Humanitarianism: Challenge and opportunity<\/p>\n
Ignas Kleden
\nThe Center for East Indonesian Affairs
\nJakarta
\nceia@centrin.net.id<\/p>\n
Humanitarianism and humanism have been controversial ever
\nsince post-modernist theorists tried to debunk the universality
\nof their values. This is demonstrated in that critique that the
\nconception of humanitarianism and humanism entails a wide range
\nof class, gender, educational and psycho-physical bias, which had
\nbeen forgotten because the conceptions have been taken as
\nsomething given without considering the historical context in
\nwhich they were produced.<\/p>\n
Humanism of the Renaissance, for example, proposed to take man
\nas the measure of all things. The human was seen as opposed to,
\nor at least additional to the divine as the principle of moral,
\nartistic and political expression and as a repository of
\nvirtues. The idea was further developed by 18th century
\nencyclopedia-philosophers in France who propounded forcefully
\nthat men were the sole and sufficient source of all values. To
\nthat extent the idea was not so much an opposition to the
\nreligious values as a strong opposition to the belief that the
\nhuman condition was merely a fallen situation and therefore human
\ndevelopment and salvation could only be provided by a total
\nreliance upon religious devotion and dedication.<\/p>\n
The modern idea of humanitarianism originates in some
\nphilosophical thoughts both among the rationalists as well as
\namong the romanticists. Julien Benda, a philosopher of
\nintellectual betrayal, once reminded us to distinguish carefully
\nbetween the abstract notion of humanitarianism and the concrete
\none. The first emphasizes the sensitiveness toward the whole form
\nof human condition, abstract virtue of duty toward one's
\nneighbors, and compassionate zeal toward humanity as a whole. In
\ncontrast to that the concrete notion advocates love for a
\nconcrete individual here and now, an idea which corresponds to
\nwhat we usually understand as charity.<\/p>\n
The question is of course: who are men after all? The basic
\ntenet of renaissance-humanism says men are the measure of all
\nthings. In this conception it is taken for granted that the
\nnotion \"men\" automatically includes other notions such as women,
\nchildren, the senile, the handicapped, the marginalized, the
\nilliterate, the poor and the landless.<\/p>\n
This, however, is not always the case. In reality, humanism
\ncan easily discriminate against those who are not men in the
\nabove sense. Men are male, well educated, landed or propertied
\nadults, who usually become part of political power, belong to a
\ncertain social standing, and make up a social class based on
\neconomic and cultural appropriation.<\/p>\n
One of the temptations which usually make people neglect a
\nhumane attitude toward other people is the orientation toward
\nidentity. The acquaintance with the other can be conducted only
\non the basis of one's name, the place one comes from, the
\nprofession or job one is doing, or ethnic group one is supposed
\nto belong to and the role one assumes.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, another important item of one's identity is
\none's religious or denominational affiliation.<\/p>\n
Can we in hindsight speak of history of identity? During
\ncolonial times the Dutch colonial government divided the
\npopulation of the Dutch East Indies into three main categories
\nwith different privileges, namely the European and Euro-Asian,
\nthe foreign oriental (Chinese, Indians, Arabs) and the pribumi or
\nindigenous people. This division of population implied a social
\ndivision of labor within trade, and a division of privileges
\npertaining to civil rights and obligations. The remnant of this
\nethnically stratified division of labor can be seen in the
\npresent habit to look at Indonesian people as the pri (pribumi)
\nand the non-pri (non indigenous, mainly those of Chinese origin).<\/p>\n
In the first postindependence years, Indonesian people used to
\nlook at one another as those belonging to the co and non-co.
\nWhereas the co were seen as those who chose to maintain the old
\nstatus quo, while collaborating with the colonial government, the
\nnon-co considered themselves revolutionary republicans who were
\ndetermined to say no to any kind of negotiation with the colonial
\ngovernment and believed that an independent state was the final
\ngoal of their struggle.<\/p>\n
After the end of the Sukarno administration, the New Order
\ngovernment divided people into two main categories, namely those
\nwho were supposedly involved in the attempted coup of Sept. 30,
\n1965, and those who were allegedly \"clean\". This division had
\nterrible consequences, because the label terlibat (involved)
\nimplied \"civil death\" of the persons concerned who were
\npractically put outside political and legal protection.<\/p>\n
After political reform in 1998, the political division of the
\npopulation became more complicated. There is a division between
\nthe followers of the New Order and the reformists in Jakarta,
\nthere is also a division between locals and immigrants in
\nconflict-ridden areas, and there is a division and even
\nseparation between Muslim Ambonese and Christian Ambonese in
\nAmbon.<\/p>\n
Identity turns out to be not always a signifier of the rights
\none is entitled to but also a signal for condemnation and
\ndisapprobation one has unduly to bear. This becomes all the more
\ntrue if identity is treated as final, essentialist in nature, and
\ncan be packaged in permanent stereotypes. Indeed, identity is
\nthat which makes somebody what she or he is and not another
\nthing.<\/p>\n
It differentiates, and makes one different from another.
\nHowever, this becomes a danger when identity metamorphoses into a
\nsort of pigeonholing complex, whereby you put someone into a
\ncertain pigeonhole without providing him with the possibility and
\nfreedom to get out of it.<\/p>\n
In that connection, the identity politics in Indonesia should
\nbe counterbalanced by a new humanism and humanitarianism, which
\ncan turn around the significance of identity and identification.
\nIt is not identity which makes a man and a woman human, but the
\nother way around, it is humanity which makes an identity a man or
\na woman. Abstract as this may seem, it is very concrete in the
\npractical experience of everyday life.<\/p>\n
If religious instruction in religious communities taught the
\nstudents to respect and to love other people not as human beings
\nin the first place but as members of their own community, this
\nwould strengthen the sense of identity at the cost of the
\ncompassionate zeal for humanity.<\/p>\n
Since religion still assumes an important and strategic role
\nin Indonesian society, religious instruction determines to a
\ngreat extent whether respect for human beings becomes an abstract
\nmatter or a concrete action, which contributes to the
\nestablishment of everlasting peace or the waging of protracted
\nconflict.<\/p>",
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