Govt needs to change to end Papua violence<\/p>\n
Muridan S. Widjojo, Researcher, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
\n(LIPI), Jakarta<\/p>\n
The public has again apparently been taken by surprise by the
\npopular uprising in Papua, this time in Timika. The clashes were
\ntriggered by the declaration of the Central Irian Jaya province
\nby Jakarta elites. For five days from Aug. 23 to Aug. 27 the
\ngroup which agrees with the establishment of the new province led
\nby the head of the Mimika legislative council, Andreas Anggaibak,
\nsupported by the \"Group of Seven Tribes\", battled the opposing
\ngroup. The latter was led by the youth of the Amungme tribe,
\nThomas Uamang, Yopie Kilangin and Yohanes Deikme, with the
\nsupport of the Amungme and other tribes in Timika.<\/p>\n
At least five people have been killed and dozens of others
\nhave been injured in what a leading Papua figure, Tom Beanal, has
\ntermed a perang adat, a war between traditional tribes. We may
\nyet see even more clashes.<\/p>\n
On a national and local level this conflict reveals years of
\ntension between the groups which are \"pro democracy\" and those
\nwhich are \"pro status quo\" in Papua. The first indication of this
\nrevelation would be to see who is really engaged in the battle at
\nthe local level. The group which agrees to the set-up of the
\ndivision of the province is led by Andreas, a retired police
\nsergeant, who became head of the Mimika legislative council. The
\nrival group is led by Yopie and company who are activists of the
\nAmungme people's organization, Lemasa.<\/p>\n
Yopie's role in the opposition of the division of Papua into
\nthree provinces cannot be separated from the figure of Tom
\nBeanal, known in pro-democracy circles since the early 1990s. He
\nleads the Lemasa and is the Amungme tribal chief, who became
\nDeputy Chairman of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP) as well as
\nbeing a commissioner of the American-Indonesian mining firm, PT
\nFreeport Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Tom and Andreas struggled together in Lemasa against Freeport
\naround 1995, but parted ways after Freeport decided to allocate 1
\npercent of its income for local development, and after the
\nIntegrated Timika Area Development (PWT2) project was launched in
\n1996.<\/p>\n
Andreas and his supporters of the \"Group of the Seven Tribes\"
\naccepted the development funds and gained the support of the
\nmilitary, the bureaucracy and Freeport. Tom, on behalf of Lemasa,
\nsupported by various tribal chiefs in Timika, rejected the cash,
\nbecause it was considered to have skewed the basic issues between
\nthe Amungme and Kamoro tribes on one side, and Freeport on the
\nother. Beanal sued Freeport in a U.S. court on charges of its
\ninvolvement in supporting the military in human rights violations
\nin Papua.<\/p>\n
The conflict widened. Tom and Lemasa gained support from
\ndomestic non-governmental organizations (NGO) as well as some
\nstate institutions, and the issue has engaged various parties in
\nJakarta. Some of those involved have record of supporting
\ndemocracy and human rights, such as the Indonesian Forum for the
\nEnvironment (Walhi), the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI),
\nthe National Development Planning Board, the Office of the State
\nMinister of the Environment as well as the National Commission on
\nHuman Rights. Meanwhile in Timika, the 1 percent development fund
\nand the implementation of the PWT2 was expedited with the full
\nsupport of the local government, the military and Freeport.<\/p>\n
Tensions between those who were happy with the development
\nmoney and those that considered it a compromise payoff increased.
\nIn January 1997, a similar clash occurred in Kwamki Lama, also in
\nTimika. Similar to the battle last year there were many fierce
\nclashes with traditional weaponry. Two died, one from each side.<\/p>\n
The 1 percent fund, now managed by Andreas, is said to have
\nbeen misused by corrupt people and many have pointed at this
\ncorruption as being the cause of several recent local conflicts.
\nFreeport hired consultants, who then sided with Tom Beanal, and
\nsince 1998, the management of the money fell to Tom's group. The
\nconflict between the groups led by Tom and Andreas continued
\nuntil the 1999 election and the election of the Mimika regent.<\/p>\n
In the local context, this political enmity could become
\npermanent. Victims, and mainly the dead -- two in 1997 and five
\nso far this year, and those from various other clashes -- have
\nbecome the basis of the rupture between the two groups in Timika.
\nThe conflict is beginning to be internalized into the social
\nsystem of the tribes in the Timika mountains where \"tribal wars\"
\nare becoming a customary method of settling problems.<\/p>\n
On the national level the clash between the pro-democracy and
\nthe pro-status quo groups started in the early 1990s. At that
\ntime, Tom and a number of Jayapura-based NGOs which were active
\nin advocating for the people's rights started to work with
\nJakarta NGOs such as Walhi and the Institute for Policy Research
\nand Advocacy (Elsam) to oppose the status quo New Order regime,
\nmilitary domination and Freeport. This also led to the public
\nrevelation of possible human rights abuses in Timika between
\n1994 and 1995.<\/p>\n
This achievement led to a number of other investigations on
\nright violations, public debate on customary rights, women's
\nrights and the emergence of various people's organizations and
\ndemands to withdraw military troops. Initially, passive religious
\ninstitutions, universities and students began to liven up
\npolitical dynamics in the province.<\/p>\n
When the special autonomy law was introduced in 2001, Tom, the
\nleader of the Presidium Council, rejected it. But the
\nintellectuals and academics, political figures and church leaders
\nwere realistic and tried to treat the special autonomy law as a
\nsource of hope to settle the Papua problem. Yet, when it became
\napparent that current regime in Jakarta was going to betray its
\nown promise of special autonomy by expediting the division of the
\nprovince this year, all these strategic representatives of Papua
\nsuddenly became united to resist the regime. They all raised
\nopposition when President Megawati Soekarnoputri signed the
\nPresidential Instruction No. 1\/2003 to divide the province in
\nJanuary.<\/p>\n
Therefore the map of the struggle on the national level has
\nnot changed much. While in the early 1990s the pro-democracy
\ngroup resisted the authoritarian regime of the New Order, now
\nthey are resisting the pseudo-democratic regime of Megawati. Her
\nclosest advisers in her regime have been collaborating with,
\namong others, the local bureaucracy, which eventually lost the
\ngovernor's seat in 2001.<\/p>\n
Finally political struggle, frequently characterized by
\nviolence, will continue to recur in Papua. There will be more
\nvictims, from important figures such as the Papua Council's Theys
\nEluay in 2001, to ordinary young people such as Jimmy Beanal of
\nLemasa, as long as Jakarta does not change its political
\norientation and vision, to enable a more healthy political
\ncontest between the prodemocracy group and the pro-status quo
\ngroup.<\/p>\n
Jakarta has for too long imposed its will on Papua, and
\nconsequently Papuans will always react negatively to anything
\ncoming from Jakarta. Quo vadis?<\/p>\n
The writer is a PhD Candidate at the Center for Non Western
\nStudies, University of Leiden, the Netherlands.<\/p>",
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