Handle Indonesia with care<\/p>\n
By Santi W.E. Soekanto<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): By any standard, Indonesia is an improbable
\ncountry. It is a wonder how it has been able to withstand for so
\nlong the polarizing forces that have always accompanied its
\nexistence.<\/p>\n
British economist Anne Booth wrote in 1996 about how the very
\nimprobability of such a huge and heterogeneous collection of
\nislands forming itself into a single country was once a source of
\nnational pride.<\/p>\n
Not anymore, according to many Indonesians. A niggling sense
\nof shame began to creep in about four years ago, coinciding with
\nthe international exposure of Indonesia's failures to handle many
\nof its problems.<\/p>\n
Individuals returning from overseas trips talked about trying
\nto conceal their nationality during gatherings.<\/p>\n
"Sometimes they looked at us with pity, sometimes with
\ncontempt. Some people lashed out at us over East Timor -- I
\nwasn't even born when Soeharto 'integrated' the territory," one
\nsaid.<\/p>\n
Let us start with the forest fires that choked the breath out
\nof many neighboring countries in 1996, to the economic collapse
\nin 1997, from the famine in Irian Jaya and other remote regions,
\nthe massive rioting that killed thousands in 1998, to the
\nrevelations of gross rights abuses and the deadly sectarian
\nconflicts in 1999. And, of course, the unceasing bickering among
\nthe political elite of today. All are cause enough to turn
\nIndonesia into both a regional and international pariah.<\/p>\n
Sociologists would assess the "multi-dimensional crisis"
\ncurrently threatening Indonesia's survival as something that is
\nsociologically "natural" because of its long-standing potential
\nfor disintegration.<\/p>\n
First, it has a long history of rebellions in its regions that
\ndates back to the early years of the republic. Political dissent
\nis a long-standing issue in Irian Jaya, Aceh and also its "former
\ncolony" East Timor, where armed political movements have been
\nwaged for years and responded to with massive military
\noperations.<\/p>\n
Second, Indonesia's diversity might have been a source of
\npride when the country was united -- as was expressed in the term
\nBhineka Tunggal Ika. But the term also means an uneven degree of
\nintegration among its more than 300 ethnic groups that vary
\nenormously in size and cultural sophistication. This constitutes
\na threat to national integrity.<\/p>\n
Scholars have pointed out how Java has had an unbroken
\ntradition of dense population and powerful states for 1500 years.
\nSpeakers of the Javanese language number at least 80 million.<\/p>\n
By contrast, in parts of eastern Indonesia there are tiny
\nlanguage groups whose recorded history dates only from the
\ncolonial period and whose integration into the broader
\narchipelagic economy has always been weak and sporadic.<\/p>\n
It is small wonder that the Republic of Indonesia emerged at
\nall. Now this is not a cue for anyone to declare, "had we taken
\nthe option of federalism after independence, we would have been
\nbetter off now." History is history after all, and the decision
\nto opt for a fragile unitary state in 1945, as opposed to
\nfederalism, should remain a lesson for all.<\/p>\n
The third reason is regional discontent over Soeharto's
\npolicies. These covered many spheres but at least three major
\nissues have been identified: the decades of economic injustices,
\nthe state and military abuses of human rights, and the highly
\ncentralized New Order regime that left almost no space for
\nregions to have a say in how their resources were being managed.<\/p>\n
Now that the New Order is no more, the glue that had been
\nkeeping the country together has also gone. Which is why
\nIndonesia began to unravel -- so people say.<\/p>\n
The fourth reason for the threat of disintegration is
\nsomething that has been spoken of from time to time, but has yet
\nto be explored further: the presence of forces that seek to
\nundermine Indonesia's geopolitical importance by fomenting unrest
\nand discouraging separatist campaigns.<\/p>\n
For example, the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings which took place
\nalmost simultaneously in a number of provinces and caused further
\nsectarian tension, have been perceived by many analysts as a
\nmanifestation of the existence of a highly organized force such
\nas the military seeking to take over power from civilians.<\/p>\n
Another example was the West's meddling in the East Timor
\ndebacle. In an interesting article titled "Indonesia, Master Card
\nin Washington's Hand" in Indonesia (Cornell University Southeast
\nAsia Program, October 1998), Noam Chomsky revealed how Washington
\nignored its own restrictions on arms sales with Indonesia.
\nFurther, the UN Security Council's order that Jakarta withdraw
\nfrom East Timor became an empty gesture because the U.S. State
\nDepartment rendered it "utterly ineffective in whatever measures
\nit undertook."<\/p>\n
This, according to the then UN Ambassador Daniel Patrick
\nMoynihan in his memoirs, was because the U.S. wished things to
\nturn out as they did. Chomsky pointed out how within a few months
\nsome 60,000 Timorese had been killed after the annexation,
\n"almost the same proportion of casualties experienced by the
\nSoviet Union during the second world war."<\/p>\n
Chomsky believes the atrocities that continued until the late
\n1990s took place with the decisive support of the U.S. and its
\nallies.<\/p>\n
How ironic that it is also the West that condemned Indonesia
\nin the 1990s for gross abuse of human rights in East Timor when
\nviolence had always been there throughout the territory's
\n"integration." Doubly ironic that it was those very same
\ncountries and the UN that forced Indonesia to evacuate East Timor
\nin 1999.<\/p>\n
The most ironic situation, however, is the fact that groups of
\nIndonesians are now pleading for the West and the UN to intervene
\ninto their affairs.<\/p>\n
Parties in the sectarian conflict in Maluku, for instance,
\nhave for some time asked the UN to send its peacekeeping forces
\nto the region, accusing the Indonesian military of unfairness and
\nthe government of incompetence in curbing the violence.<\/p>\n
Now, students and activists in the restive Aceh province have
\nasked visiting U.S. Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard for
\ninternational intervention into the military-separatist conflict.
\nThe activists accused the Indonesian government of not having the
\ngood will to investigate the crimes against humanity committed in
\nthe province.<\/p>\n
The Acehnese have the most reason to cry for help, given its
\nviolent history under the Military Operations status, but will
\ninternational intervention really help?<\/p>\n
The push for separation in Indonesian regions is a sign that
\nthe question of national disintegration is far from settled here.
\nRegional discontent that threatens national integration is one
\nthing but threats that come from other forces seeking to
\nundermine Indonesia's geopolitical importance is a different
\nmatter altogether. This particular threat needs to be considered
\nand handled well if Indonesia wishes to maintain its integrity.<\/p>\n
Indonesia has undergone so much -- if this were our parents or
\nour other loved ones that are ailing like this we would move
\nheaven and earth to find a cure. We would not feel ashamed.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, too, needs to be handled with care. It serves no
\none's interests to have it splintered into pieces. If it were to
\nfall apart, it would suffer but so would Aceh and Irian Jaya and
\nother regions now demanding separation.<\/p>\n
As historian Robert Cribb says, "the thing that most
\nIndonesians yearn for -- human dignity and prosperity -- seems
\nmuch more likely to be achieved within the larger framework of
\nIndonesia than within any possible combination of smaller
\nstates."<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist at The Jakarta Post.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/handle-indonesia-with-care-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }