Howard faces dilemma on E. Timor<\/p>\n
By Hilman Adil<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on Australia's policy on
\nEast Timor.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The ambivalent Australian posture reemerged in
\nits reaction toward Indonesia's announcement that it would allow
\nEast Timor to become independent if the people rejected an offer
\nof autonomy. Again, it appeared that considerations based on real
\npolitik prevailed by giving priority to commercial and strategic
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
While East Timor's independence is popular with the Australian
\npublic and would possibly remove a disturbing element in
\nIndonesia-Australian relations, it could also pose substantial
\nsecurity challenges in the event of a fragmentation of the
\nIndonesian Republic with Irian Jaya and Aceh or other provinces
\nfollowing suit.<\/p>\n
As Alan Dupont of the Australian National University stated:
\n\"Australia would clearly prefer to have to deal with one country
\nrather than with two countries or even more countries ... If that
\n(fragmentation) were to happen, and I don't rate that likely, but
\nnevertheless it is a possibility, then Australia's strategic
\nenvironment to our immediate north is going be complicated.\"<\/p>\n
After the announcement of a major shift in Indonesia's East
\nTimor policy, defense thinking in Canberra is now focused on the
\nneed to make changes in its policies to meet the evolving
\nsituation in Indonesia. Particularly in the context of the Timor
\nGap Treaty signed in 1989 and the Agreement on Maintaining
\nSecurity signed in December 1995, new arrangement are needed to
\nprotect Australian corporate interests in Indonesia and East
\nTimor.<\/p>\n
In his article, Woolcott's concern was that \"apart from an
\nissue of regional significance, such as the possible fracturing
\nof Indonesia, the changes could lead to substantial financial
\nimplications for the government if the Timor Gap Treaty ... were
\nto unravel.\" He feared that if Australian recognition of de jure
\nIndonesian sovereignty over East Timor were abandoned, the treaty
\ncould be nullified, resulting in substantial financial claims.<\/p>\n
It is for this reason that Australia, it seems, would rather
\nprefer an arrangement where East Timor would have a high degree
\nof autonomy but remain legally part of Indonesia. On the question
\nof self-determination for people in East Timor, Minister of
\nForeign Affairs Downer, in his statements, remains vague and
\nundefined. He did not specify on what is meant by self-
\ndetermination, not when it should be realized. The new shift in
\nAustralia's policy also appears to be highly inconsistent, given
\nthat it supports self-determination without a referendum while
\nretaining Indonesian sovereignty.<\/p>\n
Minister Downer's statement on Jan. 12 did not specify what
\nwas meant by an \"an act of self-determination\", and whether this
\nincluded support for a plebiscite administered by the United
\nNations. He also declined to specify when self-determination
\nshould take place, suggesting only \"at some future time\". He also
\nsees no need for the Australia government to adjust its support
\nfor Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.<\/p>\n
The Howard government's preference for autonomy instead of
\nindependence for East Timor seems to be influenced by two hard
\nrealities: (a) Even if the Habibie government seems to be
\nprepared to grant independence to East Timor, some elements in
\nthe Armed Forces are not prepared to accept it. The fear in
\nAustralia is that even if the Indonesian government ordered its
\nArmy occupation out of East Timor, there is a reasonable
\npossibility of serious bloodshed. (b) East Timor resources are
\nextremely limited.<\/p>\n
So far, the province is dependent on outside subsidies (90
\npercent), of which the central government supplies around two-
\nthird, with the rest coming from Western donors, including
\nAustralia.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian government's subsidy will be terminated if East
\nTimor becomes independent. Therefore, the Australian government
\nwill have to be prepared for another Papua New Guinea on its
\nborder, in terms of the proportional level of resources that
\nwould be required to sustain East Timor as a viable independent
\nstate.<\/p>\n
It is in this context that a compromise solution, that is East
\nTimorese autonomy within Indonesian sovereignty, becomes
\nincreasingly attractive to Canberra.<\/p>\n
The convergence and closeness of political security and
\ncommercial interests of both countries apparently have much
\ninfluenced their perception toward a solution of the problem.
\nFrom Indonesia's point of view, despite an official's statement
\ndescribing the province as \"an appendix which has to be removed\",
\nwider autonomy rather than outright independence might placate
\nnationalist demands and the Armed Forces resentment to keep the
\nterritory as an integral part of the Indonesian Republic.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's move to cut loose East Timor from the rest of
\nIndonesia is interpreted in Australia as merely an attempt to
\ncling to the province by raising the prospect of a swift and
\ndestabilizing withdrawal of Indonesian personnel and funding.<\/p>\n
In effect, it is calling the bluff of Western powers and East
\nTimorese leaders who have opposed Indonesian rule.<\/p>\n
Another interpretation is that behind the offer of
\nindependence, there is some expectation that in the event of
\ndisagreement among the East Timorese leaders to establish an
\nindependent state, and rather to avoid a civil war, they would
\nultimately return to be part of Indonesia again.<\/p>\n
However, this would have grave consequences for their future
\nstatus in terms of a much reduced bargaining position vis-a-vis
\nthe central government in any future demand for independence or
\nspecial status within the Indonesian republic.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior researcher in international affairs at
\nthe Indonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>",
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