Grappling with the power over our consciousness<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): How far have we achieved independence, in the
\ntrue sense of the word? This was one question posed to historian
\nTaufik Abdullah:<\/p>\n
His reply first described the \"sense\" itself, how the term has
\nbeen variously used over the years. He concluded that we're still
\nin a process of completing the initial agenda of obtaining
\ndemocratic freedom and economic independence.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, citizens must still overcome the \"hegemony of
\nconsciousness\" inherited from former presidents Sukarno and
\nSoeharto, he said. Excerpts from Taufik's responses to The
\nJakarta Post:<\/p>\n
We must be aware that independence, kemerdekaan, is not a
\nneutral or objective word. It is determined by two factors: the
\nchanges in its understanding through history, and people's
\nideological point of view.<\/p>\n
The concept of independence was first very simple.<\/p>\n
Around 1910 the term vrijheit, or freedom, was used in the
\nwomen's movement in West Sumatra to mean the freedom to gain an
\nequal education.<\/p>\n
Then, when the awareness of colonialism was introduced around
\n1912 by (Dutch activist) Douwess Dekker, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and
\nothers, independence was referred to as freedom from the
\ncolonialists. However at that time the concept of the Indonesian
\nnation was not yet clear.<\/p>\n
What Dekker and others at the time meant as \"nation\" was also
\nsimple. Hindia only differentiated between \"settlers\" of the
\nNetherlands-Indies, including foreigners, and \"nonsettlers\" or
\nsojourners.<\/p>\n
\"Independence\" was only clearly linked to the name of a nation
\ncalled Indonesia in 1924, as introduced by the organization
\nPerhimpunan Indonesia under the student activist who was to
\nbecome the first vice president, Mohammad Hatta. The concept was
\n\"Indonesia Merdeka Sekarang\" (Independence Now for Indonesia) --
\nthe nation's name was clear, and it was also clear that it wanted
\nto be independent.<\/p>\n
Since then it was obvious to everyone that the nation state's
\naim was to realize a democratic political system and achieve
\neconomic independence -- regardless of the debate that went on
\nand on around these issues.<\/p>\n
So, from the outset, \"Indonesia\" was a program for the future,
\nnot a finished product. It was an agenda which climaxed on
\nProclamation Day, Aug. 17 1945, followed by the revolution
\n(defending independence).<\/p>\n
But don't forget that Aug. 17 confirmed the victory of those
\nwho wanted to create a new world -- Indonesian nationalists -- in
\nthe debate with those who sought \"cultural nationalism\". Hatta
\nused this term, and so do I; it means an aspiration for the rise
\nof the glorious past. Sukarno called it aristocratic nationalism.<\/p>\n
Aug. 17 and the revolution which followed was a clear break
\nwith all previous battles or rebellions.<\/p>\n
Both in substance and ideals, earlier battles like the
\nDiponegoro War (Central, East Java, 1925\/1930) aimed to restore
\nthe loss of the cosmic order (involving nobles and monarchies) --
\nwhile the revolution was a struggle to create a future of
\npolitical democracy and economic independence.<\/p>\n
But the revolution was also an aberration, a social revolution
\nwhose participants aspired for freedom from the burden of an
\nentrenched, feudalistic social hierarchy. Thus what occurred were
\nevents such as the Peristiwa Tiga Daerah (Three regions incident
\nin Brebes, Pemalang and Tegal, Central Java in 1945 in which
\nlocal authorities were replaced by those chosen by residents).
\nBut the most important goal was political independence and the
\nability to create a new society.<\/p>\n
In this context a parliamentary system was tried. But there
\nwas political instability throughout virtually the whole period.
\nEfforts to nationalize big Dutch companies failed and the period
\nonly saw fierce competition between political parties.<\/p>\n
During the 1950s the country was still dealing with remnants
\nof colonial rule, like overtaking West Irian in 1963. We were
\nstill overshadowed by the colonial time bomb. These issues
\nincluded the incorporation of KNIL (Dutch military) soldiers into
\nthe national army which marginalized guerrilla fighters, the RMS
\nissue (South Maluku rebellion), APRA (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil
\nrebellion led by Capt. R. Westerling) and other uprisings.<\/p>\n
In addition to this was the embattled economy ... and
\neventually Sukarno decided he wanted a new kind of democracy,
\n\"Guided Democracy\".<\/p>\n
The justification for this was that \"parliamentary democracy
\nwas not suitable to the national personality,\" and that the
\nparliamentary system \"could not capture the elan of a multiple
\nand complex revolution ...\"<\/p>\n
So while Sukarno wanted full independence, his concept of
\n\"national personality\" slipped back into cultural nationalism, in
\ncontrast to what revolution is about, which is defying rules.<\/p>\n
The result was a paradigm of conflict full of hyperbole,
\nviolent language, and highly nationalistic symbols. There always
\nhad to be antagonistic elements -- Old Forces, New Forces and the
\nlike.<\/p>\n
He practically formulated authoritarian state nationalism, by
\nimposing unity. In the end this led to the national tragedy (1965
\nbloodbath following the failed coup attempt by the Indonesian
\nCommunist Party).<\/p>\n
The New Order was then born on the ruins of the national
\ntragedy. Soeharto offered the concept of technocratic,
\ndevelopmental nationalism, saying revolution was not the answer
\nto the country's problems, with the support of the army.<\/p>\n
But the idea of national personality was too attractive to be
\nrejected; Soeharto came up with \"national identity\". However,
\nwith this he only continued the earlier centralization of power,
\nand the blurring of the realm between values and idioms in
\nsociety, and the power and constitution of the state.<\/p>\n
Greedy<\/p>\n
These were combined, as was indicated by the compulsory
\nPancasila ideology courses.<\/p>\n
So while Sukarno enforced a paradigm of conflict, Soeharto
\nimposed a paradigm of consensus. Language was no longer violent
\nbut full of euphemism. For instance, people were not \"killed,\"
\nbut \"diamankan (taken for security)\"; or people did not \"starve,\"
\ninstead they \"lacked food\". With both the language of hyperbole
\nand euphemism, nothing was real.<\/p>\n
Under Soeharto, we experienced imposed hegemony of consensus.
\nThe concept of the \"development trilogy\" stated that stability
\ncame before growth and equity; organizations were forced to
\naccept the principle of one ideology (asas tunggal).<\/p>\n
So both the Old Order and the New Order were \"greedy states\".
\nThey were not satisfied with obedient, law-abiding citizens, but
\nthey also wanted to conquer the consciousness of the nation.<\/p>\n
In the last few years we witnessed the deterioration of such
\npower with the banning of three magazines in 1994, the violent
\ntakeover of the Indonesian Democratic Party headquarters in 1996,
\nthe riots in many areas and last year's poorly conducted
\nelection.<\/p>\n
Then the crisis hit... and we are now still in the process of
\nseeking independence. Everyone's in a state of euphoria in a
\nnegative sense, like condemning Soeharto.<\/p>\n
As long as we have not installed a strong foundation for the
\nfuture, as long as we are too obsessed with the mistakes of the
\npast, we will never be really independent. We need a broad mind
\nto overcome the hegemony of consciousness and work together for
\nthe future. (anr)<\/p>",
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