Good targeting essential in emergency aid programs<\/p>\n
Alex Arifianto, The SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla has
\nproposed a new crash program designed to help around 250,000
\nfarmers across Java, currently experiencing crop failure due to
\nthe ongoing drought. The program will comprise three parts: a
\npublic works program designed to supplement the income of farmers
\nsuffering from the drought, a free rice distribution program and
\ndelivery of water tanks to regions that have no access to clean
\nwater. The total cost of the program is estimated at Rp 150
\nbillion.<\/p>\n
The program is scheduled to last for two months, with each
\nfarmer in the program receiving a flat wage of Rp 15,000 per day,
\nat an estimated cost of Rp 75 billion. Meanwhile, the free rice
\nprogram will distribute 20,000 tons of rice to these farmers. The
\nprograms will run in August and September 2003.<\/p>\n
The prolonged drought is blamed on excessive logging and the
\nresulting inability of farmland to absorb water. It is estimated
\nthat about 100,000 hectares of farmland in Java have suffered
\nfrom crop failure, while another 450,000 hectares will suffer
\nfrom water shortages.<\/p>\n
While the government's plan to help farmers is commendable,
\nsome concern exists regarding the effectiveness of this crash
\nprogram in alleviating the suffering of these farmers. Past
\nexperience shows that crash programs aimed to alleviate the
\nsuffering of the poor were not very effective, given that they
\nwere not well targeted.<\/p>\n
There are several reasons for this. Often, the government
\nrelied on data that had not been updated for some time.<\/p>\n
Changes caused by population movement and income mobility were
\noften not reflected in the data. The result was a mismatch
\nbetween the number of people categorized as poor in the data and
\nthe reality on the ground, which resulted in districts receiving
\nless -- or more -- assistance than they really needed.<\/p>\n
There is also concern that the government has arbitrarily
\nimposed a benefit level that is much higher than the sustainable
\nlevel needed by the poor. Consequently, the program will attract
\nnot only poor workers, but also the nonpoor. The fact that the
\ngovernment plans to pay everyone participating in the planned
\npublic works program Rp 15,000 per day is of concern because this
\namount is more than the minimum wage in most districts affected
\nby the drought. Many of the participants would therefore not
\nnecessarily be poor households.<\/p>\n
Another factor that renders crash programs poorly targeted is
\nthe fact that once assistance arrived in the villages, local
\nofficials often ignored the eligibility criteria set down by the
\ngovernment and distributed assistance to every resident rather
\nthan to those deemed eligible for it, as determined by government
\ndata.<\/p>\n
While at times this policy might be necessary to maintain a
\nsense of justice among villagers and maintain local cohesion, it
\nnegates the purpose of crash programs -- to help only those who
\nare truly in need of assistance.<\/p>\n
For instance, many eligible households in the cheap rice
\nprogram carried out during the 1997\/1998 economic crisis received
\nless rice than they were eligible for because the rice was
\ndistributed to all villagers instead of just them.<\/p>\n
These programs are also exclusively planned by central
\ngovernment agencies that do not take into account conditions at
\nthe local level. Turf battles among such agencies also caused
\nthese programs to be mistargeted, as each agency created its own
\nprograms without regard to effectiveness and efficiency.<\/p>\n
Lack of coordination within central government agencies and
\nwith local governments also delays the implementation of the
\nprogram, as can be seen from media accounts on the implementation
\nof the drought program so far.<\/p>\n
Finally, decision-making in the programs tends to be
\nmonopolized by government bureaucrats with little or no
\nparticipation from community and civil society organizations in
\nimplementing and monitoring them.<\/p>\n
As long as non-governmental stakeholders are excluded from
\nactive participation in these programs, they are potentially open
\nto abuse for the political or personal gain of government
\nofficials. The programs are liable to leakage, fraud or waste, as
\nhas happened in the past.<\/p>\n
In order that this proposed crash program (or other, similar
\nprograms) is effective, good targeting is essential. The
\ngovernment should take an inclusive approach by incorporating all
\nthose who are eligible for the program into it, regardless of
\ntheir residency or marital status, gender or other
\ncharacteristics.<\/p>\n
At the same time, the program should be monitored carefully to
\nensure that only those who are eligible for the program's
\nbenefits are included.<\/p>\n
Especially for public works programs, the government should
\nset program benefits at a low enough level so that only those who
\nare truly poor are induced for participation. Doing so would make
\nthe program better targeted, because only those who were really
\npoor and needed the assistance offered by the program would be
\ninterested to join it.<\/p>\n
The program should also be decentralized so that local
\ngovernments are able to target the program to the population
\nthat really needs it, based on the most updated data that they
\nhave. Finally, all stakeholders should be allowed to participate
\nin the implementation and monitoring of the program so that
\npossible abuses can be kept to a minimum, and the program can
\nfully meet its population targets.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher with the SMERU Research Institute,
\na Jakarta-based public policy institute. The views expressed here
\nare personal.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/good-targeting-essential-in-emergency-aid-programs-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}