Hasty conclusions<\/p>\n
Indonesia, as a large, nascent democratic country, is facing a
\nseries of elections this year. The legislative election with some
\n16,000 candidates to choose from will take place on April 5.
\nThose who are elected will become members of the House of
\nRepresentatives (DPR), the national legislature, and of a new
\nbody (the DPD) that could be dubbed an embryo senate. Also to be
\nelected at the same time will be legislative members for the
\nprovinces and regencies.<\/p>\n
The first round of a direct presidential election will be held
\non July 5, the first time for such an election here. That will
\nlikely be followed by a second round presidential vote on Sept.
\n20, since it is expected that in the first round no
\npresidential\/vice-presidential pair will garner enough votes to
\nwin outright.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, a flurry of analytical forecasts have been
\npublished on the possible outcome of the elections, both
\nlegislative and presidential. Even more are likely to follow.
\nSurprisingly, however, several of these predictions, although
\nwell written, seem to be based on assumptions about Indonesia's
\npolitical sociology and the political behavior of Indonesians
\nthat are not quite in accordance with the existing realities.<\/p>\n
As an example we could mention a recently published report by
\nthe Brussels-based International Crisis Group entitled Indonesia
\nBackgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. The report clearly
\nstates in conclusion that \"the 2004 elections cannot be expected
\nto produce fundamental change. The elections will likely bring a
\nresult similar to 1999, when PDI-P and Golkar were the largest
\nparties, though they may change places.\" That pessimistic
\nstatement seems to ignore the vast changes that have taken place
\nin Indonesian society during the last five years in terms of
\npolitical understanding, and also the shifts in the social
\npsychological make-up of Indonesian voters.<\/p>\n
For one thing, during the last five years, technology has made
\nit possible for information to be more widespread, practically
\nreaching every corner of Indonesia, either through the print
\nmedia, electronic media, Internet or personal messages. A simple
\nhousehold in a remote location in North Sumatra, for example, may
\nhave little access to clean water, yet find it easy to follow
\npolitical developments throughout the country by means of
\ntelevision and radio broadcasts. If this phenomenon is coupled
\nwith the dynamic growth of the media -- aggressive is perhaps a
\nbetter word, although the quality may be questionable -- then it
\ncan be said that tens of millions of Indonesian voters are by now
\nquite accustomed to being presented with a range of political
\nviews.<\/p>\n
All this is particularly true with regard to the large amount
\nof new voters this year, whose numbers are estimated to total
\nabout 27 million. This figure reflects a 23 percent increase from
\nthe 118.5 million voters in the 1999 ballot. These first-time
\nvoters may very well be indifferent to the question of which
\nparties dominated the 1999 elections. Another factor why we
\nexpect that the political preferences of voters in 2004 will be
\ndifferent is the impact of expanding regional autonomy. A growing
\nnumber of government officials in the various regions of
\nIndonesia at present are inclined to take an independent attitude
\nand do not feel it necessary to constantly bow to the will of
\nJakarta. All these developments obviously do not benefit Golkar,
\nwhose performance in every general election in the past depended
\nvery much on the rigidity and the hierarchical structure of the
\nstate bureaucracy.<\/p>\n
In other words, the entire political situation in Indonesia in
\nterms of ideological preferences and political loyalties are
\nquite fluid. Although primordial affinities are, of course, still
\na factor to be reckoned with, even this phenomenon is undergoing
\na process of erosion. Needless to say, the conclusion reached by
\nICG is indeed premature, and the assumptions on which it is based
\nare questionable.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the report contains a number of contradictions,
\nspecifically in the executive summary. On the one hand the report
\nstates that \"public disillusionment with the performance of
\ndemocratic government since the first post-authoritarian election
\nin 1999 has been spreading rapidly. The elected government is
\nwidely seen as having failed to cope with the massive challenges
\nthat the nation is facing.\" That elected government consists
\nprimarily of PDI-P and Golkar.<\/p>\n
Public disillusionment with the two parties is indeed
\nspreading. Significant changes have been taking place in the
\ntraditional bases of PDI-P, such as Bali. The loyalty of Golkar
\nfunctionaries is no longer as it was in 1999 as it now depends
\nvery much on the performance of local government officials, many
\nof whom are Golkar party functionaries. And yet, the report's
\nexecutive summary states that \"public opinion surveys indicate
\nthat the two leading parties in 1999 -- President Megawati's PDI-
\nP and Golkar, the party of the Soeharto government -- are again
\nlikely to occupy the top positions.\"<\/p>\n
A small concession made by the author of the ICG report
\nconcedes that the Indonesian electorate is in fact not entirely
\nrigid as, it says, \"many who voted for the underdog PDI-P in 1999
\nhave been alienated by its (the party's) behavior and are
\nreturning to Golkar.\" It seems that the shift of political
\npreferences among the 2004 electorate that could have an impact
\non the coming April 5 elections are more multi-faceted and
\nqualitatively significant than being merely a shift between PDI-P
\nand Golkar.<\/p>\n
The ICG is not the only one inclined to draw hasty conclusions
\nabout Indonesia's future political development because of the
\nfailure to apply a rigorous analysis.<\/p>\n
Although a news analysis cannot be expected to be too academic
\nin nature, nevertheless a rather lengthy news analysis on the
\npossible outcome of the April 5 elections, published in the Asia
\nsection of the Singapore newspaper The Straits Times (Monday,
\nJan.10, 2004), showed the same superficiality we referred to
\nbefore. One would expect that the newspaper's seasoned Jakarta
\ncorrespondent, Derwin Pereira, who has observed Indonesian
\npolitical developments for quite some time, would have been more
\nthorough and applied a more sensitive touch to the vagaries of
\nIndonesian political dynamics.<\/p>\n
Instead, his analysis puts too much of the focus on just two
\npolitical parties, PDI-P and Golkar, as if no changes and shifts
\nhave taken place in the political landscape of Indonesia during
\nthe five years since the 1999 elections.<\/p>\n
With only three months to go until the April 5 general
\nelections, 24 political parties participating and a potential 27
\nmillion first-time voters of almost 146 million registered, it
\nwould be prudent for any political observer to follow and observe
\nthe Indonesian political trends. That also means, of course, that
\nit would be wise to refrain from drawing hasty political
\nconclusions, given the vast changes that have happened and are
\nhappening in the Indonesian society.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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