{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1489932,
        "msgid": "iaksii-and-indonesian-democracy-1447893297",
        "date": "2004-05-29 00:00:00",
        "title": "\"Aksi\" and Indonesian democracy",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "\"Aksi\" and Indonesian democracy Max Lane, Murdoch WA, Australia On May 26 The Jakarta Post published two interesting opinion pieces: Indonesian democracy or 'demo-crazy'? by Ziad Salim and Complacency: Indonesia's democratic deficit by Adam Tyson. In some key respects, these two articles presented opposite points of view.",
        "content": "<p>\"Aksi\" and Indonesian democracy<\/p>\n<p>Max Lane, Murdoch WA, Australia<\/p>\n<p>On May 26 The Jakarta Post published two interesting opinion <br>\npieces: Indonesian democracy or 'demo-crazy'? by Ziad Salim and <br>\nComplacency: Indonesia's democratic deficit by Adam Tyson. In <br>\nsome key respects, these two articles presented opposite points <br>\nof view.<\/p>\n<p>Salim argued that Indonesian democracy was, in effect, marred <br>\nby two much political activity, specifically street <br>\ndemonstrations while Tyson was arguing that there was too much <br>\ncomplacency. In some ways, however, there is also an overlap in <br>\nthe two perspectives.<\/p>\n<p>There is little doubt that street demonstrations, called unjuk <br>\nrasa in the media but aksi (actions) on the street, have played a <br>\ncentral role in Indonesian politics since the days of the <br>\nstruggle against Dutch colonialism. In the period of the <br>\nnationalist struggle, it was called actie massa and actions like <br>\nstrikes and mass rallies (vergadering) became a major weapon <br>\nagainst Dutch colonial oppression.<\/p>\n<p>After independence, it was the campaigns of mass <br>\ndemonstrations against the remnants of Dutch colonialism, in <br>\nparticular the unjust foreign Debt, that resulted in the Ali <br>\nSastromidjojo government repudiating 85 percent of Indonesia's <br>\nforeign debt to Holland. Today's demonstrations against the <br>\nforeign debt to American and British banks have not yet reached <br>\nthe same levels.<\/p>\n<p>Unilateral actions by workers also successfully took control <br>\nof Dutch plantations, mines and other companies in the late <br>\n1950s, providing a basis for Indonesia to develop its economy <br>\nindependent of Dutch neo-colonial interests.<\/p>\n<p>When these companies were mismanaged in the late 1950s and <br>\nearly 1960s by their new managers, usually military officers, <br>\nthere were again demonstrations demanding retooling (i.e. <br>\ndismissal) of these managers.<\/p>\n<p>There were also demonstrations demanding that state <br>\nenterprises have management councils where trade unions were <br>\ndirectly represented. By 1965 one third of all such state <br>\nenterprises had trade union representation.<\/p>\n<p>In 1964, when new land reform laws passed on parliament were <br>\nbeing thwarted in their implementation, landless peasants also <br>\ndemonstrated by occupying land due for distribution. In these <br>\nlatter cases there was unjuk otot (flexing the muscles) when <br>\nlandowners used the police and militia against the farmers.<\/p>\n<p>One myth is that Sukarno was overthrown by student <br>\ndemonstrations. Sukarno was overthrown as a result of a slow coup <br>\nby Gen. Soeharto. The student demonstrations by anti-Sukarno <br>\nstudents during 1965 and 1966 were used to legitimize the moves <br>\nmade by Soeharto.<\/p>\n<p>They were very different than the street demonstrations in <br>\n1997 and 1998 that forced President Soeharto out of power. In <br>\n1965-1966, the students were backed by the Army who had arrested <br>\nor killed members of the much larger student organizations that <br>\nsupported Sukarno. Anti-Sukarno students went out onto the <br>\nstreets; while pro-Sukarno students went into goal or were <br>\nburied. In 1997 and 1998, students were defying the Army, not <br>\nbeing supported by it.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, the coming to power of Soeharto in 1965 saw a <br>\nconcerted attempt to end all aksi: Depoliticisation and the <br>\nfloating mass were the orders of the day. But Soeharto was not <br>\nable to end all aksi. because (the anti-Sukarno) students had <br>\nbeen allies of Soeharto in 1965 and 1966, the new government felt <br>\nit necessary to allow some extra freedom on the campuses. Once <br>\nthe 1966 generation had left the campuses and a new generation <br>\nwas active, demonstrations began again, this time mainly against <br>\ncorruption. By 1973\/1974, demonstrations were again a daily <br>\naffair.<\/p>\n<p>From 1978 until 1988, demonstrations were relatively <br>\ninfrequent. But in 1989, students and peasants began <br>\ndemonstrating together, mainly over issues of land dispossession. <br>\nA whole new generation of aksi and unjuk rasa began. During the <br>\n1990s, factory workers joined the process, as exemplified by the <br>\nprotest strikes at factories like Gajah Tunggal and Great River. <br>\nIn fact, I think Salim is underestimating the extent to which <br>\nordinary people joined aksi.<\/p>\n<p>A review of the Indonesian press during the period points to <br>\nan increasing participation by factory workers, office workers, <br>\nfishermen, farmers, students, teachers and even doctors, all <br>\nsectors, in aksi and unjuk rasa. Most of these, though not all, <br>\nwere small and around immediate issues, but a new generalized <br>\nprocess had begun.<\/p>\n<p>This process began a new stage in June 1996 when about forty <br>\nthousand people demonstrated on a march to gambit station in <br>\nJakarta protesting the coup against Megawati Soekarnoputri in the <br>\nIndonesian Democratic Party.<\/p>\n<p>As with many demonstrations before, the Army was used against <br>\nthe demonstration. Political unjuk rasa then multiplied during <br>\n1996 and 1997, including during the 1997 election campaign. The <br>\nground was being laid for what was to happen in early 1998.<\/p>\n<p>Aksi had gone from being only about local and specific issues <br>\nbut about national political questions. Soon there were aksi <br>\naround the country on Indonesia's campuses demanding the <br>\nresignation of Soeharto after it was seen that his only response <br>\nto the socio-economic crisis after 1997 was to appoint even <br>\ncloser cronies, even his own daughter, into his cabinet. It was <br>\nthen that the aksi momentum increased leading to the occupation <br>\nof the parliament building in Jakarta and even bigger <br>\ndemonstrations in some other cities. Soeharto fell and the era of <br>\nreformasi began.<\/p>\n<p>So it was unjuk rasa and aksi that has given Indonesia the <br>\nfreedoms it has today. Will they continue to play such a positive <br>\nrole or are they becoming counter-productive as argued by Salim?<\/p>\n<p>The extent to which they occur in the form of protests is <br>\ndirectly dependent on whether socio-economic sand cultural <br>\nconditions are improving as a result of government policy, or <br>\ngetting worse.<\/p>\n<p>This is a simplistic explanation, but accurate all the same. <br>\nWill the next government have a program that can reverse the <br>\ndecline in conditions for the majority of Indonesians?<\/p>\n<p>Answer that question and you have answered the question about <br>\nthe role of aksi.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is Visiting Fellow of Asia Research Centre at <br>\nMurdoch University.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/iaksii-and-indonesian-democracy-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}