Hard lessons to be learned from East Timor<\/p>\n
By John Hargreaves<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): A number of questions stand out about the
\nchapter of East Timorese history which just ended. One question
\nis what made Soeharto and Western countries decide to integrate
\nEast Timor in 1975 to 1976.<\/p>\n
Many people say it was a Cold War necessity influenced by
\nevents in Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. But Castro's
\nrebels in Cuba were neither hard-line communists nor Soviet
\nallies when they overthrew Batista in 1958. They became so only
\nafter three years of hostile and inappropriate U.S. policy.<\/p>\n
The Fretilin rebels were even less communist or Soviet
\naligned. They started out as the Social Democratic Association of
\nEast Timor and saw Australia as a potential key ally. It
\ncertainly was not inevitable that a Fretilin-led East Timor would
\nturn into a Soviet military outpost.<\/p>\n
What really drove the Western-backed takeover was the fear
\nthat a communist East Timor would contaminate Indonesia and
\ndestabilize the Soeharto regime. They still believed in the
\ndomino theory that justified the Vietnam War. But they did not
\nforesee that the Fretilin rebels would resist a foreign army and
\na brutal dictator as fiercely as the Vietcong had.<\/p>\n
Later Western policy on East Timor is also questionable. For
\nexample, the Timor Gap treaty was said to be good for Australian-
\nIndonesian relations. But the East Timorese people were likely to
\nlose their oil for little return. At a local level, exploitation
\nof resources by foreign companies is a more important aspect of
\ninternational relations than friendliness between central
\ngovernments.<\/p>\n
Recent Australian actions have worsened relations with
\nIndonesia through bad presentation. When former president B.J.
\nHabibie announced his decision to allow independence, stories
\ncirculated that a letter from John Howard had influenced Habibie.
\nActually Habibie's policy was totally different from what Howard
\nproposed. But the policy was popular in Australia so the
\nAustralian government fostered the impression that Australia had
\nhelped to shape it.<\/p>\n
When violence broke out, Australia's policy of military
\nreadiness was prudent. But it was accompanied by misleading
\nreports in some media and aggressive anti-Indonesian
\ndemonstrations. Some comments from Australian leaders were more
\nin tune with the aggression of the demonstrations than with the
\nprudence of the policy.<\/p>\n
Turning to Indonesia, the man most criticized over East Timor
\nwas Habibie. For sure, Habibie took a risk by offering East Timor
\nindependence, but all possible courses were high risk. Habibie,
\nstepping out of Soeharto's shadow, chose the course that offered
\na quick resolution.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, the announcement of the referendum was flawed. A
\nnormal procedure would be: legislature offers referendum,
\nreferendum held, same legislature ratifies result. In this case
\nthe procedure was: government offers referendum, referendum held,
\nwait two months, new legislature ratifies result. The two-month
\nwait became a mine field. The prointegration group hoped that if
\nit lost it could still persuade the new People's Consultative
\nAssembly (MPR) to reject the result. The president became trapped
\nbetween foreign pressure and fear of preempting the MPR.<\/p>\n
Still, the big problem was security. It has been said that
\nHabibie's decision to offer independence triggered an upsurge in
\nviolence. But Habibie's decision was indeed only a trigger.
\nTrouble was instigated earlier through the recruitment of
\ncivilian militias to complement the official armed forces.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia it is important to find out how security
\narrangements went so wrong.<\/p>\n
For the United Nations it is important to ask whether any
\nreferendum of this kind can be held without an international
\npeacekeeping force. Several countries pressed Indonesia to accept
\nsuch a force bud did not insist for several reasons: fear that
\nthe ballot offer would be withdrawn, fear of upsetting
\nIndonesia's democratic transition, need for unity in the UN and
\nlack of enthusiasm among countries required to supply and fund
\ntroops.<\/p>\n
In this last regard, the United States affirmed until well
\nafter the ballot that it expected Indonesia to keep its security
\npledge and that the East Timor problem was only one of many in
\nthe world. According to statements by John Howard and Jose Ramos
\nHorta, a change of mind by Bill Clinton made Interfet possible.<\/p>\n
This indicates that United Nations action depends excessively
\non the United States. It also suggests that media pressure had an
\nexcessive influence when many international media reports about
\nEast Timor featured exaggerated death tolls and stories of
\ngenocide. In future, stories of a mere couple of thousand deaths
\nmay fail to move world public opinion and world leaders, even
\nwhen intervention is practical. East Timor may find that once
\noutrage subsides the funds it requires will prove elusive.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia, the East Timor crisis creates or influences
\nseveral important goals.<\/p>\n
One aim is to build a friendly relationship with East Timor.
\nBeyond technical matters, this means a new outlook. After so many
\nyears viewing Jose Alexandre \"Xanana\" Gusmao and Ramos Horta as
\nenemies of the state, some Indonesians may be suspicious of East
\nTimor. But East Timor will have a minor influence on Indonesia
\nwhile Indonesia will have a major influence on East Timor. While
\nEast Timorese leaders will naturally want to get on well with
\nIndonesia, it is Indonesia which should lead as it is by far the
\nlarger and more powerful country.<\/p>\n
A second aim is to improve Indonesia's position in the world.<\/p>\n
An important route to this goal is to develop the Association
\nof Southeast Asian Nations. The recent crisis showed that it
\ncannot handle security and human rights problems, which limits
\nits influence on the world stage. While some members already seek
\nmore cooperation in these areas, it is now up to the group's
\nbiggest member, Indonesia, to take a stance.<\/p>\n
It is also important to strengthen the domestic base for
\nforeign policy. While some commentators saw nonrecognition of
\nEast Timor's integration as a failure of diplomatic lobbying, the
\nreal problem was repression inside East Timor.<\/p>\n
This also means strengthening the decision-making process for
\nforeign policy. The policy of opening trade links with Israel,
\nfor example, has already suffered because it was sprung out of
\nthe blue. Policies of great public concern should be fully
\ndiscussed before they are adopted and political parties and
\nnational leaders should take a clear position. Otherwise,
\nbenefits from a policy will be attenuated by doubts about its
\nlong-term direction.<\/p>\n
A third aim is to restore order in the province of East Nusa
\nTenggara. Officially, it is already government policy to return
\nas many refugees as possible to East Timor. But in East Timor
\nitself, lack of commitment in implementing official policy led to
\ndisaster; there is a danger that the same will happen in west
\nTimor.<\/p>\n
A fourth aim is to preserve the unity of Indonesia. The
\noriginal invasion of East Timor was driven by the domino theory
\nthat an independent East Timor would transmit communism to other
\nparts of Indonesia. Now it is feared that an independent East
\nTimor will transmit separatism to other parts of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The need highlighted is for nation-building. For the military,
\nnation-building meant extending the gains of the war of
\nindependence: the 1945 Constitution, the expulsion of the
\ncolonialists and the united republic. Anyone doubting any one of
\nthese gains was a traitor. Thus, the government crushed regional
\nrebellions through force but could not handle the grievances that
\ncaused the rebellions.<\/p>\n
With a revised constitution and regional autonomy, Indonesians
\nnow want to build a new Indonesia. But nothing can guarantee that
\nthe Acehnese or others will want in.<\/p>\n
A fifth goal is to prevent further human rights disasters.<\/p>\n
Improving civil control of the military is important for this.
\nLong-term plans to reform the bureaucracy, revise the national
\nbudget and overhaul the judicial system will directly affect the
\ncapability and professionalism of the armed forces.<\/p>\n
In addition, civilians should plan further internal reform,
\nincluding in sensitive areas like intelligence and special
\nforces.<\/p>\n
In the short term, the greatest need is to try cases of abuse.
\nBut none of the high-profile cases from the Habibie era have yet
\nreached court.<\/p>\n
In general, the East Timor crisis highlights the need for
\ngreater commitment to uphold human rights.<\/p>\n
Major cases like last year's May riots have not been
\nsatisfactorily resolved. Soon after the riots, attention shifted
\nfrom investigating what happened, supporting the victims and
\npreventing a recurrence to the contention that all reports of
\nrape during the riot were fake. A report from a fact-finding team
\nwas filed and forgotten.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, a similar outcome is likely in East Timor. Even
\nat the height of the violence, attention shifted from ending the
\nterror, supporting the victims and preventing a recurrence to the
\ncontention that Indonesia was the victim of an international
\nconspiracy.<\/p>\n
Although a team is now investigating, its report may not be
\nfollowed up. With the military already under pressure over Aceh,
\nwhere the political stakes are high, it is unlikely that the
\ngovernment will want to pile on extra pressure over East Timor,
\nwhere there is no apparent political gain.<\/p>\n
The writer, a graduate of Cambridge University in Britain, is
\na teacher at the Jakarta International Korean School.<\/p>",
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