Govt pays high price for PDI row<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
SURABAYA (JP): Several factors came into play in pushing the
\nstate authorities to shake the Indonesian Democratic Party.<\/p>\n
Without "interference" the PDI would increase its votes in the
\ncoming elections for parliamentary seats.<\/p>\n
In the last elections, the ruling Golkar lost 16 seats to PDI.
\nWith a growing number of young people, many of whom join PDI
\nbecause of its rebellious edge, it is understandable that Golkar
\nis taking measures to reduce this risk.<\/p>\n
Thus, a "pilot project" was set up in East Java, where Golkar
\nlost the most seats. PDI's two provincial boards in this
\nprovince, where the PDI fiasco began.<\/p>\n
That was related to Golkar and not the Army. The latter was
\nand is involved for different yet related reasons, namely for
\nfear that the PDI would officially announce Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri, chairwoman of the now disputed board, as a
\npresidential candidate to pose a direct challenge to President
\nSoeharto.<\/p>\n
As chairwoman of an official party, she would retain the right
\nto be a presidential candidate. But, in the eyes of the Army,
\nthis would be a shameful political maneuver and a dangerous game
\nwith President Soeharto. The existing political culture does not
\nleave any room for direct confrontations.<\/p>\n
These two strong currents converged with the insecure feelings
\nof some members on PDI's central board, who would be the first
\nvictims of a strong and rationalized PDI. Most are at the height
\nof their political careers.<\/p>\n
Soerjadi, Fatimah Achmad and others have been members of the
\nHouse of Representatives for two terms. PDI rulings require them
\nto give their seats to younger candidates.<\/p>\n
Take a look at the extreme case of Sumario, the self-acclaimed
\nPDI leader from Central Java who is one of the board members.
\nSumario is in his 70s and would not have the slightest chance to
\nenjoy political and economic gains.<\/p>\n
It should be noted that in contrast to western political
\ngames, here economic gain follows political seats, and not the
\nother way around.<\/p>\n
Thus, those leaders need a political rescue to keep their
\npolitical and economic interests preserved in an insecure
\nclimate. A loose cooperation with state authorities and the Army
\nwould be enough. Through this dangerous game, they expect to save
\ntheir seats (political, and not necessarily their seats in
\nparliament) for the next five to ten years.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, there is no ideology that ties together all
\nthe fractured elements of the PDI. This is a party that emerged,
\nby coercive government measures, from the former members of
\nnationalist, Catholic, Christian and other parties.<\/p>\n
So why does it increasingly attract the masses? With few
\npolitical channels open, increasing political conscience and
\nresentment need a symbol. And PDI serves this function neatly.<\/p>\n
While PDI's leaders at the top join hands in fulfilling
\ntheir political and economic interests, at the bottom is a
\ngathering place for resentment of the establishment. Red, the
\n"official" color of the PDI, symbolizes the rebellious nature of
\nthese resentments.<\/p>\n
Caught in the middle, the provincial boards and branches at
\nthe second tiers of the organization are divided. Some take sides
\nwith Soerjadi, and some have chosen to stay with the angry mobs.<\/p>\n
As many predicted, merging the external and internal
\ncurrents has resulted in the formation of Soerjadi's cabinet and
\nuncertainly in the immediate future, especially PDI's place in
\nthe coming elections.<\/p>\n
Now three issues remain. First, the tug-of-war to control the
\n"official" headquarters and provincial offices. As a non-
\nideological party, it is difficult to expect PDI's members to
\noccupy these buildings for a relatively long period. They are
\nmilitant as far as they are with the masses. There is very little
\nevidence that they are as militant individually. All Soerjadi
\nneeds to do to takeover these buildings is be patient, and a
\nlittle help from the police.<\/p>\n
Secondly, PDI has to work out a list of candidates for the
\nHouse of Representatives. Under the Army's umbrella this is also
\nan easy task. There would be some tension, but most would be
\nsolved by accommodating those who are at the other side of the
\nofficial game, sharing parliamentary seats is the most logical
\nsolution.<\/p>\n
Third is the legal dispute. The result of Megawati's
\ndetermination to sue Soerjadi and the government is out of the
\nquestion. This threat is not being taken seriously and is a less
\ndisturbing element to domestic security.<\/p>\n
In this scenario, could Soerjadi's camp win in the coming
\nelections? Undoubtedly yes. The candidates will be chosen by
\ntheir rankings. All names in Soerjadi's camp will be listed in
\nthe top, which will give them the opportunity to secure their
\nseats, regardless of how many votes the PDI gets.<\/p>\n
But the most disastrous result of this dangerous game is the
\nboomerang effect. The authorities fear that they might lose
\ncontrol over sensitive issues such as presidential candidates.
\nBut there is no guarantee that members of the PDI would propose
\nSoerjadi as a presidential candidate.<\/p>\n
The boomerang effect will also emerge from the masses. At
\nbest, the authorities can expect PDI voters to shift their votes
\nto Golkar, or even PPP. Some of them will prefer to stay out of
\nthe elections, adding to the increasing number of golput, or non-
\nvoting citizens.<\/p>\n
In this case, it seems that the government has underestimated
\nthe trend. It is almost certain that the number of golput will
\nincrease. The higher their number, the less legitimate the
\nelections.<\/p>\n
Another underestimated result of the PDI fiasco is the
\nsympathy the party has received from non-PDI masses, including
\nmembers of the critical middle class. With a higher political
\nconsciousness, these people are non-threatening elements for the
\nstatus quo as long as economic growth sustains their individual
\neconomic interests. But once there is economic stagnation, they
\nare as dangerous as the politically less-conscious lower classes.<\/p>\n
In the distant future, these games are too expensive to be
\npaid for by the government. By that time, none of the decision
\nmakers now in power will hold the same political power, freeing
\nthem of the responsibility of whatever ensues.<\/p>\n
For the moment, we are watching an excellent telenovela, with
\nall "good boy, good girl" players, a stick and carrot prologue,
\na dramatic coercive conflict, a contrast of tears and delight,
\nand a clearly predictable ending. The next series will be more
\ndramatic.<\/p>\n
The writer is a fellow from the program for Southeast Asian
\nstudies at Arizona State University, the United States.<\/p>",
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