Gus Dur vs 'the Green Dragon'<\/p>\n
By Nuruddin Amin<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The existence of intelligence operations between
\npolitical parties has been a rumor for some time. The Nahdlatul
\nUlama (NU) conferences of both 1994 and 1995, and the internal
\nstrife of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) were subject to
\nthe rumors. The intelligence operations were said to have put
\ninto motion the Red Dragon and the Green Dragon.<\/p>\n
It is hard to know who were behind these operations.
\nInformation on high-level political behavior is usually closely
\nguarded, although it is always reflected by the political event
\nthat has taken place. There are usually two things that can be
\nfocused in the context of current political violence.<\/p>\n
First, intelligence operations are linked to the conflict of
\nmultipolar power elite interests. The military, bureaucratic,
\nIslamic and other elite groups are not on a single power line.
\nVarious factions exist in the political groups. These factions
\ninteract in a multipolar political collaboration.<\/p>\n
A certain political event can be a political project of a
\nmultipolar collaboration. It is hard to detect the actor behind
\nthe event, because this type of political collaboration is very
\nunstable. There is a great possibility that responsibility will
\nbe pushed onto others and cheating among factions may shift
\npolitical alliances in a very short time.<\/p>\n
Second, the case of the Red Dragon and the Green Dragon was
\nlinked to rumors that Megawati Soekarnoputri and Abdurrahman
\nWahid, who is popularly known as Gus Dur, were seen as
\ntroublemakers for the political mechanism created toward the
\nnational succession. Political elite factions are interested in
\nthe succession process which will take place through the 1998
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meeting.<\/p>\n
Megawati is a symbol of change and people power, while Gus Dur
\nthrough his concept of Khittah Nahdliyyah (basic principles of
\nNU), is deemed to make the jama'ah nahdliyyah (NU members) the
\nbasis of an efficient civil society. These political signs
\nendanger the status quo because of the capability of the two
\nfigures to move the forces of grassroots politics.<\/p>\n
The process of unsettling Megawati through the Red Dragon
\noperation took place smoothly despite people's strong resistance
\nto maintain commitment to the eldest daughter of the late
\npresident Sukarno who is said to be at the helm of the future
\nnational leadership. It was different with the Green Dragon
\noperation, which saw every effort to unseat Gus Dur. But his
\nauthority and political legitimacy have taken root, covering NU,
\nintellectual circles, activists, NGOs, and religious circles of
\nall faiths. It is this authority and political legitimacy that a
\ngrand-scale political scenario tries to tear into tatters.<\/p>\n
If it is true that the Situbondo and Tasikmalaya riots were
\nlinked to the Green Dragon operation, there was apparently a
\npolitical conspiracy behind the grand scenario, which has various
\ntargets. The targets point to which political factions'
\ncollaboration were behind the current political violence. There
\nare at least three identifiable targets.<\/p>\n
First, President Soeharto's power is a target. Political
\nviolence in various regions including the capital city, which
\nincludes elements of religion and race is a distant target to
\ndelegitimatize the President's power by creating political
\ninstability until the general election and the People's
\nConsultative Assembly meeting. This political violence is in
\nprotest against the long repression, the social, political and
\neconomic disparities which have become very acute and the demands
\nfor accommodating certain political factions.<\/p>\n
It would be naive to say that political violence in a number
\nof provinces was only spontaneous religious, racial or ethnic
\nruptures. The pattern of the mass movements, the issues raised
\nand the targets of violence strongly indicate long-term political
\nengineering. Accurate reading of the political symptoms show that
\npolitical violence will continue and accompany the most sacred
\npolitical ritual: the 1997 general election and the 1998 People's
\nConsultative Assembly meeting. It is fairly certain that national
\npolitical instability targets Soeharto's power. If this analysis
\nis correct, it is only a result of the competition of the second-
\nlayer political elite.<\/p>\n
Second, the basis of ICMI's power is a target. The
\nIslamization of political discourse on a wide scale in the past
\ndecade has made a number of political elite factions feel
\noppressively uncomfortable. It is a public secret that the
\npolitical elite of the pre-1980s was dominated by the first
\npolitical generation based on nationalist-secular and abangan
\n(nominal Moslem) circles established in alliance with the old
\nequilibrium. When things shifted toward the establishment of the
\nnew equilibrium based on modernist Moslem circles, tensions arose
\nbetween the second political generation and the first political
\ngeneration.<\/p>\n
It is likely that political violence combined with religious
\nand racial issues are part of this tension. This tension can be
\nexplained from two perspectives.<\/p>\n
The theological perspective says there are still religious and
\nracial prejudices which are not clear between the first and
\nsecond political generations.<\/p>\n
The economic and political perspective says a sharp disparity
\nexists between the two groups. The tension reached its momentum
\nwith the establishment of a new equilibrium dominated by the
\nsecond political generation from modernist Moslem circles. If
\nthis logic is valid, ICMI can become a target and a scapegoat.<\/p>\n
Third, Gus Dur's power base is a target. As a political
\ntroublemaker and a traditional Moslem power exponent who has been
\nalienated from the power elite, there is enough reason for Gus
\nDur and his power base to become a target. Given the rupture of
\nthe old equilibrium and the tension with the new equilibrium, Gus
\nDur as the political leader of the traditional Moslem group
\n(third political generation), has limited access to the formal
\npower and has an alliance with the first political generation.<\/p>\n
This alliance of power then obtained relevance through two
\nfactors. When the second generation modernist Moslems held power
\nthrough political representation, it was considered boasting by
\ntraditionalist Moslems, so the third political generation
\nobtained a point of interest with the first political generation
\nto set up an alliance.<\/p>\n
The power alliance also met on issues of democracy, pluralism
\nand inter-religious dialog. At the point targets were released,
\ntraditional Moslems (NU) were considered targets of political
\nviolence given the elements of religion and race.<\/p>\n
This may help in determining what interest and who is behind
\nthe current spate of political violence. Of course, the answer is
\nnever black and white. The hostility between Gus Dur and Adi
\nSasono on the mastermind behind the Tasikmalaya riot points to a
\ngreater political scenario. But on the other hand, Gus Dur
\napparently has a strong wish to save NU members from a political
\ngame full of camouflage. It is hoped Gus Dur will not be trapped
\nin a political scenario outside himself.<\/p>\n
The writer is a member of the Institute of Islamic and Social
\nStudies and secretary of the provincial branch of Nahdlatul Ulama
\nin Yogyakarta.<\/p>\n
Window: The process of unsettling Megawati through the Red Dragon
\noperation took place smoothly despite people's strong resistance
\nto maintain commitment...<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/gus-dur-vs-the-green-dragon-1447893297",
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