How sacred is the unitary state of RI?<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Just a little over a year after the proclamation of Indonesian
\nindependence, Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir signed the
\nLinggardjati agreement with the Dutch on Nov. 15, 1946. Article
\n(1) of the agreement says, "The Netherlands Government recognizes
\nthe Republic as the de facto authority in Java and Sumatra."
\nArticle (2) of the agreement says, inter alia, that "The
\nNetherlands Government and Republican Governments co-operate
\ntoward the setting up of a sovereign democratic federal state,
\nthe United States of Indonesia..."<\/p>\n
That was an initial part of Sutan Syahrir's brilliant
\ndiplomatic efforts to gain international recognition for
\nIndonesian independence.<\/p>\n
Under the circumstances, he had no choice but to agree to
\nwhat, at that moment, was thought to be the most we could get. It
\nalmost cost his prime ministership but for Sukarno's and Mohammad
\nHatta's full backing of his policy.<\/p>\n
Surely the Linggardjati agreement was never meant to be
\nsomething final.<\/p>\n
Nor was the "final" agreement reached at the Round Table
\nConference in The Hague near the end of 1949, which led to the
\ntransfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the new United Republic
\nof Indonesia, envisaged by the Linggardjati agreement.<\/p>\n
Barely a year later, the federal republic was dissolved and
\nreplaced by the unitary republic of Indonesia that has lasted to
\nthe present.<\/p>\n
The (new) unitary republic that had substituted the federation
\nwas based on a provisional constitution. Hence the significance
\nof the general election of 1955 for a new parliament and a
\nconstitutional assembly to determine a new constitution. This is
\nimportant to remember.<\/p>\n
The assembly was not to confirm the 1945 Constitution, which
\nwas itself a provisional one. Therefore, before amendments in the
\npresent "era of reform", it contained provisional and
\nsupplementary provisions. Article (2), of the latter, provided
\nthat "Within six months after the People's Consultative Assembly
\nhas been formed, the People's Consultative Assembly shall convene
\nto enact the Constitution."<\/p>\n
That was never done, even after the Constitutional Assembly
\nwas dissolved by then President Sukarno's decree of July 5, 1959
\nfor its failure to enact a new constitution. The decree not only
\ndissolved the Constitutional Assembly and newly elected
\nParliament, but it also decreed the return to the 1945
\nConstitution -- still a provisional constitution.<\/p>\n
Under the prevailing circumstances in Indonesia near the end
\nof the 1950s, Sukarno's action to declare a return to the 1945
\nConstitution, including a unitary state, was presumably
\njustified. It was an emergency situation. The point is that the
\nunitary state on the basis of the provisional constitution of
\n1950 -- as clear from the term "provisional" -- was ever meant to
\nbe final. Nor was the ("new") unitary state on the basis of the
\n1945 Constitution, the return to which was decreed by Sukarno.
\nAnd as was indicated earlier, the 1945 Constitution was also a
\nprovisional one.<\/p>\n
Here lies a mystery of Soeharto's New Order. From the very
\nbeginning, the New Order based its legitimacy on its "total
\ncorrection" to Sukarno's deviations from the 1945 Constitution.
\nIronically, it continued to claim the 1945 Constitution as its
\nbasis, a constitution decreed by President Sukarno, which was
\nnever confirmed by a series of People's Consultative Assemblies
\nof Soeharto's own creation over three decades, and which the New
\nOrder claimed to adhere "purely and consistently", again despite
\nthe fact that it was a provisional constitution.<\/p>\n
Is this also to be a final constitution? Did not our founding
\nfathers argue long before independence on what should constitute
\nthe boundaries of an independent Indonesia? Did not Sukarno and
\nHatta differ on whether or not West Irian should be part of
\nindependent Indonesia?<\/p>\n
Did our founding fathers also envisage the integration of East
\nTimor, which the Indonesian governments since Soeharto used to
\naffirm that the integration of East Timor was final and therefore
\nas a domestic affair of ours not negotiable?<\/p>\n
This analysis is not meant to be against a unitary state as
\nsuch, and neither for nor against a federal state. As a matter of
\nprinciple, however, it is against, and strongly so, the
\nimposition of anything by the central government on the people,
\nagainst the wishes of the people, backed by lies and false
\narguments, at the expense of justice.<\/p>\n
After all, the nation-state is never an end in itself. And
\ndemands for justice should not be overlooked amid the obsession
\nto defend the unitary state at all costs.<\/p>\n
In his speech on Aug. 17, 1950 broadcast on radio, the precise
\ndate the Unitary Republic of Indonesia was re-established, Prime
\nMinister Mohammad Hatta said, "the unitary state is not a magic
\nkey to open the gate to a better welfare. It is merely a means to
\nfacilitate combined efforts, to pave the way for improved
\nwelfare."<\/p>\n
He also said he did not "call traitors those who from the
\noutset have striven for Indonesian independence, but have chosen
\na different path. In their view, that path was the best to attain
\nan independent Indonesia."<\/p>\n
President Sukarno often referred to Ernest Renan's concept of
\nnationhood. But Renan's idea was simply a speculative,
\nmetaphysical and intellectual construct rather than a theory
\nbased on empirical evidence to explain or to understand the
\nphenomenon of nationhood.<\/p>\n
As far as Indonesia is concerned, it seems arguable if the
\nnation of Indonesia was promoted, in line with Renan's
\nconceptualization, as "a soul, spiritual principle", or "a great
\nsolidarity, created by the sentiment of the sacrifices which have
\nbeen made of those which one is disposed to make in the future.
\nIt presupposes a past; but it resumes itself in the present by a
\ntangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire to
\ncontinue life in common".<\/p>\n
The fact, however, is that for a period of over a century,
\nintermittent but isolated revolts by different regions of the
\nthen Netherlands East Indies against Dutch colonial rule were
\nnever successful.<\/p>\n
Perhaps this bitter experience finally made Indonesia leaders
\nof the time realize that only a united and concerted struggle by
\nall the peoples throughout the territory would be able to oust
\nthe colonial ruler. Hence the growth of an awareness of the need
\nfor a new all-embracing and all-inclusive nation. The Indonesian
\nnation was thus born primarily out of a pragmatic, practical
\nconsideration. Sukarno's recourse to Ernest Renan seems to have
\nbeen an effort to justify that need and to give it a rational and
\nintellectual foundation.<\/p>\n
Indeed, Indonesia as a nation was at the beginning fostered in
\nthe face of a common enemy: Dutch colonial rule that had created
\ninjustice. It was glued together by a common cause: the demand
\nfor justice, and thus the demand for independence as a means to
\nthat end. Other things being equal, injustice under one's own
\ngovernment is worse than under foreign rule, especially now that
\njustice has been truly and miserably lacking.<\/p>\n
Indonesia as a nation was at the beginning fostered in the
\nface of a common enemy: Dutch colonial rule that had created
\ninjustice. It was glued together by a common cause: The demand
\nfor justice, and thus the demand for independence as a means to
\nthat end. Other things being equal, injustice under one's own
\ngovernment is worse than under foreign rule, especially now that
\njustice has been truly and miserably lacking.<\/p>",
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