Foster dialog, end violence in Papua<\/p>\n
Muridan S. Widjojo, Research Institute for Democracy and Peace
\n(RIDeP), Jakarta<\/p>\n
The murder of Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) chief Theys Eluay,
\nwho was found dead on Nov. 11, represents just one episode in
\nPapuan history under the unitary state of the republic, dominated
\nso far by the politics of violence.<\/p>\n
From the time of Papua's integration into the republic in the
\nearly 1960s up to when Theys was slain, the security forces have
\ncontinued to resort to violence, mostly under the pretext of
\neradicating the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and maintaining the
\nrepublic's territorial integrity.<\/p>\n
However, after nearly four decades, the Indonesian Military
\n(TNI) has not been able to rout the OPM. Ironically the
\nrepublic's integrity is increasingly under threat because
\nexcesses of military operations have bred violence and other
\nhuman rights violations.<\/p>\n
Instead of increased political stability and loyalty of
\nPapuans to the republic, demands for independence have spread and
\nmilitancy has increased. The politics of violence pursued by
\nsecurity personnel has made the Papuans even more resilient.
\nRepression, once considered a deterrent and a means to enforce
\ncompliance, has failed.<\/p>\n
The PDP clearly showed its defiance after Theys' burial. PDP
\nmeetings and regency's panels have demanded UN protection, the
\nwithdrawal of TNI from Papuan soil and a referendum.<\/p>\n
The militancy demonstrated by the Papuan independence
\nsupporters is becoming more and more visible through the
\nunfurling of the Morning Star flag, the use of other Free Papua
\nsymbols and defiance of the agenda offered both by the central
\ngovernment and the provincial administration. These movements
\nhave shown greater militancy as they are based on the local
\nbelief that Papuan independence shall mean liberalization and the
\nadvent of a new and more prosperous era for the people.<\/p>\n
Theys was the chairman of the Papuan Presidium Council who was
\nelected by the second Papuan congress. The congress was
\nparticipated in by representatives from all regencies. Hence his
\nleadership is held high in the eyes of Papuans. Theys' leadership
\nis reinforced by mythology and the messianic ideology in which
\nTheys is positioned as a kind of messiah, a savior.<\/p>\n
He was therefore the leader of the largest faction of
\norganized political resistance in Papua. Traditionally he was
\nindeed only the leader, the ondoafi of the Sentani area, but the
\ncongress made him the leader of Papua.<\/p>\n
The PDP under his leadership had \"panels\" which were the
\nCouncil's structures in each regency. Most Papua intellectuals
\nsupported the PDP. For these reasons the Papua Free Movement
\n(OPM) was less popular than the PDP among Papuans.<\/p>\n
The people's increased militancy has served as a pretext for
\nthe TNI and the police to resort to repressive actions. Unless
\nthis is checked, the relationship between the republic and
\nPapuans will never be harmonious and will always be marred by
\natrocities.<\/p>\n
The government seems unable and unwilling to review whether
\nits militaristic approach is effective in maintaining the
\ncountry's unity or whether such an approach has brought about the
\nopposite effect.<\/p>\n
The political elite of Jakarta and Papua alike have been
\ntrapped in debates involving issues of the nation's integrity and
\nthe rights to independence. The government is preoccupied with
\nspecial autonomy -- while autonomy to the Papuans is akin to
\ntheir prolonged suffering. Hence their demand for \"freedom\", the
\nantithesis of these sufferings.<\/p>\n
Papuan leaders are overly ambitious to have a new state
\nwithout realizing that it would merely be a superstructure, an
\ninstrument to enable a nation state manage its interests and
\nachieve its goals.<\/p>\n
The danger that both Papuans and others in Indonesia commonly
\nfall into is protracted conflict that will lead to further misery
\nfor the people.<\/p>\n
Even when the form of the province was not an issue, Papua
\nfaced a myriad of problems related to its development. Now both
\nparties have been dragged backward into a dispute over autonomy
\nand independence. There is a risk of neglecting development
\nefforts to the disadvantage of the community.<\/p>\n
Neither wide-ranging autonomy under the unitary republic, nor
\na free West Papua state, would guarantee a settlement of the
\nproblems of development and welfare of the Papuans.<\/p>\n
These two alternatives still provide space for oppression, or
\neven violence in another form, as long as Papuans are without
\npolitical, economic and cultural strength.<\/p>\n
The growth of civil society is thus crucial. Yet a civil
\nsociety in Papua will never become powerful if the politics of
\nviolence continues amid the dispute over autonomy or
\nindependence.<\/p>\n
The government must stop this politics of violence and allow
\nroom for the growth of civil society. People's empowerment must
\nbe achieved to ensure their pragmatic and rational involvement in
\nthe dynamics of politics, the economy and culture. Papuans would
\nbe able to voice their interests on an individual or collective
\nbasis, and protect their land, forests, rivers, seas and natural
\nresources belonging to their forefathers.<\/p>\n
Today, the urgent agenda for the pro-independence Papuan
\nleaders and their counterparts in Jakarta is to sit together and
\ntry to understand each side's concerns with cool heads. Both
\nsides must, in the shortest time possible, have a common
\nunderstanding that the present uncertainty is disadvantageous to
\nthe Papuan people.<\/p>\n
Uncertainty will only rob the Papuans of their right to enjoy
\nrecovery from the damage caused by the New Order regime and later
\ngovernments. The government of Megawati Soekarnoputri must be
\nable to introduce a new discourse, one not confined only to a
\ndichotomy of special autonomy and independence. The language of
\nculture and humanity must be given priority.<\/p>\n
The Papuan political elite have said that their demand for
\nindependence is not a \"fixed price\". This means that in the
\nPapuan political tradition, this demand is negotiable. The
\nleaders of the PDP such as Tom Beanal, Herman Awom, Thaha
\nAlhamid, Agus Alua and others are nurtured in a culture which
\nprioritizes negotiation in the settlement of disputes.<\/p>\n
The above demand for independence can be interpreted as an
\nattempt to gain stronger bargaining power in dealing with the
\ncentral government. The government must thus humbly open up and
\nlearn to understand the characteristics and patterns of
\nnegotiation commonly found among the Papuans.<\/p>\n
Openness, sincerity and patience may win the hearts of the
\nPapuan leaders and people and pave the way for a better future.<\/p>",
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