Has international terrorism gone local?<\/p>\n
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Security officials here have partly blamed the
\nrecent wave of bomb attacks on what they claim is infiltration of
\nIndonesia by foreign terrorist groups.<\/p>\n
The extent of the threat may never be truly revealed, but the
\ndanger was real enough to prompt both the United States and
\nBritain to take precautionary measures against possible attacks
\nfrom \"extremist elements\".<\/p>\n
Purported plans to bomb the U.S. Embassy, the American Club
\nand Hotel Indonesia were also uncovered.<\/p>\n
Police and intelligence officers claim these groups are linked
\nto a network in the Middle East. Specifically, the Mujahideen are
\nregarded as being the fountainhead of these groups.<\/p>\n
Malaysians were among those allegedly employed to carry out
\nthe operations.<\/p>\n
Authorities claim the Malaysians, including those identified
\nas being responsible for two recent church bombings, and the one
\nat the Atrium Plaza, are members of an organization called the
\nKumpulan Jihad, or Group for Holy War.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is no stranger to international terrorist attacks.
\nIn 1986 the Japanese Red Army attacked the Canadian, Japanese and
\nU.S. Embassies here.<\/p>\n
But the specter of international terrorism gripping the
\ncountry at a time when domestic violence remains unchecked is a
\ndaunting prospect.<\/p>\n
The international connection was first made when police said
\nsuspects in last year's Christmas Eve bombings were trained and
\nhad fought in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, little is known about the Afghanistan link
\nwhich arose after some Indonesians joined the Mujahideen during
\nthe Soviet occupation of that country in the 1980s.<\/p>\n
Since early last year there were already signals that
\ninternational terrorist groups had established links with radical
\ngroups in Indonesia, helping to aggravate religious violence in
\nthe country.<\/p>\n
Initially little credence was given to these reports,
\nparticularly the potential dangers to foreign facilities here.<\/p>\n
U.S. Ambassador Robert Gelbard in August 2000 indicated these
\nconcerns when he, seemingly out of the blue, launched a stinging
\ncriticism of Indonesia's weak intelligence operations.<\/p>\n
In an interview with the Washington Times he charged that the
\nIndonesian authorities had failed to detect and stop terrorist
\nnetworks penetrating the country.<\/p>\n
He said Washington was \"very concerned\" about the \"extremist
\ngroups\", including those from abroad, implanting themselves in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
\"We believe that has begun.\" CIA Director George J. Tenet said
\nin a statement before a U.S. Senate Committee in February this
\nyear, noting the rising specter of terrorist infiltration in a
\nstate wracked by economic chaos and political uncertainty.<\/p>\n
\"Some Southeast Asian leaders fear a power vacuum in Indonesia
\nwould create fertile ground for international terrorist groups
\nand Islamic activists, drug trafficking and organized crime,\" he
\nsaid.<\/p>\n
But who is actually at work here? What is the alleged
\nMujahideen link?<\/p>\n
The closest known organization that regularly carries out
\nterrorist attacks in the region is the Abu Sayyaf group whose
\nactivities are centered on the southern Philippines.<\/p>\n
It originally worked under the umbrella of the Moro National
\nLiberation Front (MNLF) until it split away in 1991\/1992.<\/p>\n
The MNLF has since negotiated a peace treaty with Manila which
\nwas brokered by Indonesia. But Abu Sayyaf remains defiant.<\/p>\n
It is strongly believed that apart from local funding they
\nalso receive sponsorship from groups based in the Middle East.<\/p>\n
Some of Abu Sayyaf's original members were veterans of the
\nAfghanistan conflict and are believed to have nurtured ties with
\nfellow veterans of the Mujahideen.<\/p>\n
While Abu Sayyaf could extend moral and personal backing to
\nactivities here, it is unlikely, given their limited resources,
\nthat they would engage in wide-scale operations if they were not
\ndirected at Philippine facilities.<\/p>\n
The most commonly suspected executors highlighted by the
\nintelligence community here are terrorist operatives linked to
\nthe infamous Osama bin Laden.<\/p>\n
Osama is a son of a Saudi Arabian construction magnate who
\nclaims that his father helped in the modern construction of the
\nholy mosques in both Mekkah and Madinah, along with restoration
\nof the Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem.<\/p>\n
He first gained attention when he rushed to fight against the
\ncommunist regime which invaded Afghanistan.<\/p>\n
But he is most noted for his initiative in organizing the
\nrecruitment and training of international volunteers to fight
\nwith the Mujahideen.<\/p>\n
This was the genesis of the transnational network which a
\ndecade later would serve him in his various activities.<\/p>\n
He continued to use his inheritance, estimated at being
\nbetween tens of millions and hundreds of millions of dollars, to
\nfinance the Al-Qaida group he established in the early 1990s.<\/p>\n
The United States claims that as leader of the Al-Qaida
\norganization, Osama is responsible for the Aug. 7, 1998, bomb
\nattacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam.<\/p>\n
Washington has indicted Osama and other members of the group
\nfor terrorist crimes and claims he persists in waging \"war\"
\nagainst the United States by way of terrorism.<\/p>\n
U.S. government reports often point to Osama's 1998 fatwa
\n(edict) dubbed \"International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews
\nand Crusaders\" which allegedly states that \"it is the duty of
\nMuslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the
\nenemies of God.\"<\/p>\n
\"Enemies\" in this case being the United States and its allies
\n-- installations, servicemen and civilians alike.<\/p>\n
Washington's attempts to apprehend Osama, now in his early
\n40s, have been in vain. He continues to live under the shield of
\nthe Taliban Movement in Afghanistan in defiance of a United
\nNations Resolution.<\/p>\n
The organization he heads, Al-Qaida, is a sorority of rebel
\nfighter alumnis who fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n
Apart from waging war on the United States, the group under
\nthe banner of the World Islamic Front aspires to establish Muslim
\nstates around the world.<\/p>\n
The list of alleged of terrorist crimes committed by Osama and
\nhis group are long as Washington strongly believes he is
\nconnected to most attacks on U.S. installations in recent years,
\nincluding the death of U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993.<\/p>\n
Al-Qaida also had close connections with the Egyptian Islamic
\nJihad group.<\/p>\n
Al-Qaida's tentacles, using the network first established
\nduring the Afghan resistance movement, have spread to
\ntransnational destinations, including increasing activity in
\nSoutheast Asia.<\/p>\n
The group is linked to attempts on the life of the Pope during
\nhis visit to Manila in 1994 along with attacks on U.S. embassies
\nin Asian capitals.<\/p>\n
As recently as 1998, an NBC news report claimed Osama had
\ntraveled to Malaysia and the Philippines.<\/p>\n
In a chilling reminder of how terrorist groups may have gone
\nto ground here, an intelligence officer said once operators sent
\nto a country had infiltrated its borders they were usually hard
\nto detect as their routine would be to remain as mundane as
\npossible.<\/p>\n
The key to the success of these missions lies in meticulous
\nplanning and surveillance. Patience is the operative word.
\nNothing is rushed or hastily executed.<\/p>\n
There is a definitive separation between those who plan the
\noperation and those who execute it with the two acting
\nindependently, with one often not knowing who the other is.<\/p>\n
Thus, the authorities may be able to foil one attempt and
\nround up the alleged perpetrators, but the operation as a whole
\ncould still remain intact and capable of mounting another attempt
\nin the distant future.<\/p>\n
After foreign operatives have infiltrated a country and
\nselected targets, surveillance could take place for six months up
\nto a year.<\/p>\n
These foreign operatives usually recruit a small number of
\nyoung locals to carry out the mission. Sometimes the perpetrators
\nwould be recruited from out of town (or abroad), arriving only
\nweeks before the attack is to take place.<\/p>\n
These executors themselves would know little about the depth
\nof the operation or the existence of other cells also assigned to
\nexecute other parts of the operation.<\/p>\n
Intelligence officers concede that in situations where the
\nsecurity infrastructure is in disarray, foreign agents often
\nemploy disgruntled or former servicemen looking for a quick
\npayoff.<\/p>\n
Foreign agents may also utilize the services of an already
\nestablished network in the target country by exploiting small
\nfanatical groups who are ideologically sympathetic to their
\ncause, or those who had past associations with them.<\/p>\n
Ideally these local groups should be inconspicuous, but as
\nlong as they are not on police wanted lists they will suffice as
\nthey are merely used for recruiting executors who will then work
\nindependently of the group.<\/p>\n
During the execution, each cell is equipped to fulfill a
\nspecific task and will be triggered into operation upon certain
\nconditions being fulfilled.<\/p>\n
Impulsiveness is not a trait that is sought. Each cell is
\nhighly independent, but does not function autonomously.<\/p>\n
The planning and bomb-making are almost always conducted in
\ndifferent locations.<\/p>\n
Surprisingly, the cost of conducting such operations are not
\nextreme. For example, American media reports claim that in the
\nWorld Trade Center bombing in New York, the estimated total cost
\nof the operation was less than US$25,000.<\/p>\n
In closing, it should be noted that one man's \"terrorist\"
\ncould be another man's \"freedom fighter.\"<\/p>\n
Many Indonesians may even be sympathetic to the terrorists'
\ncause.<\/p>\n
However, when the means employed result in wanton destruction
\non Indonesian soil and put its people in peril, they are not
\nsomething which can be tolerated. No matter how just the cause.<\/p>\n
The author is a staff writer with The Jakarta Post.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/has-international-terrorism-gone-local-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }