nConstitutional changes in its early years when we had prime
\nministers rather than strong presidents. Then we saw a changing
\nof the guard when the old Sukarno order made way for the \"New
\nOrder\" of Soeharto.<\/p>\n
Today, the government catchword is not the \"New Order\"
\nanymore, but the \"Reform Order\" since Soeharto does not reign
\nsupreme.<\/p>\n
The junction we find ourselves at has no clear road signs.
\nYet, it is most compelling, and also confusing, as our domestic
\npolitical players must switch gears as they choose which way to
\ngo. Everybody agrees that we need to get rid of the Soeharto
\nstyle of political repression. But what alternatives will we
\nchoose?<\/p>\n
The new president, B.J. Habibie, is trying hard to shed his
\nold image of a long time understudy of the old political maestro.
\nHe wants to go down in history as a leader who is more
\naccessible, folksy and amicable, i.e., the \"you can touch me\" and
\n\"call me Rudi\" type. This is an image completely different from
\nhis stern-looking and up-on-a-pedestal predecessor.<\/p>\n
Habibie says that his Cabinet sessions now see open
\ndiscussions with give-and-take between the chief executive and
\nhis ministers. But that only affects style. What about substance?
\nIn this, Habibie and his Cabinet are also doing their best. He
\ncalls his administration the \"development and reform government\".<\/p>\n
He is looking to reform the political system. The election
\nsystem will be changed from a proportional (or party list) system
\n-- in which voters actually chose a party rather than individual
\ncandidates, which allowed Golkar leaders to place obedient
\nfollowers in the legislature regardless of whether they had ever
\nlived in the district -- into a \"district system\", in which
\nindividual candidates are chosen by the voters.<\/p>\n
Such reform, some say, will not change the fact that Golkar
\nhas the potential to win a majority again.<\/p>\n
Others, however, predict that the new national legislature
\nwill be full of popular religious leaders elected by their
\ndistricts. Depending on how the districts are drawn up, the
\nsystem could be harsh on minorities and bountiful to large
\nparties.<\/p>\n
Hence, many have agreed now that there should be a combination
\nbetween the two systems, which could develop over time. But who
\nshould decide how the two are mixed and what changes occur over
\ntime?<\/p>\n
Before the end of the year, though, the legal reforms
\npertaining to the election and political system should be in
\nplace because the date for the general election has been set for
\nMay 1999.<\/p>\n
With no current restrictions on the formation of political
\nparties, a large number (as many as 58) have either been
\nregistered or have been publicly announced. Many political
\nobservers believe, however, that the number of parties should
\neventually not exceed, say, eight.<\/p>\n
The German model of refusing a party that cannot win a minimum
\nnumber of seats totaling 5 percent has become popular. But how
\nwould this recognize small parties of legitimate minorities? Of
\ncourse, Indonesia could follow another example, like the one in
\nSingapore, where non-Chinese minorities are guaranteed a number
\nof seats in the legislature. All such details have to be agreed
\nupon in very short period of time. But perhaps our lack of time
\nwill turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Given unlimited time,
\npoliticians and lawmakers often never come to a consensus.<\/p>\n
Military<\/p>\n
The role of the military is now also under debate. Young
\nIndonesians see no use for the \"dual function\" of the Armed
\nForces (ABRI). Together with Soeharto, they made a mess out of
\nnation building. On the other hand, ABRI is still a major
\npolitical force. When looking at the \"Turkish formula\", in which
\na civilian president is watched over by the army, we can see
\nseveral similarities with our political system.<\/p>\n
Should the military have a quota of seats in the House of
\nRepresentatives (DPR), or in the bigger People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR)? Certainly, in the next legislature or in the
\nfuture, that should be decided by what is deemed necessary at the
\ntime.<\/p>\n
The succession from Soeharto to Habibie has been called by
\nsome foreign observers as having gone \"smoothly\". Perhaps that
\nis true compared to 32 years ago when it was much more bloody.
\nOne of the direct costs was the lives of four Trisakti University
\nstudents. Without this incident, Soeharto most probably would not
\nhave relinquished his power.<\/p>\n
The indirect cost was much greater -- that is, the loss of
\nmore than 1,000 lives during the May riots. The economic costs
\nhave included a serious battering of the rupiah, a further slump
\nin the manufacturing sector, hundreds of thousands of newly
\nunemployed workers, and a near breakdown of law and order taking
\nthe form of mass actions, sometimes accompanied by loss of
\nproperty, looting of crops (including coffee beans) and prawns,
\nand the seizure and hijacking of container ships. Because labor
\nunions have been given freer reign, while wages have remained
\ndepressed, we can expect more labor actions affecting the
\nbusiness climate.<\/p>\n
The nation has never been properly prepared for such a sudden
\nsuccession, though in retrospect, the fall of Soeharto was
\npredictable months before it happened. But before that, the
\norganized political system, the bureaucracy and the military did
\nnot even dare to think about a \"post-Soeharto\" situation.<\/p>\n
From now on, the system will definitely be much more
\ndemocratic. On the other hand, order should be preserved so as
\nnot to throw sand into the economic machine. How should we manage
\nthis transition and who should lead the country?<\/p>\n
Due to the political process surrounding the succession, the
\ntransition is now being led by a government which, in terms of
\nleading personalities, is still very much an extension of the old
\nSoeharto regime.<\/p>\n
Because of this, the present government is politically
\ntainted.<\/p>\n
ABRI, having to cope with the maintenance of law and order,
\nhas also called for a gradual approach to reform. General
\nWiranto, its chief, still has problems within his ranks. He has
\nmanaged to win a power contest with Prabowo, Soeharto's son-in-
\nlaw, though some problems may still come from this.<\/p>\n
Hence, ABRI's leadership, under the circumstances, does not
\nhold a strong card.<\/p>\n
Habibie realizes that he is a transitional president tainted
\nby past political affiliations. However, he does not want to go
\ndown in history as a mere footnote. He is working very hard to
\naccommodate popular demands and please everybody, even the
\ninternational world, by, for example, helping along the peace
\nprocess for East Timor.<\/p>\n
In a way, that will make him a popular \"reformer\", but one
\ncannot please everybody all the time. Sooner rather than later,
\nsome people will get mad at him. In the end, he is, by definition
\n(of a transitional leader), a weak president.<\/p>\n
Golkar, the major political supporter of the government, has
\nalso been weakened. It may face a significant loss of votes in
\nthe planned May 1999 general election.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, since it has the best political machinery
\nin the country, Golkar may be able to garner enough votes to
\nremain indispensable in the formation of any government,
\nespecially because the \"opposition\" will probably be splintered
\nand weak in organization, with not much money to finance its
\ncampaigns. Officially, ABRI and the bureaucracy should not
\nsupport Golkar much longer, but one does not know how this will
\nbe in reality.<\/p>\n
And where are the students who were able to persuade Soeharto
\nto step down from the presidency? Nobody seems to know what has
\nhappened to them as a political force. Are they like the gallant
\ncowboy who, after the shoot-out, silently rides away into the
\nsunset without even claiming recognition? Most Indonesians do not
\neven know who their leaders are, let alone their future agenda.<\/p>\n
With all these changes and the weakness of both the old forces
\nof Soeharto and the opposition, how will the political map be
\nshaped? We do not know, but this uncertainty will affect the
\nother aspects of civil life, especially the economy. The only
\nconsolation is that it may enable a \"thousand flowers to bloom\".
\nBut at some stage, there will be the danger of a power takeover
\nby a strong man and a setback of our country's flowering
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
The Habibie and Akbar Tandjung faction has won the leadership
\ncontest in Golkar's recent extraordinary congress. Had retired
\nGen. Edi Sudradjat won the contest, that could have paved the way
\nto a change in the presidency in a special MPR session planned
\nfor November. Now it looks that Habibie will reign until the end
\nof the century. Is this (relative) political stability better?
\nPerhaps for politics, but we cannot be so sure for the economy.<\/p>\n
Economy<\/p>\n
The Habibie factor, by itself, has not been able to persuade
\nthe market to strengthen the rupiah. The currency only marginally
\nstrengthened from a position of around Rp 14,000 per dollar after
\nthe results of the aid consortium meeting in Paris, where clearly
\nthe international donor community has given strong support to
\nIndonesia in its plight to survive a very deep economic crisis.
\nThe hope of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that it will
\nstrengthen toward Rp 10,000 by the end of the year.<\/p>\n
Habibie, Akbar, Minister of Cooperatives Adi Sasono and some
\nothers in the Cabinet are representatives of the Association of
\nIndonesian Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI) and the Association of
\nIndonesian Young Businessmen (Hipmi) with aspirations of
\nempowering the Moslem majority in social and political life and
\ngiving it a greater role in business. Some of the signals
\nemanated (for example, from Habibie himself) did not acquiesce
\nthe Chinese business community, and the capital that fled after
\nthe burning and looting during the May riots has not returned. In
\ntime it may, but in the meantime, the economy is suffering.<\/p>\n
The weak rupiah can gain strength only if confidence returns,
\nand that is, in the final analysis, a political variable. Can the
\nHabibie government do something about this in this transition
\nperiod? We do not know, but he can revamp his government and shed
\nsome of the corruption from the Soeharto days.<\/p>\n
The November 1998 special MPR session may provide that
\nopportunity, but so far, nothing is on the agenda. He can speed
\nup reform and engage in a more forceful \"righting of the wrongs
\nof the past\", but that will be tricky for him if it means that he
\nshould go after the ill-gotten wealth of the former first family.<\/p>\n
The economic reform agenda is probably easier. If the
\ngovernment follows the agreement with the IMF, it would have to
\nimplement a lot of reforms. For instance, an antimonopoly and a
\nnew bankruptcy law, further deregulation of economic sectors, an
\nindependent central bank, a thorough banking reform, greater
\ntransparency and accountability of government transactions and of
\neconomic institutions will be on the government's plate.<\/p>\n
Apart from such reforms, there is now a demand from certain
\nintellectual circles to change the economic (development)
\nparadigm, from (perceived) too much reliance on conglomerates and
\nbig businesses to a greater emphasis on small and medium
\nenterprises -- adopting the Taiwanese rather than the Korean
\nmodel. From reliance on industrialization with high import
\ncontents, large projects and a lot of borrowed capital, to
\ngreater emphasis on a resource-based economy -- back to
\nagriculture and other natural resources. Perhaps, it is part of
\nan emerging inclination for \"populism\" in a time of dire economic
\nemergency. When, after two or three years, times will be normal
\nagain and growth rates rebound, we have to asses the mood again,
\nand the political situation.<\/p>\n
The writer is a noted economist and a former cabinet minister.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/indonesia-at-crossroads-after-53-years-of-independence-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }