First 100 days: Legal reform agenda<\/p>\n
Mas Achmad Santosa and Nenad Bago, Jakarta<\/p>\n
With elections this year over, and front-runner Susilo Bambang
\nYudhyono now a president-in-waiting, unparalleled expectations
\nare placed on the new administration to improve overall
\ngovernance -- including in judicial, prosecutorial and police
\nsectors.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, some are skeptical as it has been observed that
\nneither political parties nor presidential candidates managed to
\nproduce a comprehensive plan for legal and judicial reform.<\/p>\n
In an effort to propel governance reform forward by providing
\nthe new president with clear reform objectives and a detailed
\naction plan for their implementation, during a meeting in
\nYogyakarta on Aug. 16th, the Partnership for Governance Reform in
\nIndonesia presented to Susilo \"20 Programs for Improved
\nGovernance\". The document provided a detailed reform agenda based
\non the partnership's experience in facilitating, developing and
\nimplementing good governance practices.<\/p>\n
Learning from the experiences of post-reformasi governments,
\nIndonesia's failure to accomplish its legal reform agenda was
\ncaused by numerous factors, particularly the following five:<\/p>\n
First, a lack of leadership within the government to ensure
\ncomprehensive and continuous legal and judicial reform.<\/p>\n
Second, the failure of the government to produce a systematic
\nand comprehensive legal and judicial reform program.<\/p>\n
Third, a strong opposition to exhaustive reform within the
\ngovernment, the legislature and the judiciary.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the established practice within all three pillars of
\npower of carrying out legal and judicial reform programs through
\nelitist, ad hoc and partial changes -- naturally, this partial
\napproach failed to produce significant results.<\/p>\n
Fifth, the lack of will within the government to utilize
\nalready developed legal and judicial reform programs and concepts
\nby the National Law Commission -- which was established as an
\nadvisory body for the President.<\/p>\n
Bearing in mind these missed opportunities, it is important to
\nremind the new president to develop programs for the first 100
\ndays in office that are aimed at the restoration of public trust
\nin the rule of law.<\/p>\n
These programs should include: First, the careful selection
\nof leading public figures for a \"legal dream team\". Second, the
\ndefinition of a set of concrete actions -- a \"shock therapy\" --
\nwhich would send a clear signal to the public that the new
\ngovernment is ready to tackle corruption, and show potential
\ncorruptors that corruption activities will be vigorously
\nchallenged. Third, the enhancement of the development of an
\nexternal supervisory mechanism for the judiciary, public
\nprosecution and the police, through the establishment of
\njudicial, prosecutorial and police commissions respectfully.<\/p>\n
Ideally, the \"legal dream team\" should comprise an Attorney
\nGeneral, National Police chief and Minister of Justice who have
\nclean track records, are recognized as pro-reform minded and are
\npublicly acceptable. This \"legal dream team\", together with the
\nhead of the Corruption Eradication Commission, should perform
\n\"shock therapy\" in their institutions, proving that they are able
\nto be the front-runners of a comprehensive and serious legal and
\njudicial reform.<\/p>\n
Within the context of the \"shock therapy\", activities can be
\ntwofold: First, to ensure that all corruption-related judgments
\nawaiting execution are promptly executed, in a show of commitment
\nto combating of all forms of corruption. Second, to identify ten
\nexemplary corruption cases that should be given priority.<\/p>\n
These ten identified cases should be selected based on the
\nfollowing basic criteria: First, the amount of assets that would
\nbe returned to the State. Second, the public interest in the
\ncase. Third, the impact of the crime in question on society.<\/p>\n
Certainly, there is no lack of cases from which the ten can
\nbe selected -- presently, 72 corruption cases are being processed
\nby the Attorney General's Office, 64 corruption cases by the
\nNational Police and six large corruption cases by the Corruption
\nEradication Commission.<\/p>\n
The strengthening of the external supervision of judicial,
\nprosecutorial and police institutions -- including the
\nstrengthening of the role of the Corruption Eradication
\nCommission -- should include the following measures:<\/p>\n
First, support for the Corruption Eradication Commission via
\nthe issuance of a presidential decree, which would give the
\ncommission the authority to hire personnel and define other
\nadministrative issues that are presently slowing down its
\nperformance. In addition, the government should provide the
\ncommission with sufficient funds.<\/p>\n
Second, issuing a presidential decree on establishing a
\nselection committee for an independent judicial commission. The
\nsignificance of the establishment of a judicial commission is
\nunquestionable -- weak internal control calls for the
\nestablishment of an external control mechanism of the judges'
\nperformance. The establishment of the judicial commission's
\nselection committee must be swiftly followed by the official
\nappointment of the seven commissioners -- selected in a
\ntransparent and participative selection process.<\/p>\n
Third, instruct the Attorney General to implement the relevant
\nstrategic recommendations, included in the \"Governance Audit of
\nthe Public Prosecution Service\", as a blueprint of the Attorney
\nGeneral's Office reform which was finalized in 2001. Moreover,
\nduring his first 100 days in office, the president should take
\ninitial steps toward the establishment of a prosecutorial
\ncommission, which would improve the performance of the public
\nprosecution service (in accordance with Article 38 of the Law
\n16\/2004). One of the first steps should be the establishment of
\nan independent selection committee, which would be tasked with
\nthe selection of the commissioners.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the establishment of an independent selection
\ncommittee to select the National Police commission -- an external
\nsupervisory mechanism for police conduct.<\/p>\n
The existence of external supervisory institutions for the
\njudiciary, public prosecution and police would expedite the
\nprocess of institutional reform within those institutions, in the
\nmidst of huge public distrust toward their respective internal
\nsupervisory mechanisms.<\/p>\n
Susilo looks set to become the sixth president of Indonesia.
\nFor him, legal reform is not unknown territory -- he was one of
\nthe initiators of the law summit, facilitated by the Partnership
\nfor Governance Reform, which brought together heads of state
\nlegal institutions, leaders of the bar association and non-
\ngovernmental organizations in an effort to develop a
\ncomprehensive legal and judicial reform agenda.<\/p>\n
Moreover, Susilo also stressed the need for comprehensive
\nlegal and judicial reform during his mandate as a coordinating
\nminister for political affairs during the law summit. The single
\nmost crucial step for Susilo will be to identify and appoint
\npeople who will lead the legal and judicial reform -- the \"legal
\ndream team\".<\/p>\n
The writers are Legal and Judicial Reform Advisors in the
\nPartnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.<\/p>",
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