Impact of Sept. 11 on Asia Pacific region<\/p>\n
Jusuf Wanandi, Founder and Member Board of Trustees Centre for
\nStrategic and International Studies, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The impact of Sept. 11 on the Asia Pacific region can be
\ndiscussed within the context of the new global strategic
\ndevelopment and how this will unfold in the future. This
\nnecessitates some exercises in speculation about those future
\ndevelopments.<\/p>\n
This will involve an examination, though not exclusively,
\nabout U.S. future strategies. It also involves an examination of
\nhow U.S. allies, friends and foes will react to future U.S.
\npolicies and strategies, and the outcome of the dynamics of the
\nmix between those policies and strategies.<\/p>\n
After Sept. 11, President Bush and his administration re-
\nordered their priorities and strategies around two targets.<\/p>\n
First, was how to get rid of global terrorism and groups or
\nstates that support them? At the very least, the objective was to
\nsubdue them so they could not become a major threat to the U.S.
\nand its global interests.<\/p>\n
Second, was how to prevent weapons of mass-destruction (WMD)
\nbeing used against the U.S. and its interests? This includes
\nnuclear, chemical and biological weapons.<\/p>\n
With the above as background, what can be said about the Asia
\nPacific region? What has really changed and what is going to
\ncontinue? What is temporary and what is permanent in the region
\nafter Sept. 11?<\/p>\n
In the first phase of the fight against global terrorism,
\nnamely to get at al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Bush
\nadministration was rather successful, based on cooperation and
\ncoalition building with allies and friends. In particular,
\nrelations with other great powers and with a number of Muslim
\ncountries have improved.<\/p>\n
Russia has established its credentials particularly in getting
\ncloser to the West and the U.S., especially in allowing military
\nbases to be established in Central Asia, as well as allowing
\nintelligence support. Chechnya has almost been forgotten and a
\nnew agreement on cooperation with NATO is being finalized.<\/p>\n
Japan has strengthened the alliance by a new law on security
\nand by sending some supporting ships to the Middle East -- this
\nis the first time Japan's Self Defense Force (SDF) has been
\nmobilized beyond its borders. This move, considered a first step
\ntoward becoming a \"normal\" country has been acquiesced by her
\nneighbors.<\/p>\n
China, which also faces the threat of terrorism and wishes to
\nestablish normal relations with the U.S., also cooperated in
\npolitical support and the exchange of intelligence.<\/p>\n
India, who has been preparing for some time to get closer to
\nthe U.S. strategically, has made use of the events to support the
\nU.S., while expecting U.S. support for Kashmir.<\/p>\n
Among Muslim countries, Pakistan has fully supported the U.S.
\ndespite some internal opposition, through intelligence, as a
\nstaging base for military operations, politically, etc. And so
\nhave other countries in the Middle East with their military
\nbases, although more limited than Pakistan. Politically, the
\nsupport from Muslim countries has been crucial.<\/p>\n
In the Asia Pacific region, political support has been given
\nat the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, at the
\nASEAN Summit, and the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, and Korea) Summit.
\nMoreover, ASEAN members, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and the
\nPhilippines, started to cooperate among themselves to fight
\nregional terrorism. This cooperation has been, in particular,
\nbetween intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as
\namong the military. The Sept. 11 attacks have strengthened the
\npresence of the U.S. and its cooperation with East Asia in many
\nlayers; regionwide (APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum), sub-region
\nwide (ASEAN or part of it) and bilaterally.<\/p>\n
But since the region is so wide and diverse, the intensity and
\nvariety of cooperation might differ from one sub-region to
\nanother and from one country to another.<\/p>\n
Domestic complexities could constrain them from cooperating
\npublicly or openly, especially in the case of countries with
\nMuslim majorities such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Others face
\nMuslim insurgents and are in need of assistance, such as the
\nPhilippines. Other countries in Southeast Asia that have very
\nsmall numbers of Muslims like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar,
\nand even Thailand have been less concerned domestically, came
\naboard rather late and are involved mainly in political terms.<\/p>\n
Take Indonesia as an example. The government is weak and law
\nenforcement agencies are also weak and corrupt. The crisis has
\ncreated an enormous challenge to dealing with poverty,
\nemployment, regional insurgences, law and order, restructuring
\nthe economy, huge debt (domestic and foreign), and weak
\ngovernance. Some small radical Muslim groups have been agitating
\nagainst the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.<\/p>\n
However, the large mainstream Muslim organizations such as
\nNahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are not supporting these
\ngroups. As for the government and the U.S., the best course is to
\ngive support to mainstream Muslim organizations to lead the
\nMuslim community toward modernization, moderation, openness and
\ndemocratic values.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the government has to be firm on law and
\norder, strengthen the police and military when necessary, to take
\nlegal action against any criminal acts or illegal agitation and
\nactivities by any radical group. NU and Muhammadiyah support such
\nactions. The police need to have better training, and this is
\nwhere the U.S. can assist. This includes a gradual fostering of
\nnormal relations with the military.<\/p>\n
Established intelligence cooperation should also be
\nstrengthened. With these policies, the U.S. will strengthen the
\ngovernment in dealing with global terrorism but also at a pace
\ncomfortable to them. In the end, the best contribution the
\nIndonesian government and society can give to the fight against
\nglobal terrorism is to keep the majority of Muslims, moderate,
\nopen and democratic.<\/p>\n
If Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, could show to the
\nworld and especially other Muslim nations how Muslims can be
\nmoderate, open and democratic, and develop economically at the
\nsame time, then this should give a tremendous boost to the
\nstruggle for the right ideas, vision and soul of Islam.<\/p>\n
The situation in the Philippines differs from Indonesia. They
\nhave a problem of Muslim insurgents in the south. Although
\nMuslims consist of less than 10 percent of the population, at
\npresent they are in a majority in a few districts in the southern
\nPhilippines.<\/p>\n
The problem of these radicals, such as the Abu Sayyaf group,
\nis a problem of criminality and extortion plus kidnapping. They
\nhave had relations with al-Qaeda cells before and that
\nrelationship could be revived. More importantly, however, is the
\nMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government is
\ncurrently negotiating a political deal with them. If they are
\nalso found to be connected to al-Qaeda than this is more worrying
\nbecause they are much stronger than the Abu Sayyaf group.<\/p>\n
The article is an extract from Jusuf Wanandi's paper for the
\nAsia Pacific Roundtable on June 3, in Kuala Lumpur.<\/p>",
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