Hardline Islam on the march in Indonesia<\/p>\n
Merle Ricklefs
\nThe Straits Times
\nAsia News Network\/Singapore<\/p>\n
There has recently been a major upsurge in the ongoing contest
\nbetween Islamic liberals and conservatives in Indonesia. Its
\ncourse and current state may help us to judge which way the
\nreligious wind is blowing there.<\/p>\n
The immediate issue has been a group known as the Ahmadiyah.
\nThis goes back to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (circa 1839-1908), who
\nprovoked great controversy when he declared that he was the
\nIslamic Messiah. By some interpretations, he also claimed to be a
\nnew prophet.<\/p>\n
Orthodox Muslims, who accept the teaching of the Koran that
\nMuhammad was the last of God's Prophets, judged Ghulam Ahmad to
\nbe a heretic. After independence, violence broke out between
\nAhmadis and more orthodox Muslims in Pakistan. Ahmadiyah has been
\nbanned in several Muslim-majority nations over the past half-
\ncentury.<\/p>\n
Ahmadiyah arrived in Indonesia in the 1920s and attracted
\ncriticism from mainstream Muslims from the beginning. Their
\nnumbers are relatively small by Indonesian standards, about
\n200,000. Only recently has there been significant violence
\nagainst them.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's national-level Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, or
\nIndonesia Religious Scholars Council) issued a fatwa in 1980
\ndeclaring Ahmadiyah a deviant sect outside the bounds of Islam.
\nThe Ahmadis, however, continued their low-profile activities.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the public face of Indonesian Islam came
\nincreasingly to be dominated by two conflicting trends. On one
\nside were liberals, represented strongly in the Islamic higher
\neducation system, the major national-level organizations
\nMuhammadiyah (about 25 million members) and Nahdlatul Ulama (35-
\n40 million followers), and in a small group called JIL (Jaringan
\nIslam Liberal, or the Liberal Islamic Network).<\/p>\n
On the other side were extremists of various hues:
\nfundamentalist Salafi movements that thrived in the late stages
\nof the Soeharto regime and in the more open political environment
\nafter that.<\/p>\n
These include Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Majelis Mujahidin
\nIndonesia, groups like Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders
\nFront (FPI) which were willing to engage in violence and, most
\nnotoriously, Jamaah Islamiyah.<\/p>\n
A third leadership group seemed to have lost control of the
\nagenda altogether: The conservative, literalist, not extremist
\nbut also not liberal, religious scholars known as ulamas.<\/p>\n
The elections of 2004 even demonstrated that however much
\nrespect ulamas might receive from ordinary Indonesians, most
\npeople were not prepared to take their advice about whom to vote
\nfor.<\/p>\n
In the middle of 2005, religious conservatives sought to
\nreassert authority. Their first victory was in Muhammadiyah, a
\nmodernist organization founded in 1912. Modernism in Islam
\nembraces scientific and secular knowledge and modern social
\nstyles, but it also goes back to the basic texts of Islam, the
\nKoran and Hadith (Prophetic traditions), unmediated by the
\ninterpretations of the orthodox schools of law, so it also has a
\nliteralist, puritan side.<\/p>\n
The MUI was just then in the process of issuing new fatwas. On
\nJuly 28, it issued 11 of them, two of which are of interest to us
\nhere. They condemned, firstly, pluralism, liberalism and
\nsecularism as against Islam, and secondly, Ahmadiyah as heretical
\nand its followers as murtad (apostates, whom it is lawful to kill
\naccording to some interpretations of Islamic law).<\/p>\n
The authorities in West Java sealed Ahmadiyah properties in
\nKuningan, the target of attack in 2002.<\/p>\n
In Garut, Ahmadis had machetes put to their necks and were
\nforced to say they had returned to the true Islam. In Bogor, the
\nAhmadi complex was attacked. The FPI, under its leader Habib
\nRizieq Shihab, returned to prominence in the West Java anti-
\nAhmadiyah actions.<\/p>\n
The FPI has also been active in forcing the closure of over 20
\nChristian churches in West Java over the past year. So much for
\nfreedom of religion in that part of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
In Padang, West Sumatra, religious leaders told Ahmadis they
\nhad a week to disband, but elsewhere nothing seems to have
\nhappened.<\/p>\n
In Jakarta, the authorities sealed an Ahmadi mosque in order
\nto prevent violence, but in Solo and Yogyakarta all was quiet.<\/p>\n
In Tawangmangu, Central Java, the local MUI branch said it had
\nno intention of doing anything for there had never been problems
\nbetween Ahmadis and their neighbors.<\/p>\n
So the impact of the MUI fatwa denouncing Ahmadiyah varied
\nfrom place to place. Where there was a historical background of
\nconflict, as in West Java, it was taken as justification for more
\naction. Elsewhere, it rarely had an impact.<\/p>\n
Liberal figures rallied against the MUI fatwas. Ulil Abshar
\nAbdalla of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), with his unerring
\ngift for infuriating conservatives, called the fatwas tolol,
\nplain stupid.<\/p>\n
On Aug. 5, the FPI attempted to lead an attack on the JIL
\nheadquarters in Jakarta. The JIL was defended by several hundred
\npeople: students from the State Islamic University, Nahdlatul
\nUlamas youth militia, Muhammadiyah's Security Command, local
\nresidents and some 200 police. The mob backed off.<\/p>\n
This was an ominous development for the MUI: Conservative and
\nreactionary ulamas might wish to regain the agenda from the
\nliberals and the extremists, but few would wish to see their
\ncause associated with extremist violence. Yet that was what
\nhappened: the extremists in a back-handed way were assisting the
\nliberals to discredit the MUI.<\/p>\n
Former president Abdurrahman Wahid, major Islamic leaders and
\nother public figures condemned the fatwas and asked why the MUI
\nrefused to issue one condemning violence.<\/p>\n
Newspapers lauded Indonesia's plural social heritage.
\nPresident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said nothing at all.<\/p>\n
Where does this conflict stand now? Conservatives and
\nreactionaries dominate two important organizations, the MUI and
\nMuhammadiyah, to a greater extent than before. But the MUI fatwas
\nso far seem to have been effective only in one area, West Java,
\nwhere there was already a history of conflict.<\/p>\n
Pluralism is a fact of life in Indonesia which the MUI can't
\nwish away. Liberalism is deeply embedded in the educational
\nsystem and has strong cultural roots. It is probable that the
\nIslamic thugs in robes have assisted the liberal cause by
\nassociating the MUI fatwas with anarchic violence. This is a good
\nway to persuade Indonesians that your cause is unacceptable.<\/p>\n
This is a perpetual story without endings, but there are
\ngrounds for thinking that the progressive liberalism of Indonesia
\nhas withstood the attack. With its reactionary fatwas, the MUI
\nmay indeed have sidelined itself from the rapidly changing
\nsociety around it.<\/p>\n
We must now wait to see what is done by Din Syamsuddin and his
\ncolleagues in Muhammadiyah, an organization of immense importance
\nto Indonesia's future. Will they try to push a conservative
\nagenda even more vigorously?<\/p>\n
The writer is a professor at the National University of
\nSingapore. He may be contacted at polrmc@nus.edu.sg.<\/p>",
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