Hunger brings political apathy to nation<\/p>\n
By Asip A. Hasani<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): At the height of student protests in May,
\nGadjah Mada University rector Ichlasul Amal distinguished himself
\nas a strong supporter of the proreform movement.<\/p>\n
Nearly six weeks after the protests helped bring down
\npresident Soeharto, Amal reflected on developments which have
\ntranspired on the political scene, particularly prospects for
\ncoming elections.<\/p>\n
Question: Has Habibie's administration so far been considered
\nsuccessful in fulfilling the popular demand for reform and
\ndemocratization?<\/p>\n
Answer: Indeed, we may say that Habibie's becoming president
\nwas inevitable as there was then no other choice.<\/p>\n
What is more important now is that his legitimacy depends on
\nhis acceptability to the people. In fact, the people do not
\nreally care who is their leader. What counts more to them is
\nwhether in the short term they can be saved from the threat of
\nstarvation, which is now looming as a result of the crisis of
\nbasic commodities, or whether they can have a better life. If
\nHabibie can make this come true, then he will have stronger
\nlegitimacy. Whether or not his legitimacy is constitutional will
\nthen no longer be a problem.<\/p>\n
Q: What do you think about what Habibie's administration has done
\nso far?<\/p>\n
A: I'm actually disappointed with what his ministers in economic
\nand industrial areas have done.<\/p>\n
Take Pak Ginandjar, for example. He said the government could
\nnot do anything unless there was political stability. This goes
\nback to what he must do as a coordinating minister of economic
\nand industrial affairs. At least he must think about what he must
\ndo.<\/p>\n
Q: But hasn't Habibie shown his commitment to the demand for
\nreform by allowing political transparency, a phenomenon welcomed
\nwith the establishment of many new parties?<\/p>\n
A: What we must bear in mind is that parties should not be
\nestablished on the basis of emotion or because of an urge to find
\nan opportunity to benefit from political openness, for example in
\norder that one may join the Cabinet or get a certain position.<\/p>\n
Unless great care is exercised, this openness, which is an
\nopportunity to establish a civil society, will simply be a
\nmirage. So, let's welcome cool-headedly this openness and the
\ngood intention showed by the Armed Forces to review their social
\nand political role. Let's not get emotional and let's continue to
\ndevote our attention to \"people's stomachs\".<\/p>\n
Q: Do you think these parties enjoy popular support?<\/p>\n
A: The trouble is that those wishing to establish these parties
\nare the elites, not the grass roots. It's a little strange here.<\/p>\n
The elites are emotional while the people are most concerned
\nwith whether they can eat tomorrow or can immediately have jobs
\nagain.<\/p>\n
Therefore, I'm afraid that these many parties will not be
\neffective in the general election. A fairly good general election
\nwill require the participation of 25 percent of the total
\npopulation. I'm afraid in the next election this 25 percent
\ncannot be reached because many people may have turned apathetic
\nand devoted most of their attention to food problems. Once again,
\nall parties must prioritize people's economic problems while, of
\ncourse, political consolidation toward the establishment of a
\ncivil society will continue to be implemented.<\/p>\n
Q: How many parties should Indonesia ideally have in its
\nmultiparty system?<\/p>\n
A: In my opinion, the number does not quite matter. This is
\nbasically only the beginning, sort of a test case.<\/p>\n
However, this party system must be followed with quotas. It
\nmeans that if a party joins the general election but fails to
\ncollect, for example, 5 percent of the total votes, this party
\nmust stop being one. So, there is a sort of requirement, but this
\nwill be seen only after the election process starts. This will
\nnaturally limit the number of parties. In 1955, no quotas were
\nintroduced with the result that there were too many parties.<\/p>\n
Q: Who will determine the size of the quota and how big is it
\nideally for Indonesia?<\/p>\n
A: This quota will be determined jointly. In Germany, the quota
\nis 5 percent while in Israel 1 percent. A quota of 10 percent
\nwill be too big, I think, because a party based on the minority
\nwill find it difficult to reach the quota. In fact, it is
\nimportant to accommodate the minority.<\/p>\n
As for an ideal size of a quota, of course we must calculate
\nthis carefully. If the quota is 5 percent, for example, there
\nwill be too many parties which can easily meet this. Ten percent
\nwill be difficult for a minority party to meet. So, perhaps, the
\nideal figure is 7 percent.<\/p>\n
Q: What factors do you think will determine the victory of a
\nparty in the coming general election?<\/p>\n
A: Established social infrastructure like that which Nahdlatul
\nUlama (NU) and Muhammadiyah have secured.<\/p>\n
However, the problem is that those having established social
\ninfrastructure are based on religion. In fact, we do not quite
\nlike this, do we?<\/p>\n
Q: What do you think of the prospects of the Golkar functional
\ngroup in the coming election?<\/p>\n
A: It is obvious that Golkar will have nothing. It is impossible
\nfor Golkar to achieve anything because it has been very much
\ndependent on the figure of Pak Harto. So when it was suggested
\nthat Pak Harto should be separated from the board of patrons,
\nGolkar showed that it was at a loss.<\/p>\n
The picture is like this: Golkar cannot elect its own general
\nchairman, let alone elect a president in a session of the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR).<\/p>\n
Golkar is very much dependent on Pak Harto. When Pak Harto is
\nno longer the president, all infrastructure of Golkar will be
\nfinished. I believe Golkar's votes in the coming general election
\nwill drop sharply.<\/p>\n
Q: The name of Golkar itself?<\/p>\n
A: As there is a demand for total reform, everything smacking of
\nthe New Order, like the name of Golkar, will be scrapped. Perhaps
\nit will later call itself the Indonesian Functional Party.<\/p>\n
Q: What about the United Development Party (PPP)?<\/p>\n
A: PPP may well maintain its existence. The problem is that if
\nAmien Rais decides to establish a new party, how many PPP members
\nwill move to Amien Rais' party?<\/p>\n
The same holds true if NU becomes a party. And the same
\nphenomenon will occur if the others, who have so far supported
\nPPP in terms of votes, follow suit. In this case, PPP will also
\ngreatly decline.<\/p>\n
Q: What of prospects for Megawati Soekarnoputri?<\/p>\n
A: She has a chance. It must be kept in mind, however, that
\nMegawati became so popular and great because she had opponents,
\nSoerjadi, for one.<\/p>\n
Then the oppressed people in the lower social classes, like
\nworkers, joined Megawati's camp. But now workers can set up their
\nown workers' party.<\/p>\n
Q: Some people are apprehensive that a multiparty system will
\nresult in an unstable political situation, as occurred during the
\nOld Order era, a situation which will justify the Armed Forces'
\ntaking over political control...<\/p>\n
A: True. if the situation gets really out of hand, the military
\nmust take control.<\/p>\n
The Armed Forces may not be able to overcome the economic
\nproblems that the nation is facing but at least the military may
\nfind justification to take control.<\/p>\n
But there are at least two things which may reduce this worry.<\/p>\n
First, the military must be aware that this poor situation is
\nthe result of their own prior support of Soeharto. It means that
\nit is the noncivilian government that has brought about the
\npresent crisis. So if the civilians later fail to handle
\npolitical affairs, their failure is to be attributed to the very
\nbad situation they have inherited from the New Order government,
\nwhich was noncivilian. A fair judgment is required here.<\/p>\n
Second, it won't be that easy for the military to assume
\npolitical domination over civilians because the circumstances now
\nare different from those in 1950s. They are also different from
\nthe circumstances in 1965-1966. At that time, it was clear that
\nthe enemies were the forces of the Indonesian Communist Party,
\nbut now we are facing economic problems and these problems cannot
\nbe solved with weapons. That's why the Armed Forces will
\nimmediately hand over the administration to civilian hands again
\nif it is beyond them to solve economic problems.<\/p>",
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