{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1284860,
        "msgid": "gus-durs-gamble-1447893297",
        "date": "2000-12-12 00:00:00",
        "title": "Gus Dur's gamble",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Gus Dur's gamble Tension has escalated in Aceh and Irian Jaya in recent weeks after the adoption of a tougher approach by the government in its dealings with secessionist demands in both provinces. But the government is taking a big gamble in clamping down on independence supporters, including by resorting to the use of force, irrespective of whether they are fighting with arms or words. Like all gambles, this one is not without risks.",
        "content": "<p>Gus Dur's gamble<\/p>\n<p>Tension has escalated in Aceh and Irian Jaya in recent weeks<br>\nafter the adoption of a tougher approach by the government in its<br>\ndealings with secessionist demands in both provinces. But the<br>\ngovernment is taking a big gamble in clamping down on<br>\nindependence supporters, including by resorting to the use of<br>\nforce, irrespective of whether they are fighting with arms or<br>\nwords.<\/p>\n<p>Like all gambles, this one is not without risks. In the last<br>\ntwo weeks, we have seen more bloody clashes in both Irian Jaya<br>\nand Aceh, and more casualties on both sides of the row.<br>\nTragically, many innocent civilians are caught in the middle. And<br>\nwe have seen the government arresting leaders of the independence<br>\nmovements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, even as they were preaching<br>\nnonviolent means in their struggle for freedom.<\/p>\n<p>This is a major departure from the more conciliatory approach<br>\nwhich President Abdurrahman Wahid had used in the first 12 months<br>\nof his leadership in dealing with separatist demands. Open<br>\nexpressions for separation or independence were then tolerated as<br>\nlong as they were done peacefully and did not call for an armed<br>\nrebellion. This led to the political rally of more than one<br>\nmillion people demanding a referendum of self-determination in<br>\nAceh in November 1999, and the Papuan people's conference to<br>\nassert their demand for independence in Irian Jaya in May 2000.<\/p>\n<p>Such tolerance now seems to have disappeared as the hard-<br>\nliners in the government and in the Indonesian Military have<br>\nseized the initiatives away from President Abdurrahman. The<br>\nreferendum rally in Aceh and the Papuan people's conference in<br>\nIrian Jaya must have alarmed many people in Jakarta as they<br>\nshowed the extent of the support for independence in the two<br>\nprovinces.<\/p>\n<p>By raising the specter of national disintegration if such<br>\nseparatist aspirations were further allowed in the open, the<br>\nhardliners in the government and in the military seem to have<br>\ngained the upper hand. They have now managed to persuade the<br>\nPresident to adopt a stronger stance in facing such demands.<br>\nNational unity, security and territorial integrity are now once<br>\nagain the overriding concern of the government, so much so to the<br>\npoint of suppressing people's democratic rights.<\/p>\n<p>The trouble with this approach is that it had been tried<br>\nbefore and it had failed miserably. Rather than reducing the<br>\ndemand for independence, this \"security approach\" in the past<br>\nstrengthened the aspiration of the people in the regions. The<br>\nhuman casualty that resulted from this approach, particularly<br>\nfrom human rights violations by the security apparatus, drove<br>\nmore people into the fold of the independence cause. The large<br>\nsupport which the separatist movements today enjoy among the<br>\npopulace in Aceh and Irian Jaya emanated largely from the<br>\nrepressive policies of the past regime of president Soeharto.<\/p>\n<p>The government of President Abdurrahman Wahid is now about to<br>\ncommit exactly the same mistake that Soeharto's tyrannical regime<br>\nmade in Irian Jaya, Aceh and in East Timor. The expensive lessons<br>\nof East Timor seem to have been completely forgotten by the<br>\ncurrent administration: that the use of force is an almost sure<br>\nrecipe for disaster. And since history has a tendency to repeat<br>\nitself, at this rate, we are sure to lose the two provinces, with<br>\nall the dire consequences for the nation.<\/p>\n<p>By taking a tough stance in both Irian Jaya and Aceh, and by<br>\narresting the proindependence leaders, the government has<br>\neliminated the middle ground where independence supporters could<br>\nfight for their cause in a peaceful and democratic way. With this<br>\nground eliminated, these fighters and their supporters would go<br>\nunderground, and probably even join the armed rebellion. When<br>\nthey do, it will be hard to draw them to the negotiating tables.<\/p>\n<p>Unless the government stopped the current clampdown in both<br>\nAceh and Irian Jaya, tension in both provinces would soon develop<br>\ninto full-scale, and probably protracted, conflicts. This will be<br>\na war that Indonesia will find hard to win. The debacle in East<br>\nTimor should have taught us by now that you cannot win a war when<br>\nyou fight against underground or guerrilla forces.<\/p>\n<p>In the meantime, the Indonesian security apparatus, as a<br>\nReuters photo (which appeared on the front page of this newspaper<br>\non Monday) of a police armored vehicle on a street in Aceh<br>\nshowed, is looking more and more like an unwelcome occupation<br>\nforce. This looks like a gamble that President Abdurrahman Wahid<br>\nshould never have taken because it is not going to pay off.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/gus-durs-gamble-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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