Fear of authoritarianism legitimate<\/p>\n
Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam<\/p>\n
They opted for ballots and promised changes; yet, the rise of
\nformer generals in the presidential election raises questions as
\nto ex-militaries' potentials to lead the nation and strengthen
\nIndonesia's incipient democracy. At issue are their associations
\nwith the New Order's methods, institutions and networks.<\/p>\n
Initiating a debate on ex-military politicians, Muslim
\nintellectual Nurcholish Madjid recently said we should make a
\ndistinction between "military" and "being militaristic". He
\npointed out that a general like Dwight D. Eisenhower became a
\ngood and democratic president, but a civilian like Adolf Hitler
\nbecame an infamous dictator.<\/p>\n
The problem is, having won World War II and the election,
\nEisenhower built a military industrial complex and started the
\nCold War by occupying Korea and the Vietnam War by sending
\nmilitary advisors. A racist like Hitler seized state power
\nthrough the Nazi party amid the 1930s crisis in a historically
\nhurt society.<\/p>\n
Since his argument rests on individuals and behavior rather
\nthan on institutions and societies, Nurcholish' proposition seems
\ninapt: Hundreds of Eisenhowers would not guarantee a stronger
\ndemocracy for Indonesia any more than hundreds of Hitlers would
\nmake Indonesian rulers fascists.<\/p>\n
However, given the country's history -- with almost two-thirds
\nof its post-independence period under authoritarian rule -- other
\nfactors could have created a fascist Indonesia. Had Soeharto's
\nrule been charismatic, populist and consistently totalitarian, it
\nwould have made his New Order regime closer to Hitler's Third
\nReich. It was not an individual, however, but an institutional
\nlegacy, that made the difference.<\/p>\n
The New Order legacy has made dubious the post-Soeharto
\ncivilian-military dichotomy. At issue is whether the politicians
\n-- be they of civilian or military origin -- will adopt the old
\nmethods if they get hold of state power. On the other hand,
\nobviously, it is the ex-militaries who can make the most of the
\nNew Order's institutional legacy, since they have inherited and
\ncould rely upon and use old networks and military institutions.<\/p>\n
If they command powerful apparatuses and self-righteously
\nbelieve in repressive measures, with a dose of chauvinism and
\nxenophobia -- incidentally, not unlike Hitler -- they could fall
\neasily into authoritarian methods and suppress civil rights. This
\nhas actually happened in Aceh, but has apparently also occurred
\nrecently when a closed meeting between some legislators and
\nintelligence head Gen. (ret) A.M. Hendropriyono resulted in a
\ndecision to expel foreign researcher Sidney Jones, blacklist
\nanother and threaten 19 other foreign and local NGOs.<\/p>\n
For the military, what matters is results, not methods.<\/p>\n
In an election, everyone knows the method, but is uncertain
\nabout the result. However, some militaries are used to applying
\nvarious -- including arbitrary -- methods, with or without the
\nthreat of violence. The military is more likely to do so than
\ncivilians, as they hold the privilege of a legitimate monopoly in
\na Weberian sense -- of violence as a means to serve the state. It
\nlogically follows that the military must remain politically
\nneutral.<\/p>\n
In Indonesia, however, the military has always been a
\npolitical force, even though it has never been monolithic. It
\nclaims an "extra" legitimacy based on its inception during the
\nindependence movement and invokes the doctrine of People's
\nDefense, or Hankamrata, which, 58 years on, still justifies its
\npowerful structure of territorial command -- all the way down to
\nremote hamlets across the archipelago.<\/p>\n
While a "normal" democracy takes a neutral military for
\ngranted, the Indonesian Military (TNI) commander has to
\nrepeatedly urge its members to remain politically neutral in the
\nnational elections -- as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto did in April.<\/p>\n
Since these anomalous institutions became rooted firmly during
\nthe New Order, they will not simply fade away. Likewise, even if
\nthey are retired, this does not mean ex-generals are divorced
\nfrom their corps. Once immersed in their doctrines, they are
\nlikely to carry the social capital they may need for material and
\nideological resources, which may include key political, corporate
\nand financial connections, in addition to comradeships formed at
\nwar or military academies and personal networks within and
\noutside security apparatuses. Territorial connections also serve
\nas infrastructure to mobilize support, militia or other forces.<\/p>\n
All these are assets the ex-generals may or may not use -- but
\nagainst which no civilian politician can possibly compete.<\/p>\n
One observer, Indro Tjahjono, noted that Gen. (ret) Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono has a great advantage over Gen. (ret) Wiranto,
\nsince his last job as the top security minister enabled him to
\nexpand his network internationally and, more importantly,
\nthroughout various sectors and regions at home. These early
\n"campaigns" made him popular in Washington, Aceh and Poso, and
\nalso explains his rapidly rising star.<\/p>\n
Wiranto, obviously, will challenge this by using the wide
\nnetwork of Golkar Party interests -- another legacy left by the
\nNew Order -- which Susilo also did via Golkar running mate Jusuf
\nKalla. Meanwhile, both will also use personal friends and friends
\nof friends among retired and active officers. Clearly, the former
\ngenerals are able to attract and reach the greater public by
\nrelying upon considerable support from institutions and
\nmechanisms of both Golkar and the military.<\/p>\n
As a consequence, a serious row recently occurred within the
\nTNI over whom the PEPABRI, or Veterans Association, a grouping of
\nretired generals highly respected as sesepuh -- wise elders --
\nand known to be staunch supporters of military supremacy, should
\ndirect its support. It finally urged TNI members and their
\nfamilies to vote only for presidential candidates of TNI origin
\ndespite Endriartono's calls for neutrality.<\/p>\n
For all its claims of reform and professionalism, the TNI,
\nwith all its tentacles, has created a political discrepancy
\nvis-a-vis political parties and civil society. No legitimacy
\nexists for this to perpetuate under a "normal" democracy --
\nsomething Indonesians have hoped for and aspired to since the
\ndownfall of Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist of Radio Netherlands. This article
\nis personal views.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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