Getting rid of the military's dual-function<\/p>\n
Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Although it has formally abandoning the much criticized dual
\nfunction (Dwifungsi) doctrine, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is
\nyet to shed its image as a \"troublemaker\".<\/p>\n
Normally, the military's presence in an area of conflict will
\nraise the hope that peace and order will be restored.<\/p>\n
But that is not always the case. Look at the heavy military
\npresence in areas of conflict in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso,
\nAceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.<\/p>\n
Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine
\nintention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in various
\nregions. Some have even charge that the military added fuel to
\nthe fire.<\/p>\n
The benefit they gain range from short-term like selling arms
\nto the warring factions to the long-term such as showing that the
\nmilitary is still high in demand because The country is unsafe.
\nThe speculation receives mere credence when communal conflict in
\nPoso, Aceh and Irian Jaya got even worse amid news that 50,000
\ntroops have been deployed in areas of conflict.<\/p>\n
Military data shows that the largest troop deployment is in
\nAceh and Maluku, where some 22,000 personnel are now stationed.
\nThe remaining troops are stationed in several other regions such
\nas Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Poso in Central Sulawesi.<\/p>\n
Syamsuddin Haris, a senior observer of the National Institute
\nof Sciences (LIPI), has cynically said that the existing
\nconflicts amount to constitute lucrative \"projects\" managed by
\n\"those who don't want to see the struggle for reform and
\ndemocracy in this country a success.\"<\/p>\n
Syamsuddin is pessimistic that the government is be able to
\nsettle the problems because otherwise there must be a deal that
\nwould favor the military.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's militaristic regime's fall on May 21, 1998 after
\nruling Indonesia with an iron fist for 32 years rekindled hope
\nfor political reform that would allow the civil society to
\nflourish.<\/p>\n
The wind of change following the dictator's fall and the had
\nalso prompted the military to reform. The most important move was
\nprobably dropping the dual function doctrine that allowed it both
\ndefense and political role.<\/p>\n
The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts
\nin 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was also
\nscrapped in November.<\/p>\n
Both TNI's social and political roles, and later its
\nterritorial roles, had been seen as hampering democracy because
\nthey allowed the military to become deeply involved in civilian
\naffairs.<\/p>\n
To support its role, TNI has extensive network: Regional
\nMilitary Commands (Kodam) in nearly all of Indonesia's 31
\nprovinces, Military Resort Commands (Korem) in the smaller
\nprovinces, District Military Commands (Kodim) in regencies and
\nmayoralties, Subdistrict Military Commands (Koramil) in
\nsubdistricts and Military Representative Posts in villages.<\/p>\n
Over the past year, TNI internal reform remains rhetorical.
\nIts leadership does not seem to have any a clear vision on where
\nthe military is heading for. The territorial post has been
\ndropped from the military's organization structure but not the
\nomnipresent supporting institutions used for so long to back
\nSoeharto regime.<\/p>\n
Many have also charged that after abolishing its territorial
\nfunction, TNI established and trained civilian militias in
\nseveral conflict regions such as Red-and-White Task Force in
\nIrian Jaya. TNI has also been understood to have defended the
\ninvolvement of Laskar Jihad in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and
\nPoso.<\/p>\n
The presence of these militias, of course, is only worsening
\nthe conflict and makes all efforts to stop them futile.<\/p>\n
A high ranking military officer at the TNI Headquarters who
\nasked to be anonymity once revealed that military prefers to use
\na strategy called \"war by proxy\".<\/p>\n
\"Supporting the militia is intended to cover up the military's
\ninvolvement in the conflicts,\" he said.<\/p>\n
Friction in the military top leadership is has Been well-
\nknown. The best-known was probably that of between former Army's
\nStrategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief, the late Lt. Gen.
\nAgus Wirahadikusumah, and former TNI's chief of territorial
\nAffairs Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. Their rivalry broke into the open
\nwhen the two promoted a review over TNI's territorial roles..<\/p>\n
Wirahadikusumah, an outspoken general, insisted that TNI must
\nabolish its territorial role and scrap its institutions at the
\ncommand level (from the village to provincial). Widjojo was
\nfiercely opposed to the idea. He proposed, instead, that TNI
\nshould transfer its territorial authority to the local
\nadministration and national police.<\/p>\n
Widjojo also said that should TNI dissolve its institutions at
\ncommand level, it must be done in phases and might take years.<\/p>\n
The TNI chief Adm. Widodo A.S. later clarified Widjojo's
\nstatement, saying that the eliminating TNI territorial function
\ndid not mean dissolving its institutions at the command level.<\/p>\n
Speaking in a hearing with the House of Representatives'
\nCommission I on Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs, Widodo
\nsaid that the presence of TNI's command level across the country
\naimed at safeguarding security.<\/p>\n
But in fact many believe that the bottomline of the endless
\ndebate among the top officers on the territorial issue is that
\nthe military is reluctant to go back to barrack as the reformist
\ndemand.<\/p>",
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