{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1235398,
        "msgid": "fiscal-sustainability-how-sustainable-will-it-be-1447893297",
        "date": "2002-12-26 00:00:00",
        "title": "Fiscal sustainability: How sustainable will it be?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Fiscal sustainability: How sustainable will it be? Muhammad Chatib Basri Looking at the prospects of the world economy in 2003 is like looking at a silhouette. You can see the big picture, but you cannot tell the details. In the big picture we can see that while there are continuing indications that a global recovery is well underway, the details show that the economic recovery is likely to be weaker than anticipated.",
        "content": "<p>Fiscal sustainability: How sustainable will it be?<\/p>\n<p>Muhammad Chatib Basri<\/p>\n<p>Looking at the prospects of the world economy in 2003 is like <br>\nlooking at a silhouette. You can see the big picture, but you <br>\ncannot tell the details. In the big picture we can see that while <br>\nthere are continuing indications that a global recovery is well <br>\nunderway, the details show that the economic recovery is likely <br>\nto be weaker than anticipated.<\/p>\n<p>The pace of recovery in the United States is now expected to <br>\nbe slower than earlier. In Europe projections have also been <br>\nreduced somewhat with domestic demand likely to pick up more <br>\nslowly than previously expected. In Japan, domestic demand <br>\nremains weak.<\/p>\n<p>The direct effects of the slow world economic recovery will <br>\nobviously affect Indonesia through trade. In addition, it is <br>\nlikely the growth of the Indonesian economy in 2003 will be <br>\naffected by the Bali blast.<\/p>\n<p>In this situation, growth will be very much dependent on two <br>\nmajor components: private consumption and the government budget. <br>\nPrivate consumption will very much depend on the government's <br>\nability to keep the inflation rate down. At the same time, any <br>\nhope of growth can only be expected to come about if the <br>\ngovernment allocates the budget to sectors that have high <br>\nmultiplier effects.<\/p>\n<p>Our economic simulation shows that increase in government <br>\ninvestment by 10 percent can increase economic growth by 0.4 <br>\npercent to 0.5 percent.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, as pointed out by Ikhsan from The Economy and <br>\nSocial Research Institute at the School of Economy, University of <br>\nIndonesia (LPEM-FEUI), the cost of poverty alleviation has <br>\nincreased five times compared to the pre-crisis era. In a <br>\nsituation in which the government budget is dominated by <br>\nrepayment of domestic and foreign debts, it is difficult to <br>\nexpect there will be budget expansion that can stimulate the <br>\ndomestic economy and alleviate poverty. As a result, a fiscal <br>\nadjustment program will be needed.<\/p>\n<p>There are three scenarios for fiscal adjustment. First, if <br>\nthere is no increase in government expenditure. Under this <br>\nscenario, fiscal deficit and financing gap problems will <br>\nobviously be overcome. Albeit, this scenario is not consistent <br>\nwith the economic recovery as we cannot expect economic stimulus <br>\nfrom this scenario.<\/p>\n<p>Second, if there is a significant increase in government <br>\nexpenditure. This scenario will obviously match the demand for <br>\neconomic recovery. However, it will create a larger financing gap <br>\nand keep the debt ratio to GDP relatively high. Although it fits <br>\nwell with the economic stimulus, this scenario will harm the <br>\nsustainability of the government budget.<\/p>\n<p>Third, under this scenario, the government is expected to <br>\nimprove macroeconomic stability and make some adjustments in both <br>\nrevenue and government expenditures. This scenario requires a <br>\nwell targeted subsidy, tax reform, debt restructuring and <br>\nprivatization.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, there is some improvement in the debt ratio. The <br>\nratio of government debt to GDP in mid 2002 has been cut to 72 <br>\npercent from an earlier 106 percent in 2000 and 91 percent in <br>\n2001. This is an outcome of prudential macroeconomic policies and <br>\nsuccessful government external debt rescheduling in the Paris <br>\nClub III meeting last April. In fact, the government is now <br>\ntrying to obtain loans of more than US$1 billion from the World <br>\nBank (high case scenario).<\/p>\n<p>However, in order to obtain this, Indonesia is required to <br>\nimplement the economic reform program.<\/p>\n<p>On the domestic debt front, the government plans to have a <br>\ndomestic debt re-profiling that applies to fixed rate recap <br>\nbonds. The plan will put in effect recap bonds maturing in 2004 <br>\nheld by main recap banks. For recap banks, it is important to <br>\neventually convert the bonds to liquid assets either by direct <br>\nselling in the market or through an Asset to Bond Swap Program <br>\nwith the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Otherwise, <br>\nthe recapitalized banks would be left with a large amount of non-<br>\nliquid assets. In this case, banks not only would face a cash <br>\nflow problem but also can hardly resume their financial <br>\nintermediary function.<\/p>\n<p>Although some efforts have been done in the debt <br>\nrestructuring, the reverse is true for the case of privatization.<\/p>\n<p>The progress has been very slow. The failure of the government <br>\nto reach its privatization target in 2001 is an indication of the <br>\ngovernment's lack of resoluteness in carrying out privatization. <br>\nFortunately, the divestment of Indosat has been successful and <br>\ncan contribute around Rp 5.5 trillion to the government's <br>\nrevenue.<\/p>\n<p>In 2002 the Indonesian government has been successful to <br>\ncollect around Rp 8 trillion from privatization which is higher <br>\nthan the initial target Rp 6.5 trillion.<\/p>\n<p>Taken into account the problem of fiscal sustainability, like <br>\nit or not, the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program, which has <br>\nbeen extended until the end of 2003, will still be needed for two <br>\nreasons:<\/p>\n<p>First, the main prerequisite for an economic recovery is to <br>\nimplement government policies and discipline. Like it or not, <br>\namidst several political interests and the wildly spreading <br>\neconomic interests, the IMF's pressure is needed to remind the <br>\ngovernment of its target of economic recovery.<\/p>\n<p>Second, to fulfill the requirement of the Paris Club III <br>\nagreement that the IMF reform program is still in place. However, <br>\nthe legislature has already asked the government not to extend <br>\nthe IMF program after the end of 2003. There is a lingering <br>\nconcern of how the exit strategy will be and how far the fiscal <br>\nconsolidation program has been prepared to anticipate such <br>\ndecisions. To many people's chagrin, so far the debate on the IMF <br>\nprogram has only focused on the issue of whether we need the IMF <br>\nor not, not on the action plan to warrant that our fiscal <br>\ncondition will be sustainable in the future and thus what action <br>\nmust be made to anticipate this.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/fiscal-sustainability-how-sustainable-will-it-be-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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