History binds Indonesia and Australia<\/p>\n
By Nova Poerwadi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia and Australia share a unique history.
\nBoth nations evolved their national identity early in the 20th
\ncentury, Indonesia during the birth of the nationalist movement
\nin the early 1900s, and Australia in 1901 (albeit still within
\nthe framework of a \"White Australia\" policy).<\/p>\n
In the late 1940s, instead of siding with their Dutch
\n\"European brothers\", Australians supported the Indonesian cause
\nduring the struggle for independence. Australia boycotted Dutch
\nshipments and served as an active mediator in talks to finally
\nsever Indonesian ties with the Netherlands. (Sound familiar? But
\nthen again, 20 years later a Liberal Party government opposed
\nIndonesia on the question of West Irian until compelled to
\nsupport the policy in 1962 by the U.S. How familiar is that
\nforeign policy turnaround?)<\/p>\n
Now, as the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) prepares to
\ndecide on Indonesia's future, Australians are also bracing for a
\nNovember referendum on the proposed Republic. It seems that as
\nIndonesia stands poised to choose between the old ways and
\ndemocracy, so too will Australia decide whether it remains an
\narchaic demi-nation under British semi-sovereignty, or finally
\nbecomes a self-ruling people with an Australian-chosen head of
\nstate.<\/p>\n
Ironically, as both nations undergo these momentous changes
\nrelations are at their lowest point. While the two governments
\nare involved in a heated row over the East Timor issue,
\npeople-to-people relations could not be any worse. Australian
\npublic opinion, urged on by the distorted three-minute television
\ntime slots of a \"report first, verify later\" international media
\n-- only starting now to be denounced by more responsible local
\nand Western media -- has come to view 200 million Indonesians
\nbased on the alleged actions of a handful of its people. Talk in
\nsome public arenas is focusing on whether East Timor marks the
\n\"end of the Javanese imperium\", or \"the beginning of the end for
\nIndonesia\" (brave words for foreigners who neither understand
\nIndonesia, nor have to even live here).<\/p>\n
Although Canberra has insisted that their quarrel has never
\nbeen with the Indonesian people, conditions on the ground are
\nmuch different. The widespread vandalizing of Indonesian missions
\nand symbols (especially the flag) in the country, as well as the
\ntrade boycotts enforced by labor unions in the country, were
\ncertainly viewed in many quarters as an affront to the Indonesian
\npeople as a whole.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, a fierce nationalist backlash is brewing in
\nIndonesia over what is perceived as Australia's excessive
\nintervention in Indonesian affairs, and Canberra's \"betrayal\" of
\nits role as a mediator between Indonesia and the West. Anti-
\nAustralian sentiments are being openly expressed on the streets
\nwith almost daily demonstrations; in the country's legislature
\nwith condemnation leveled at what is viewed as a lack of respect
\nfor Indonesian sovereignty; and in the media where Australia-
\nbashing has become a staple.<\/p>\n
The rising nationalist sentiment in Indonesia can best be
\ndescribed as terrifying to outsiders. For the 32 years of
\nSoeharto's rule, outsiders were accustomed to a soft-spoken
\nobedient nation which was determined to serve American strategic
\nand commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region in a low-key
\nmanner.<\/p>\n
It brings back memories of the last years of the Soekarno
\nyears, when the founding president accused Australia and Malaysia
\nof being in league with Western \"neo-imperialist\" forces to
\n\"encircle Indonesia\", then a leading voice in the Third World.<\/p>\n
The often daily displays of nationalist bravado, which at its
\nmost violent sent Australian expatriates packing in Kalimantan
\nand other outlying cities, only goes to show how the focus has
\nshifted. For many Indonesians, the emphasis has turned away from
\nthe atrocities allegedly committed in East Timor, to how the
\nnation was humiliated, because Australia has chosen to lead the
\ninternational chorus to isolate Indonesia into submission.<\/p>\n
Of course just as Indonesians have found a convenient
\nscapegoat in its southern neighbor, so too have Westerners found
\na convenient scapegoat for the nationalist backlash in the form
\nof the Indonesian Military (TNI). TNI has been blamed for
\ndiverting attention from human rights violations in East Timor by
\nfanning the flames of nationalism.<\/p>\n
But such a simplistic analysis is inherently racist as much as
\nit is flawed.<\/p>\n
Racist, because it implies that Indonesians cannot think for
\nthemselves, and have to be \"provoked\" by its stereotypically
\nsinister military into taking offense at Canberra's unfriendly
\nattitude. It is a typical position of many Westerners to view the
\nrest of the world as a caricature of backwardness, and its people
\nas ignorant stooges until \"enlightened\" by foreigners bearing
\n\"facts\".<\/p>\n
Flawed, because it underestimates the deep-seated mistrust of
\nWesterners among many Indonesians, a mistrust Australian (and
\nother Western) politicians and reporters have yet to understand,
\ndue to their own history (i.e. they have never been at the
\nreceiving end of racially-based oppression).<\/p>\n
Even without TNI's urging, the nation has a collective cache
\nof memories of its colonial past, while some Muslim elements in
\nIndonesian society have never fully trusted the predominantly
\nChristian Western nations, who are seen as hostile to Islam. To
\nmore well-read Aussie-bashers, the Australian furor over East
\nTimor also smacks of \"do as we say, not as we did\". These
\nanalysts say that Australia (like much of the Americas) was borne
\nout of the subjugation and forced relocation of indigenous
\npopulations by white settlers.<\/p>\n
Although it is reasonable to suppose that the military is
\nfunding a handful of the recent anti-Australian activities, it
\nwould be giving them too much credit to suggest they have the
\ncapability to rally Indonesian public opinion to such a high
\nchorus of condemnation.<\/p>\n
Just ask the casual person on the street (or in offices, where
\nmany Western-educated people work) and find out how they feel
\nabout Canberra's involvement in dictating domestic policy.<\/p>\n
Even if the military are later proved to be the instigator,
\nthen Canberra is pushing all the right buttons. Australian Prime
\nMinister John Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and
\nDefense Minister John Moore are a propagandist's dream come true.
\nNot only are they unapologetic for setting back bilateral
\nrelations by decades, they are also putting fuel on the fire by
\nvirtue of their statements alone.<\/p>\n
What these political leaders have yet to learn is that gone
\nare the old days, when you could rally public opinion at home,
\nwhile appeasing foreign ears with a toned-down version. What
\nHoward, Moore and Downer say in the comfort zone of their home
\nmedia filters through to Indonesian ears.<\/p>\n
Recent reported statements by Moore that Australian troops
\ncould chase suspected prointegration militia members into
\nIndonesian territory (and unsubstantiated reports that Australian
\nhelicopters are making regular incursions into Indonesian
\nairspace) has caused Jakarta to issue its strongest words against
\na foreign power since probably the Soekarno years. The government
\nhas warned that it may take action over the alleged violation of
\nIndonesian airspace.<\/p>\n
Howard's earlier response to the annulment of a 1995 Security
\nPact, in a tone implying it was of little consequence to
\nAustralia, also set off a reaction in Jakarta, which expected
\nCanberra to at least say \"Ouch!\"<\/p>\n
And last but not least, the furor over the so-called \"Howard
\nDoctrine\" outlining the administration's delusions of grandeur in
\nmaking Australia the enforcer of Asia-Pacific security, has also
\nundermined Australia's long-term foreign policy goals. After
\npainstakingly trying to convince Asia, especially Indonesia, that
\nAustralia is Asian (although its people are not of the same
\nrace), the Howard administration has revived suspicions that it
\nremains a \"foreign power in our midst\".<\/p>\n
It is noteworthy that official responses to the anti-
\nAustralian backlash in Indonesia seem to have been belated. The
\ncommon mood on the ground seems to have taken time to affect
\npolicy-makers and the business community, who only came to
\nrealize the level of popular resentment toward Australia about a
\nmonth after it all began.<\/p>\n
One of the reasons for the delay may be caused by the fact
\nthat the Indonesian elite understand better than to blame East
\nTimor squarely on Australia. Canberra's only fault (no matter how
\njust the cause was) was that by interfering in a highly emotional
\nissue it neglected to treat Indonesia as an equal.<\/p>\n
The delay can also be attributed to the transitional nature of
\nIndonesian society, which has yet to form a fully fledged
\ndemocracy where individual initiative moves society. For example,
\nreaction from the legislature, including harsh criticism from the
\nlikes of outspoken veteran legislator Aisyah Amini, received a
\nlimited reaction from the B.J. Habibie administration.<\/p>\n
The annulment of the 1995 treaty, and a token slap on the
\nwrist from Habibie during his last legislature address, have been
\nthe only concrete official action taken by the government.<\/p>\n
But in the fully fledged democracy Indonesians are determined
\nto have after the General Session, the legislature will have a
\nbigger say, and the executive branch will have less power to
\nresist. The biggest obstacle to restoring Australia's good
\nstanding among Indonesian politicians is the fact that unlike
\nWashington, which presents itself as a friendly (if also pushy)
\npartner in Indonesia's transition to democracy, the Howard
\nadministration has yet to prove itself sympathetic to Indonesia,
\ndemocratic or not.<\/p>\n
In light of the long love-hate relationship between the two
\nnations, future ties between a democratic Indonesia and a
\npossible Australian Republic appear uncertain. Based on the
\nevents during Indonesia's struggle for independence, the two
\nnations proved capable of extraordinary cooperation in the
\npursuit of a common interest.<\/p>\n
But the question for the post-Timor era is: do the interests
\nof both nations still converge, or do they differ too much, with
\nAustralia wanting to play the role of a \"moral leader\" and
\nIndonesia wishing to take its rightful, upright role in the
\nregion?<\/p>\n
In looking ahead to Australia's engagement with Indonesia, the
\nlast thing Canberra needs is to follow up the suggestion in the
\nwidely panned \"Howard Doctrine\" of beefing up its military
\npresence. This move would only antagonize its northern neighbor
\nfurther. Australia only needs to muzzle its short-sighted
\npoliticians, or at least have them show more constraint beyond
\nthe token \"we understand this is a sensitive issue\" proclamation,
\nwhich often comes too little, too late.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, whether Australia benefits from the converging
\nvalues on human rights that Indonesian democracy will usher in,
\nor is buried by the public hostility it has inadvertently sewn,
\nwe in Indonesia must proceed in creating a just and lasting
\ndemocracy. Now that Indonesia is in the process of removing the
\n\"splinter in its own eye\" (i.e. that of military abuses and
\ncivilian corruption), perhaps the nation will find itself in a
\nstronger position to (in the words of protesters) \"crush
\nAustralia\", but only in a diplomatic and economic sense. Or at
\nleast if Canberra again oversteps the limits of cordial relations
\nbased on mutual respect, Indonesia will be able to cut its
\nneighbor down to size.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/history-binds-indonesia-and-australia-1447893297",
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