How to indict a regime<\/p>\n
Catatan atas Gagalnya Politik Order Baru
\n(Note on the Failure of New Order Politics)
\nEep Saifulloh Fatah;
\nPustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, May 1998;
\n312 pp + index;
\nRp 22,500<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): A strong movement is shaking down the
\nestablishment in this country. The movement manifests itself in
\nvarious forms, including rioting.<\/p>\n
Some quarters believe rioting is triggered by the social gap,
\nbut others contend the root cause is the monopoly of power. All
\nare convinced, however, the outbreak of a riot is but an
\nexpression of the community's indictment of those in power.<\/p>\n
The result is the demand for rapid political change, which
\ncompels us to alter, improve and reformulate our interpretation
\nof power. Soeharto's stepping down as president has opened up new
\npossibilities for our future political life.<\/p>\n
This book discusses a number of reform scenarios which have
\ndeveloped in the political discourse of the New Order and
\nsignificantly contributed to this wave of change.<\/p>\n
First, a division in the New Order strategic alliance has
\npaved the way for the reform movement. O'Donnel and his
\ncolleagues provide the frame of thought for this scenario when
\nthey state \"there is no transition whose beginning is not the
\nconsequence -- direct or indirect -- of important divisions
\nwithin the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the
\nfluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners\".<\/p>\n
The division broke up the solidity and cohesion in New Order
\npolitics, reducing the power of the state and simultaneously
\nmaking the split more serious. It opens up the way for new
\npolitical negotiations toward the implementation of reform.<\/p>\n
Second, reform as the consequence of political regeneration in
\nthe state power side. The basis of the assumption used for this
\nscenario is that the New Order has been able to maintain the
\nstatus quo -- with only ad hoc and artificial policy adjustments
\nhere and there -- because there has not been a change in
\npolitical leadership and regeneration in a wider sense.<\/p>\n
Third, reform as a further result of popular radicalization
\nwhich has brought down power legitimacy. This is marked, among
\nothers, by frequent outbreaks of rioting and mass banditry.<\/p>\n
Fourth, reform as the result of a social movement -- initiated
\nparticularly by the (political) middle class -- which has
\nbecome stronger and stronger. In the past seven or eight years,
\nthe middle class has shown a tendency to politicization and has
\nbecome more articulate, evident by their participation in non-
\ngovernmental organizations.<\/p>\n
Fifth, reform prompted by international pressure which is
\nimpossible to block. According to this scenario, international
\npowers have a stake in the expansion of democracy and in this
\ncontext urge every country, which is yet to be democratic, to
\nadjust itself to this demand.<\/p>\n
Sixth, reform as the only solution to a serious and
\nunmanageable economic crisis. The argument is that a protracted
\neconomic crisis has manifested itself in latent problems in
\npolitical systems. There is a growing awareness that this
\neconomic crisis is actually rooted in an erroneous political
\nstrategy or an error in developmental approach.<\/p>\n
Indeed, not all dimensions of reform are covered in this book.
\nDespite its shortcomings, the book is intended to stimulate
\nfurther elaboration on reforms not only at the level of
\ndiscussions, but also more concretely at the level of strategy
\nand tactical preparation.<\/p>\n
-- Binhad Nurrohmat<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/how-to-indict-a-regime-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }