Finding a balance between Japan and China<\/p>\n
Makmur Keliat, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Why doesn't Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visit Beijing after he
\nvisits Tokyo?<\/p>\n
One might answer this question by saying that going to Beijing
\nwould take longer and needs much more time to produce results.
\nHowever, this argument is certainly open to debate. One can also
\nraise the following question: Why did Susilo, then, visit the
\nUnited States? The fact that it took more than 24 hours to reach
\nWashington flying from Jakarta, does not explain why the
\npresidential delegation is not making a trip to Beijing, which is
\nless than 12 hours from Tokyo.<\/p>\n
There is a need to analyze the visits Susilo makes not merely
\nby looking at what national leaders say but also by using
\ninterpretative lenses.<\/p>\n
A bilateral relationship does not exist in a regional
\npolitical vacuum; it is shaped by regional dynamics. In this
\nregard, it is noteworthy that Indonesia, Japan and China through
\nthe ASEAN+3 mechanism have been involved actively in a new
\nregional initiative, popularly known as the East Asian Community.<\/p>\n
The first signal conveyed by Susilo's visit to Tokyo is
\nactually very clear. Japan has advantages that China does not
\nhave in its bilateral relationship with Indonesia. With the
\nexception of China, Japanese naval capability remains unrivaled
\nin the Southeast and East Asia region.<\/p>\n
Irrespective of this evidence, Indonesia harbors few
\nmisgivings about Japan's intention to project its military power
\ninto the Southeast Asian region, mainly due to its special
\nrelationship with the United States. Most Indonesian strategic
\nthinkers have strong a conviction that Japan can be expected to
\nact as a balancer to neutralize China in the new strategic
\nenvironment evolving in the East and Southeast Asian region at
\nthe end of the Cold War era.<\/p>\n
In line with this strategic perception, most Indonesian
\npolicy-makers are of the opinion that Japanese economic power is
\nof great importance to transform the Indonesian economy into a
\nmodern one.<\/p>\n
As the largest aid contributor to Indonesia, Japan's Official
\nDevelopment Assistance (ODA) is vital to build infrastructure
\nprojects in this country. Closely linked with Japan's ODA policy,
\nthe country's multinational corporations through foreign direct
\ninvestment have had an important role in nurturing the Indonesian
\nmanufacturing industry. Along with the United States, Japan is
\nalso a major destination for Indonesian exports.<\/p>\n
Japan possesses other pluses that China does not have. Despite
\nthe asymmetric economic interdependency between Japan and
\nIndonesia, most Indonesians are comfortable with the Japanese.
\nThe country's philanthropic projects, disbursed through a number
\nof foundations such as the Japan and Toyota Foundations, has
\nplayed an important role in impressing Indonesians. This factor
\nseems lacking in the Sino-Indonesian bilateral relationship.<\/p>\n
In addition, Tokyo has not been patronizing when crafting its
\nbilateral relationship with Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Hence, the strategic significance of Susilo's visit to Tokyo
\nis understandable. It mainly intends to strengthen the existing
\nbilateral relationship by launching new agendas for economic and
\ntrade cooperation.<\/p>\n
But since bilateral relationships cannot be isolated from
\nregional dynamics, the visit could also convey another signal. It
\nseems both Japan and Indonesia are forging a new common response
\nto the idea of an East Asian Community.<\/p>\n
Japanese multinationals have played a significant role in the
\nmany national economies of the East Asian region by helping to
\nconnect and integrate industrialization and trade in the region.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the idea of the East Asia Community is considered
\npositive and advantageous as it would further cement Japan's
\ninfluence in the region for the benefit of all.<\/p>\n
And in the detail of how the East Asia region should be
\nintegrated, the Japanese position seems close to that of
\nIndonesia's.<\/p>\n
However, it seems necessary to point out that there could be
\nstrategic disadvantages for Indonesia if Jakarta was seen as
\nbeing too close to Tokyo. It could well send a signal to Beijing
\nthat Indonesia and Japan are quietly ganging up on China,
\nparticularly at this crucial juncture when Sino-Japanese
\nrelationship are souring.<\/p>\n
Indonesia needs to take this political sensitivity into
\nconsideration when it decides the future direction of its
\nrelationship with China.<\/p>\n
To erase such an impression, it seems there is a need for
\nSusilo to visit Beijing in the near future. Moreover, China has
\nsought to give a higher priority to establishing Free Trade Areas
\n(FTAs) with ASEAN countries rather than Japan or South Korea.<\/p>\n
Since the latter two countries are perceived as having a more
\nadvanced and competitive economies, China, it seems, believes
\nFTAs with Japan and South Korea could hurt its national economy.<\/p>\n
It is likely then, that China would also feel left out if
\nIndonesia made a commitment to realizing an FTA with Japan
\nwithout making a similar pledge to China.<\/p>\n
The writer is the executive director at the Center for East
\nAsian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS) at the University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>",
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