From sticks to carrots: U.S. gambles on TNI reform<\/p>\n
Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The decision by the U.S. administration to resume arms sale and
\nmilitary financing to Indonesia is a foreign policy trophy for
\nPresident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was even more significant
\nsince the decision was made through a special discretionary
\nwaiver granted to the executive to override certain restrictions
\nof a law.<\/p>\n
Just a week earlier the U.S. Congress had agreed to maintain
\nthe restrictions when it passed the Foreign Operations, Export
\nFinancing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006. It
\nreflected U.S. lawmakers' dissatisfaction with the pace of
\nmilitary reform in Indonesia and its accountability for past
\nhuman rights violations.<\/p>\n
The waiver is consistent with the Bush administration's
\ngrowing empathy for Jakarta. In February, the International
\nMilitary Education and Training (IMET) was resumed. During
\nSusilo's visit to Washington in May, he and President George Bush
\nexpressed their commitment to a resumption of military relations.
\nThis opened the way for further relaxation of restrictions for
\nthe sale of non-lethal weapons.<\/p>\n
A week before the waiver was announced, Eric G. John, the
\nState Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
\nPacific Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
\nthe U.S. must be a \"reliable friend to Indonesia\".<\/p>\n
He added that the Bush Administration sees TNI reform \"as a
\nlong-term project\", adding that U.S. Secretary of State
\nCondoleezza Rice had told Susilo that while the United States had
\nat times pulled back in its relationship with Indonesia \"this is
\nnot the way it will be in the future\".<\/p>\n
So why is the U.S. giving away its best leverage in regard to
\nthe unreformed TNI? There are simple, pragmatic reasons beyond
\nthe questions of human rights and accountability.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is an anchor of stability in the region and its
\nwaters a vital passage of international trade. It is in no one's
\ninterest to have an Indonesia incapable of maintaining security
\nin its waters.<\/p>\n
The embargo placed on Indonesia since 1991 has also meant that
\nIndonesia had to readjust its arms procurement. In 2003,
\nIndonesia began purchasing Russian-made jet fighters and assault
\nhelicopters, while the Navy has looked to South Korea and other
\ncountries for patrol boats.<\/p>\n
More importantly, Jakarta and Beijing are also in the initial
\nphases of establishing stronger military cooperation.<\/p>\n
Geopolitics dictates that Washington would be amiss not to
\nestablish stronger ties with a country whose waters are traversed
\nby a third of the world's sea-borne trade.<\/p>\n
Another reason is Washington's global fight against terrorism.<\/p>\n
The effectiveness of Indonesian security officers to weed out
\nthe fanatic cells here is a significant blow to the terrorist
\nnetwork seeking a Southeast Asian foothold.<\/p>\n
Though Indonesia does not completely ally itself with the U.S.
\npolicies, security forces here have been increasingly cooperative
\nwith their U.S. counterparts.<\/p>\n
Democratization and the positive assessment of Indonesia's
\nfirst-ever democratically elected president was also an important
\nconsideration.<\/p>\n
It is imperative for Washington to be seen supporting the
\nthird-largest democracy, which is also home to 14 percent of the
\nworld's Muslims -- Indonesia's Muslim population is larger than
\nthe combined number of Muslims in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Saudi
\nArabia.<\/p>\n
Not only can Indonesia be a poster-boy of new democracy, but
\none which can show the compatibility of democracy in an Islamic
\ndominated society.<\/p>\n
What is most interesting is that statements over the past few
\nmonths coming out of the U.S. State Department justifying the
\nneed for resuming full military ties persistently focus on
\nSusilo's reformist agenda and the growing oversight of civilian
\nofficials over the TNI.<\/p>\n
The changes most often highlighted include the end of the
\nmilitary's \"dual function\" in politics; efforts by Minister of
\nDefense Juwono Sudarsono to strengthen civilian control of the
\nbudgetary and procurement process; as well as legislation to help
\noversee military businesses.<\/p>\n
However, let us not forget that all these have been civilian-
\noriented initiatives that have been \"imposed\" on the military or
\nones the TNI could not afford to openly reject.<\/p>\n
There was very little mention -- and as any political pundit
\nhere knows -- limited \"eagerness\" by the TNI to reform its ranks.
\nIn fact, a closer look at Indonesian politics suggests that
\nrather than be a compelling force for change, the TNI is laying
\nlow and biding its time and allowing reformasi to run its course.<\/p>\n
Hence Washington's decision to resume arms sales to Indonesia
\nlooks very much like a token to allow Susilo, a retired Army
\ngeneral, to appease his former brothers in arms so they engage in
\nfurther change: The stick is now replaced by a carrot, which the
\nIndonesian president is expected to dangle in front of the TNI.<\/p>\n
The resumption of U.S. arms sales is welcome relief for an
\nunder-equipped military tasked with securing these strategic
\ninternational passageways. But the key question is whether this
\n\"gamble\" is good for Indonesia's democratic evolution?<\/p>\n
With enough political shrewdness, Susilo can use it to induce
\nchange.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, over the past 12 months, very little has
\nactually been shown by Susilo to show he is still focused on his
\nreform pledges. It is even more glaring in how the attitude of
\nmoderation has changed within the military and the difficulties
\nfaced by the civilian defense minister in initiating real change.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, providing carrots to a TNI that remains
\nlethargic about political reform only reinforces the belief that
\ntheir quiet subversion is paying dividends.<\/p>",
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