Focusing on substantial rationality<\/p>\n
By Meuthia Ganie Rochman<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Indonesians are witnessing a deep political
\nchange at the close of the century as the result of economic and
\nother crises.<\/p>\n
Just two years ago, the majority of Indonesians still believed
\nthat the country's economic structure had firm bases to encounter
\nchallenges in the next millennium. But the current economic
\ncrisis has changed many aspects of the country's life -- the
\ncollapse of a great deal of economic activity, political
\nturbulence and change of leadership.<\/p>\n
Basic political changes have been achieved and more are being
\npursued. People are demanding new political rules of the game,
\nsymbols and visions of the social and political orders.<\/p>\n
The changes happening in Indonesia are not only a matter of
\npower play but also originated from the civilization process
\nencountered by the country and other nations in their
\ninternational relations. In this context what kind of vision
\nneeds to be developed by this country?<\/p>\n
External power has long been acknowledged as playing a role in
\nshaping a country's direction. The external power includes
\nsuperpower nations or institutions like the International
\nMonetary Fund (IMF) that promote their own interests.<\/p>\n
In reality, the external power might be something that is more
\nbasic. This kind of power takes shape in the principles of how a
\nmodern state must be organized, including how it effects
\nrelations.<\/p>\n
Such principles have been evolving since the emergence two
\ncenturies ago of nation-states in Europe. The newly emerging
\nnation-states then promoted their own principles through
\ntechnology and economic power.<\/p>\n
The most basic principle is rationality -- that human actions
\nmust occur in a calculable context. The big domain for the
\ncreation of rationality is a nation-state. Within a nation-state,
\nthe principle of \"calculable context\" applies in the relationship
\nbetween state apparatus and the people.<\/p>\n
This principle has various names depending on historical
\ndevelopment, such as \"objective and efficient bureaucracy\",
\n\"clean government\" and \"good governance\".<\/p>\n
The principle is manifested through certain forms of
\ninstitutions. Almost all countries in this modern time, for
\nexample, have a similar category of ministries.<\/p>\n
Since World War II the tendency to expand forms of functions
\nthroughout the world has been getting stronger. Bodies like the
\nLeague of Nations (currently called the United Nations), the IMF,
\nthe World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
\n(GATT) have expanded their international programs in economy,
\nscience, education and politics. The success or failure of their
\nprograms is measured by common standards, such as gross national
\nproduct (GNP), literacy rate and participation rate in general
\nelections.<\/p>\n
The programs within the international organizational framework
\nhave been imbued with a spirit called substantive rationality.
\nOne basic kind of substantive rationality is the view that within
\na nation-state political change is normal and sovereignty should
\nbe in the people's hands.<\/p>\n
This view was developed by the French Revolution. Some
\nhistorians have even argued that the French Revolution changed
\nnot only France but also the world.<\/p>\n
The nation-state concept rejects a closed political system,
\neither one based on blood relations or on domination. Change must
\nbe possible in accordance with the people's will.<\/p>\n
In the next development there then emerged other values which
\nwere considered necessary to support the edifice of nation-
\nstates, such as equality before the law, human rights,
\nrepresentative participation and sustainable development. Such
\nprinciples became guidance for the work of some forms of
\norganization.<\/p>\n
Both kinds of rationality, formal and substantive, are
\nvehicles that shape identity, status and legitimation of a
\nnation's life. There are sanctions, from stigmatization to
\neconomic embargo, imposed upon governments and nations which have
\na bad status.<\/p>\n
In the past, sanctions were mostly imposed by foreign
\ngovernments. But now people's linkages across nationalities have
\nplayed an important role in shaping responses to \"bad\" national
\ngovernments. There has already emerged what is called \"market
\ndictatorship\" in which investors can easily leave out a country
\nconsidered as having violated market ethics. All are served by
\nthe expansion of information technology, like international
\ntelevision networks and the Internet.<\/p>\n
Even though every nation is expected to observe the
\ninternational framework of organization and to promote its
\nsubstantive values, still there are forms of fragmented
\nrationality in many nations.<\/p>\n
Internationally recognized organizations such as government
\nministries and banks often violate their original organizational
