How long will Indonesian political uncertainties last?<\/p>\n
By Yulius P. Hermawan<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on political transition in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
BANDUNG (JP): Indonesian political actors probably need to
\nlearn from South Korea's lessons of the transition to democracy.
\nThe transition really depends on the role of pro-true democracy
\nparties. The political games which were played by both reform and
\nconservative parties in Korea made democratization difficult in a
\nshort time. Koreans have needed at least a decade to adopt
\ndemocratic government.<\/p>\n
The uncertainties have lasted longer than many Koreans ever
\nexpected. Widespread optimism for the birth of a democratic
\npolitical system under a civilian leadership in 1987 did not
\nguarantee that democracy would come soon. Political leaders'
\nvested interests and efforts to achieve political careers were
\nvariables which made consensus on the unity of reform forces
\ndifficult to build.<\/p>\n
The transition to democracy in South Korea took place after
\nRoh Tae-woo -- the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP)
\npresidential candidate -- announced his democratization package
\non June 29, 1987. The opposition, dissidents and students
\ncontributed to the announcement of the so-called June 29
\ndeclaration.<\/p>\n
However, it is unfortunate that the opposition forces failed
\nto continue their alliance just a few months before the December
\n1987 presidential elections. Two prominent opposition leaders,
\nKim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung failed to agree on the single
\npresidential candidate. This disagreement led the two to compete
\nwith each other in a public competition and fragmented the
\nproreform forces into two groups of supporters.<\/p>\n
This opened a better chance for Roh to win in the direct
\npresidential election. Many Koreans were disappointed with the
\ndisintegration. If the two leaders had continued their alliance,
\nthe proreform groups, jointly, would have collected 55 percent of
\n33 millions votes cast. This number would have been enough to
\noutperform Roh, who gained only 36 percent.<\/p>\n
Yet the 1988 National Assembly elections reshaped Korean
\npolitics in ways which created further obstacles for a reunion,
\nand, furthermore, lengthened political uncertainties. The ruling
\nDJP failed to retain a majority of seats in the Assembly, taking
\nonly 125 of 299 seats.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile the opposition parties together held a majority of
\nseats. The election result created so-called politics of Yoso
\nYadae, in which the ruling party held a minority of seats,
\ncompared with the opposition with a majority of seats. The ruling
\nDJP could face difficulties in passing its bills if it failed to
\ncooperate with elements of the opposition or to take advantage of
\nthe ongoing competition among the three major opposition parties.<\/p>\n
In fact, the politics of Yoso Yadae sophisticated Korean
\npolitics. It often sharpened the difference between the ruling
\nparty and the opposition camp, while it also often led to fierce
\ncompetition among the three Kims' parties. President Roh soon
\nfound that his political leadership ability was weak. The three
\nKims and opposition lawmakers frequently blocked the government's
\nproposed bills in the National Assembly. They continuously
\nattempted to dominate the Assembly, forcing the DJP to accept
\nsome opposition demands and to act on opposition motions. The
\nopposition also criticized often Roh's Cabinet for various
\nfailures in conducting state affairs. This criticism often forced
\nRoh to reshuffle his Cabinet and to form a new Cabinet as
\ndemanded by the opposition. Overall, the opposition-controlled
\nlegislature put the Executive in disarray.<\/p>\n
Beside the sharp confrontation, the fierce competition among
\nthe three Kims were also salient. Due to their different
\ninterests, each Kim seemed not reluctant to break agreements with
\none or both of the other Kims. Each Kim attempted to outperform
\nthe others, to improve his image and his party in order to win
\nthe 1992 general election.<\/p>\n
The controversial phenomenon occurred in early 1990 when Kim
\nYoung-sam and his Reunification Democratic Party decided to form
\na coalition with the ruling DJP and another opposition party, the
\nNew Democratic Republican Party, headed by Kim Jong-pil, the
\narchitect of 1961 military coup d'etat and that of Park's
\nauthoritarianism.<\/p>\n
There were some questions regarding the unusual alignment. Why
\ndid Kim Young-sam, who had fought all his life against past
\ndictators, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, and who, until a few
\nmonths before, had struggled to undermine President Roh, decide
\nto join the forces of his past enemies and become part of the
\nestablishment? Many people denounced his political ambition to be
\nthe next president.<\/p>\n
The ruling grand coalition then led him to reach power in
\n1992. Yet Kim Young-sam's leadership did not bring political
\ncertainty. The ruling party, with a majority of legislative
\nseats, lessened the role of minor opposition camp.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the ruling coalition experienced constant internal
\nconflicts due to the different stands of three factions. Two
\nfactions were conservative in nature, while another faction was
\nreformist. Whenever party policies were being decided, acute
\nconflicts between reformists and conservatives seemed inevitable.<\/p>\n
In 1995, internal conflicts caused Kim Jong-pil and his
\nfaction to bolt from the grand coalition and establish a separate
\nparty. In early 1997, Kim Jong-pil formed an alliance with Kim
\nDae-jung to enter the presidential and National Assembly
\nelections. This alliance contributed to the victory of Kim Dae-
\njung in the 1997 presidential election.<\/p>\n
Korea's experience shows how conflicts and alliances among
\nparties can affect political stability for more than a decade of
\nthe transition process. Koreans probably still need some years to
\nestablish and secure their democracy. The main cause of this is
\nthe failure of pro-true democracy forces to build an alliance in
\nthe early stages of the transition.<\/p>\n
There are some similarities as well as differences between the
\nIndonesian and South Korean cases in their early stages of
\ndemocratization. The two experienced a strongly authoritarian
\nmilitary regime, which established serious obstacles for
\ndemocracy. The collapse of the authoritarian regime in both cases
\nwas a result of students' massive demonstrations.<\/p>\n
In some respects, Indonesia is likely to have a better chance
\nto establish democracy quicker. The failure to unify reform
\nforces in Indonesia did not cause the worst impact on the general
\nelection result. Reform-oriented parties could outperform the
\nruling party in the most free and fair general election. It may
\nbring better prospects in the near future if reformists' parties
\ncan set a conditional accord before the upcoming general session
\nof the People's Consultative Assembly (See Parties need
\nconditional accord in the June 16 and June 17 editions by the
\nsame author). In South Korea, the failure to do so let the
\nmilitary regime stay in power after Roh outperformed reformists
\nin the first free and fair direct presidential election.<\/p>\n
Yet the Indonesian case is different from the Korean case with
\nregard to its national economy. The Korean economy was in its
\nbest shape when the democratization started in 1987. Indonesia's
\neconomy was in deep crises when the transition to democracy began
\nin 1998. This calls for reform forces to work together to restore
\nnational economy and to bring welfare for the whole nation.<\/p>\n
Besides, there are some obvious differences regarding
\nethnicity and religion. Korean society is relatively homogeneous,
\nwhile Indonesia is very pluralistic. The political actors'
\nnecessary task is now more complicated: how to realize ideas for
\ndemocracy which could protect ethnic and religious issues.<\/p>\n
Of course, it is a challenge for everyone: to respect any
\nachievement of the transition as shown in the recent polls, or to
\nfall into a long-time classical debate about vested interests
\nwhich may benefit the persistence of the old regime. The response
\nto this challenge will determine how long the ongoing uncertainty
\nwill last.<\/p>\n
The writer is a lecturer on International Relations at the
\nCatholic University of Parahyangan and a researcher at the
\nParahyangan Center for International Studies, Bandung. The
\narticle is based on research on Korean politics, completed at the
\nDepartment of Politics, Monash University, in 1997.<\/p>",
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