{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1401583,
        "msgid": "good-but-not-enough-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-08-25 00:00:00",
        "title": "Good, but not enough",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Good, but not enough Without doubt, the dismissal of Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto from active military service and the relief from \"all structural duties\" of two other high ranking officers from the Army's Special Force (Kopassus) is headline news for the Indonesian media. Not since the failed communist coup of 1965 has the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) been challenged to clean up such a nasty mess within its ranks.",
        "content": "<p>Good, but not enough<\/p>\n<p>Without doubt, the dismissal of Lieutenant General Prabowo<br>\nSubianto from active military service and the relief from \"all<br>\nstructural duties\" of two other high ranking officers from the<br>\nArmy's Special Force (Kopassus) is headline news for the<br>\nIndonesian media. Not since the failed communist coup of 1965 has<br>\nthe Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) been challenged to clean up<br>\nsuch a nasty mess within its ranks. Prabowo's discharge and the<br>\nactions that are being taken against his two former Kopassus<br>\nsubordinates, Maj. Gen. Muchdi and Col. Chairawan, are seen as a<br>\nsignificant parts of those efforts.<\/p>\n<p>Under examination by an Officers Honor Council, Lt. Gen.<br>\nPrabowo reportedly confessed to having \"misinterpreted\" an order<br>\nfrom an as yet unidentified superior officer, leading to the<br>\nalleged abduction and torture of dissident political activists by<br>\nKopassus soldiers. Announcing the decision to reporters yesterday<br>\nafter receiving recommendations from the Honor Council, Armed<br>\nForces Commander Gen. Wiranto said he did not rule out the<br>\npossibility of the three officers being tried by a court martial<br>\n\"if evidence warrants\".<\/p>\n<p>It is no exaggeration to say that what started as a covert<br>\nintelligence operation against anti-Soeharto dissident groups<br>\nbefore the former president's downfall in June has grown into a<br>\ncause celebre even before the court martial of soldiers accused<br>\nof physically undertaking the kidnappings has been convened. The<br>\nreasons for this are simple enough.<\/p>\n<p>First, of course, is the fact that reports of the brutality<br>\nwhich defenseless political activists were allegedly subjected to<br>\nhas inevitably touched a very sensitive nerve in the public's<br>\nconscience. Second is the reported involvement of officers from<br>\nthe Indonesian army's most elite combat force -- not to mention<br>\nillustrious names such as Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, who was not<br>\nonly one of the fastest rising stars in the Indonesian Armed<br>\nForces, but is also a son-in-law of former president Soeharto.<br>\nThird, with army personnel suspected of having committed similar,<br>\nor possibly even more brutal atrocities in areas such as Aceh,<br>\nEast Timor and Irian Jaya, the popularity and good standing of<br>\nthe Indonesian Armed Forces is at present at its lowest ebb.<\/p>\n<p>Considering all this, and given the fact that the abductions<br>\nwere obviously politically motivated, the measures that have been<br>\ntaken against the three senior Kopassus officers, while good<br>\nenough as a beginning, do not go sufficiently far to allow us to<br>\nget to the bottom of the affair. Clearly the involvement of<br>\nKopassus and some of its most senior officers indicates that some<br>\nas yet unexplained political agenda lay behind the kidnapings.<\/p>\n<p>Unless Prabowo, Muchdi and Chairawan are brought before a<br>\nmilitary tribunal together with the men under their command who<br>\nactually carried out the abductions, we may never know what that<br>\nagenda was, how big the scope of the operation was, the name of<br>\nthe more senior officer whose orders were \"misinterpreted\" by<br>\nPrabowo, and what precisely those orders were. We must also keep<br>\nin mind that if the accounts of some of the kidnapped activists<br>\nare true, then some units of the military other than Kopassus may<br>\nhave been involved, which again could be indicative of the scope<br>\nof the operation.<\/p>\n<p>There is of course the possibility that getting answers to<br>\nthese questions will be very painful to the Armed Forces, at<br>\nleast in the beginning. Yet allowing them to remain unanswered<br>\nwill not make the problem disappear and will in the long run only<br>\nserve to cast the Armed Forces in an even more sinister light.<br>\nAllowing suspicions of what ABRI is really trying to conceal to<br>\nfester will obviously do no good, either to the Armed Forces or<br>\nto the nation as a whole. The wise, and only, path to take is to<br>\nlet the truth emerge and thus rebuild the foundation of mutual<br>\ntrust between the Armed Forces and the people.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/good-but-not-enough-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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