\nprinciples. Many government bodies establish hidden arrangements
\nthat, in effect, divert public resources. Many banks lend money
\non the basis of personal connections, not on that of economic
\npotential. Universities produce graduates that do not match with
\nsociety's needs.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, during the Soeharto era, several times violated
\ninternational principles in economy and civil domains. Its
\n\"national car\" program, highly criticized by the World Trade
\nOrganization (WTO), its deviation from agreements with the IMF
\nand grave human rights violations in East Timor and other areas
\nare among outstanding examples that have tarnished its image as a
\nreliable state actor. The Indonesian government then often viewed
\nforeign criticisms as intervention in its internal authority. Its
\nleaders forgot that any kind of relationship needs structures.<\/p>\n
In this era of reform, the situation seems to be getting worse
\nday by day. It is certainly not because people put new demands on
\nthe state apparatus but because of the government's stubborn
\nattempts to maintain the status quo.<\/p>\n
Since the mass rioting in the middle of May, an image that
\nthere is no order in this \"newly poor country\" has begun to
\ndevelop among foreigners.<\/p>\n
Formerly, Indonesia was known as a country where \"order\" was
\nthe buzzword in politics and patronage was a decisive way in
\neconomics. But now, the government is incapable of maintaining
\norder and managing the economy. Economic activities, especially
\nthose among different nations, are established by contracts and
\ntrust but who is going to maintain their contracts if very basic
\nsecurity is a luxury nowadays?<\/p>\n
Indonesia's image is also badly tarnished by various violent
\nactions that have not been resolved. They, like things left
\nbehind by train passengers, are lost from sight but they still
\nexist in reality. Some events were so extremely violent that the
\nworld can hardly understand them. Indonesia has now become
\nnotorious as a country with terribly low standards of humanity, a
\ncountry that is once again struggling to establish the basic
\nnecessities of a modern nation.<\/p>\n
As other nations are celebrating the close of the century with
\nvarious kinds of cultural and intellectual activities, the
\nIndonesian people are facing unchartered waters for their future.
\nCrisis after crisis develops.<\/p>\n
Some groups in society seem to have realized the potential
\ndanger facing this nation: Once the social order breaks down,
\nthere will be little hope of restoring the economy.<\/p>\n
Indonesia may be left out from the political and economic
\nagenda of other nations. Some foreign development agencies have
\nbeen thinking of cutting their involvement in Indonesia,
\nconsidering this country to be highly problematic. Maybe people
\ncan say that it does not really matter as Indonesia can develop
\nits own resources. However, this is a very unrealistic choice.
\nThis country has embedded its life in the world economy.<\/p>\n
Therefore, there is no other way than adjusting its
\norganizational framework or values to international structures.
\nTo do so, there are some basic problems that must be solved.<\/p>\n
* Indonesians must establish functional relationships between
\nthe state and society. In the past, the relationship between the
\ntwo were characterized by dominance of the state and dependency
\nof society. The problem now is to build an authoritative and yet
\nfully representative state.<\/p>\n
* They must develop a framework of citizenship in the sense
\nthat society acknowledges the rights and responsibility of
\ncollective life.<\/p>\n
* They must determine national identity -- becoming a nation
\nthat only consumes ideas and goods, but one ready to be realistic
\nand work hard.<\/p>\n
* They must solve the problems of double transition --
\ndemocratic transition amid international demands to open the
\neconomy.<\/p>\n
Surely, there is no easy way. Relative prosperity before the
\ncrisis has mesmerized people into not paying attention to the
\nnational identity and to the questions of where this nation might
\ngo.<\/p>\n
Indonesians, for example, forgot that behind the supermarkets
\nand luxurious buildings, their international achievements were
\nscant. They also forgot that foreign investors came because they
\nsold labor and natural resources cheaply, not because of good
\nservices and skills.<\/p>\n
Some forms of formal rationality in the world may not be good
\nfor Indonesia. But Indonesian people can adopt some substantive
\nrationality, such as universal human rights, sustainable
\ndevelopment and equality in order to adjust themselves to
\ninternational requirements. They are mostly full of goodwill. The
\ngood principles are treated as guidance in the development of
\nmechanisms and methods for managing society.<\/p>\n
The writer is a teaching staffer at the University of
\nIndonesia's Department of Sociology.<\/p>",
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