Habibie's legitimacy questioned<\/p>\n
By Ignas Kleden<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Though B.J. Habibie seems to have taken over the
\noffice of president very easily, smoothly and quickly, he is now
\nbeset by the heavy and protracted question of his legitimacy and
\nlegality. His presidency is considered not fully legally valid
\nbecause it has not received the mandate of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR). It is also allegedly lacking
\nlegitimacy because he is seen as a man very close to the former
\npresident, Soeharto.<\/p>\n
According to his critics, a special session of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly would solve the two questions if Habibie
\ncan come out as president-elect. However, this might not be
\ntotally true in view of the fact that while election by the
\nAssembly will solve the problem of legality, Habibie's legitimacy
\ndepends very much on whether or not he can prove himself as more
\nthan a mere protege and faithful follower of Soeharto.<\/p>\n
In reality this means that his legitimacy depends very much on
\nthe actions he takes to overcome the shortage of basic
\nfoodstuffs, as well as to stabilize the exchange rate of the
\nIndonesian currency. The two questions of legality and
\nlegitimacy, unfortunately, seem to have a mutually opposing
\neffect. If one wants to settle the problem of the legality of the
\nnew president, this might completely absorb public attention and
\npolitical time to the extent that the very urgent economic
\nproblems would not be solved on time, this leading to a more
\nrestive situation which, again, will possibly hit political
\nstability.<\/p>\n
If one takes the second option by giving the president enough
\ntime to settle the economic problems (which is essential to his
\nlegitimacy), this will necessitate a suspension of political
\ndiscussion and a delay of the pressing demand for political
\nreform for some time. In so doing one might miss the present
\npolitical momentum, because the people would be required to
\nrestrain themselves from political participation and the exercise
\nof their democratic rights for the sake of economic
\nstabilization. A possible risk one might be running is that the
\npostponement of political reform will be extended to an
\nindefinite period of time, as was the case with the New Order.
\nThis is the reason why demonstrations are still going on despite
\nthe president's repeated request to stop such actions in order
\nfor him to work without too much political disturbance.<\/p>\n
In a sense, the beginning of Habibie's governance is fairly
\ncomparable to that of Soeharto's in the mid sixties. Both come
\nout of economic crisis. The inflation rate by the end of
\nSoekarno's regime was over 600 percent. People were short of
\ndaily foodstuffs and prices increased astronomically. Now,
\naccording to some forecasts, the inflation rate will go far
\nbeyond 600 percent. People are confronted with serious shortages
\nof basic foodstuffs and prices are still going up everyday while
\nthe rupiah becomes weaker and weaker.<\/p>\n
However, the challenges faced by the two presidents are
\ntotally different. Soeharto, at his time, was entitled to claim
\nany prerogatives to stabilize the economic situation, which he
\ndid well at the beginning. This gave him a powerful legitimacy,
\nbecause people were satisfied with the improvements to the
\neconomic situation after getting fed up with protracted
\nideological conflicts and political turbulence.<\/p>\n
For the time being Habibie obviously lacks the privilege of
\nformer president Soeharto. For one thing, the trust of
\ninternational bodies to the first cabinet of Soeharto was quickly
\ngained, due to the integrity and the technical expertise of the
\nministers of his cabinet. For another, at the beginning of the
\nNew Order people were still willing to sacrifice some of their
\npolitical rights for the sake of economic stabilization. This
\nwillingness was owing to the then much propagated assumption that
\neconomic development would eventually bring about a democratizing
\nprocess.<\/p>\n
Habibie has more problems because not all his ministers are
\nsupposedly free from the old practices of KKN (corruption,
\ncollusion and nepotism), while they also do not represent the
\nbest expertise available in the Indonesian political community,
\nespecially with regards to economic and financial know-how. At
\nthe same time people are much more wary of once again sacrificing
\ntheir political rights for economic stabilization, if there is no
\npolitical guarantee given in whatever form that this limitation
\nis treated as a merely provisional measure for a temporary, short
\nperiod of time.<\/p>\n
The legitimacy of President Habibie will depend not only on
\nhis ability to settle economic problems successfully, but also on
\nwhether or not he can liberate himself from the overshadowing
\ninfluences of his predecessor, who according to his often
\nrepeated acknowledgement, was his most important political patron
\n(he is often quoted as saying, \"Soeharto is my political
\nprofessor\").<\/p>\n
This is obviously an important step forward in the building of
\npeople's political consciousness. Economic development is a must
\nfor any government which wants to stay in power, but it is only a
\nnecessary condition which is nevertheless not automatically
\nsufficient for winning legitimacy. The lesson people have learned
\nfrom the New Order is: economic development for democracy: yes;
\neconomic development for authoritarian governance: no.<\/p>\n
Another lesson from the present crisis is that participation
\nis not only a matter of political democracy, but also a condition
\nfor economic sustainability. From a political perspective it
\nbecomes increasingly evident that economic development should not
\nonly aim at sustained growth but also at the capability to
\novercome risks. A benefit-oriented economy should be strengthened
\nby a cost-oriented economy. Economic growth without economic
\nresilience looks like a palace built upon sand.<\/p>\n
This truth is fairly discernible in the political behavior of
\nSoeharto's regime. The inevitability of a temporary wealth
\nconcentration was often propagated as a stage which economic
\ndevelopment must undergo, but every time the national economy is
\nhit by a crisis an appeal to people's participation is loudly
\nheard. Why is it that in good conditions only a few can have
\nprivileges (allegedly as a transitory stage), while in crisis all
\npeople should be responsible? The loss of people's confidence in
\nSoeharto's governance originates for a great part in the
\nrejection of this political hypocrisy.<\/p>\n
Besides, it is dangerous if the economy is dominated by a
\nhandful of powerful conglomerates. In time of crisis, they turned
\nout not powerful enough to overcome the emergency by their
\ncapacity alone. A common truth has too long been forgotten and
\nneglected: distribution of income is not only a claim for social
\njustice. It entails the distribution of risk among more people,
\nwho of course will have broader shoulders to carry the burden of
\nthe crisis.<\/p>\n
Habibie is not so lucky as Soeharto was, because he is faced
\nwith a double challenge, without having the possibility of
\nmeeting one at the expense of the other. He has to overcome the
\neconomic crisis, or, better put, he has to salvage the country
\nfrom imminent total economic collapse. At the same time he is
\nobliged to solve the problem of his legitimacy by enlarging the
\npolitical room for more participation, which means, giving
\nopportunity to more demands, expectations and aspirations.<\/p>\n
The question of the legality of his presidency can be best
\nsolved by convening a special session of the People's Assembly as
\nsoon as possible. However, this \"as soon as possible\" is already
\nimpossible, because there is not enough time for even an
\napproximate preparation. Besides that, from the economic point of
\nview, there might be hardly any economic rationale for the huge
\nexpenditure involved for a special session considering the
\ndifficult financial situation. At the same time, by doing that
\nthe focus of government attention will shift from economic
\nproblems to political problems, leaving the people with
\nuncertainty about what they have to do to meet their basic needs
\nwithout delay.<\/p>\n
The primary urgency is to improve the price and distribution
\nof basic commodities and the exchange rate of the rupiah. This
\nshould be done quickly and successfully, because otherwise
\nanother outbreak of social unrest could possibly emerge, which
\nmight bring the whole situation to political chaos, needing a
\nlonger time to recover. You can tell the people about all
\npossible good things in politics, but you cannot let them wait
\nfor one week with nothing to eat.<\/p>\n
President Habibie is obviously aware of this urgency and the
\ninternational dilemma it entails. His legitimacy depends very
\nmuch on his ability to recover from the financial crisis.
\nHowever, this will be unthinkable without regaining the
\nconfidence of international bodies and the trust of the
\ninternational market. In turn, the confidence of international
\nbodies requires the enforcement of democracy and a more serious
\nobservance of human rights as its conditionality. If this is the
\ncase, Habibie should give his attention to Indonesia's domestic
\npolitical affairs, which means there will be no possibility for
\nhim to give priority to economic and financial problems while
\nsuspending for the time being political questions.<\/p>\n
The difficulty faced by the president is that so many things
\nare uncertain. One cannot rely on the good intentions of the IMF
\nalone in view of the implementation of its aid until now. This
\nmeans, there are only very limited options for President Habibie
\nas far as national and international politics are concerned.<\/p>\n
He can choose to settle domestic politics first to regain
\ninternational confidence, which is instrumental to the
\nimprovement of monetary and economic conditions. This will come
\ntrue if the willingness of those international bodies to help
\nIndonesia is serious enough. If it is not the case it might be
\ntoo late for Habibie to overcome the economic crisis, which his
\npresidency might not survive as well.<\/p>\n
He can take another option by concentrating on solving the
\neconomic crisis while trying to persuade the international bodies
\nof the urgency of this action and the importance of economic
\nrecovery as a material base on which to build democracy. This
\nmight sound logical and reasonable and Habibie might mean it in
\ngood faith. However, this argument lost all its validity and
\npersuasive power during the regime of Soeharto: 32 years of
\neconomic development and yet no democracy at all. Nobody who has
\na good memory will easily buy such an argument right after the
\ndemise of the New Order, which used that argument merely to
\nmaintain its power.<\/p>\n
The only way out can be found if there is serious political
\nwill from the present government to give a political guarantee.
\nHabibie will regain the confidence he needs from both the
\nIndonesian people and international bodies if he meets two
\nrequirements. First, he has to demonstrate his determination to
\novercome the present economic crisis. The political condition for
\ndoing that in the form of political tranquility will be given him
\nif he can guarantee that the suspension of political rights will
\nonly last for a short period of time. To make sure of this
\nguarantee, he has to, secondly, announce his unwillingness to be
\nreelected as president after the end of the present term in order
\nto rule out the suspicion that the requirement for a temporary
\nlimitation of people's political rights is nothing but a mere
\npretext.<\/p>\n
I think if the requirements are fulfilled, there will be no
\ngreat hesitation among people and international bodies to give
\ntheir confidence. This comes as a personal sacrifice to President
\nHabibie. However, if he wants to salvage the country from
\nimminent economic collapse, there seems to be no other choice
\nthan to sacrifice himself and his power upon the altar of
\nnational and international politics. This is the price he has to
\npay for regaining confidence, which in the present political and
\neconomic situation has become a highly valuable commodity of
\nextreme scarcity. In so doing he will be out of politics but
\nwelcome in Indonesian history.<\/p>\n
Ignas Kleden is a sociologist based in Jakarta.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/habibies-legitimacy-questioned-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }